The emergence of Islamic feminisms in South Africa in the 1990s by Jeenah, Na'eem
  
from the cover of the brochure of the MYM Gender Desk 
“A degree above…”
The Emergence of Islamic Feminisms
in South Africa in the 1990s
Naeem Jeenah
“A degree above…”
The Emergence of Islamic Feminisms
in South Africa in the 1990s
Naeem Jeenah
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts (Religious Studies), Faculty of Arts,
University of the Witwatersrand
Johannesburg
June 2001
Declaration
I declare that the contents of this Research Report are original except where
duly  referenced.  This  Report  has  not  been  submitted  previously  for  any
degree to any academic institution.
_____________
Naeem Jeenah
for
soraya bosch
and
shamima shaikh
may the equality and justice that they desired be theirs always
and may they be surrounded by fragrance and light forever
Acknowledgements
To Paul Germond for being a teacher, a critical supervisor and a friend, for 
having confidence in me and for encouraging me to have as much confidence 
in myself.
To all in the Religious Studies post-graduate class of 2000 for making it a 
pleasant, stimulating and challenging year.
To all those who trusted me enough to financially assist me through my 
Masters degree and with this research.
To all family, friends, neighbours and comrades that tolerated my using this 
Research Report as an excuse for not doing other things and for doing things 
for me when they believed my excuse.
To Minhāj and Shir‘a for helping me to do my homework even though they 
believed I was too old to be a student.
To Shamima for inspiring me for more than a decade, and then continuing to 
inspire me even after.
And thanks to The All-Knowing and The Provider for being at my side 
through a year (and a life) of uncertainty.
wallahu ‘alam
And God knows best
Contents
Chapter One
Introduction 1
Chapter Two
Different Strokes for Different Folks
A Survey of Islamic Feminisms in South Africa in the 1990s 7
Chapter Three
Re-reading and Re-thinking
International Islamic Feminist Thought and the South African Link 60
Chapter Four
Re-Acting
The Impact of the National Liberation Struggle 84
Chapter Five
Phambili Makhosikazi
The Potential for the Future 102
Appendix A
Statement by the 23rd Street mosque Women’s Jamaah 129
Appendix B
In Defence of a Positive Image of Islam: The Issue of Women’s Voices 131
List of Interviews 133
Bibliography 134
Abstract
This Research Report is an investigation of the rise of Islamic Feminisms in South Africa. I argue 
that:
1. with its roots in developments within the Muslim community in the 1980s, Islamic 
Feminisms in South Africa flourished from 1990 to 1998.
2. the emergence of Islamic feminisms in South Africa was based on particular readings of 
Islamic scripture. The process of rereading these scriptures was assisted by a developing 
international trend towards the reinterpretation of Islamic scriptures from a contextual 
perspective and specifically the reinterpretation of the Qur’ān and Sunnāh from a feminist 
perspective.
3. the development of political Islam in South Africa in the 1980s and its interaction with the 
national liberation struggle was an important factor in the rise of Islamic feminisms.
I will narrate and analyse this history in terms of the development of several key organisations and 
moments: the Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa and its Gender Desk, the Call of Islam, 
women’s attempts to claim space in the mosques, Muslim Personal Law, Muslim media, the matter 
of Radio Islam and the funeral of feminist Shamima Shaikh. It is within this history and its broader 
context of struggle in South Africa that I propose two types of Islamic feminist thought having 
emerged: activist feminist thought and academic feminist thought. I will analyse these two 
tendencies and show how the comparative rise of the latter affected the manifestations of Islamic 
feminisms in the late 1990s.
The high point of Islamic feminisms in South Africa, I show, was in 1997-1998. I argue that the lull
in feminist activity from 1998 to 2000 was caused by several reasons, one of which was the 
increased academicisation of Islamic feminisms in South Africa.
Finally, I lay out and discuss some of the challenges facing Islamic feminists in South Africa for the
future. These challenges, if met and addressed, I argue, could result in the re-emergence of Islamic 
feminisms in South Africa. I thus propose ways in which the Islamic feminist agenda in South 
Africa can be revived and strengthened.
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Chapter One Introduction 
 
Verily, for all men and women who have surrendered themselves 
unto God, and all believing men and believing women, and all truly 
devout men and truly devout women, and all men and women who 
are true to their word, and all men and women who are patient in 
adversity, and all men and women who humble themselves [before 
God], and all men and women who give in charity, and all self-
denying men and self-denying women, and all men and women who 
are mindful of their chastity, and all men and women who 
remember God unceasingly: for them has God readied forgiveness 
of sins and a mighty reward. 
(Qur’ān, 33:35) 
 
 
Muslims have lived in South Africa for over 300 years. The Muslim community is diverse, a 
diversity which is manifested through differences in race, ethnicity, language, class, politics and 
jurisprudential schools. Such diversity has often created differences and conflict within the 
community. Women have been located within this diversity and have generally developed their 
identities around the above factors. Despite the important community roles women have played, it 
has been only in the past three decades that the gender roles and the gendered identities as defined 
by the Muslim community have been seriously questioned, particularly on the basis of Islamic 
scriptures. Such re-evaluation about the position and role of women within Islam came to a head in 
the 1990s with the emergence of feminist tendencies that premised themselves on Islam. This brief 
period then – the decade of the 1990s – is the focus of this Research Report. 
 
As with most communities, the attitudes towards women and gender roles vary within South 
Africa’s Muslim community. On the one extreme there is a significant misogynist tendency 
paralleling the most conservative Taliban-type
1
 Muslim discourse on issues relating to women. On 
the other extreme there have been emerging feminist tendencies. The latter have become prominent 
and vocal particularly in the last two decades of the 20
th
 century and have coincided with the 
increased involvement of Muslims in the struggle against apartheid. Indeed, apartheid and the anti-
apartheid struggle, I will argue, provided the backdrop for the emergence of Islamic feminisms in 
South Africa. Generally, the human rights culture and the emphasis on justice and equality that 
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came to the fore during and through the anti-apartheid struggle had a logical consequence in the 
struggle for a non-sexist society. Islamic activists found themselves re-interpreting Islamic 
scriptures in the cause of an anti-apartheid and anti-capitalist struggle. Such re-interpretation later 
impacted on the discourse of women’s rights as well. However, the development of Islamic 
feminisms in the 1990s did not occur in isolation of initiatives by Muslim women in the past few 
decades to assert themselves and gain a greater role for themselves in Muslim society. These 
women often found allies in men who also argued that Muslim women had greater roles to play in 
society than traditionally understood. 
 
But what is Islamic feminism and who is an Islamic feminist? And what are the manifestations of 
this kind of feminism in South Africa? These are among the questions that this Research Report 
seeks to explore. In the process of exploring these questions, however, I will sometimes impose the 
label ‘feminist’ on people that would not – at least publicly – call themselves feminists. Despite 
Margot Badran’s warning that ‘[i]t is important to be attentive to the identities individuals claim for 
themselves and not to impose unwanted feminist identity labels on persons,’2 I will apply the label 
on people that I regard as feminist and who possibly avoid it for various reasons that I will discuss 
in Chapter Three. Such application will, however, be based on a definition – within the South 
African context – of ‘Islamic feminism’ and ‘Islamic feminist’ that I will propose. 
 
I will argue in this Research Report that Islamic feminisms exist within South African Islamic 
discourses and I will show that the emergence of these feminisms in South Africa was based on the 
following factors: 
 
1. particular types of readings of Islamic scripture. The process of rereading these scriptures 
was assisted by a developing international trend towards the reinterpretation of Islamic 
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scriptures from a contextual perspective and, specifically, the reinterpretation of the Qur’ān 
and Sunnāh from a feminist perspective. 
2. the development of political Islam in South Africa in the 1980s and its interaction with the 
national liberation struggle. 
 
In order to achieve these aims, I will propose a definition of Islamic feminism in terms of the praxis 
of Muslim women’s rights activists throughout the world. I will argue that a liberatory reading of 
Islamic scripture – the Qur’ān and  ad th – has been the main impetus for a feminist discourse 
within Islam and will discuss how South African Muslim activists have chosen to read these 
scriptures from a liberatory perspective in developing Islamic feminisms. 
 
An important element of my hypothesis regarding the emergence of Islamic feminisms in South 
Africa is that these were developed within the crucible of the anti-apartheid struggle among Islamic 
activists who attempted to develop a broad Islamic understanding of justice and could not allow 
themselves to ignore gender justice as part of that understanding. The anti-apartheid jihād3 with its 
emphasis on justice and a human rights discourse was, I will argue, an important factor contributing 
to the gender jihād. 
 
While there has recently been increasing amounts of material written on progressive understandings 
of women in Islam, not much has been written on the development of Islamic feminisms in South 
Africa and how contextual forces have shaped them. Indeed, not much has been written on Muslim 
women’s activism in South Africa in general over the past few decades. This study will contribute 
to an understanding of Islamic feminisms in South Africa, to the theoretical and ideological 
perspectives informing some of such feminisms, to the role of the new democratic order in 
influencing them and to an appreciation of the organisations and individuals involved in this 
movement. 
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Furthermore, gender studies have – over the past few decades – come to the forefront in the study of 
religion and the social sciences more generally. Among various religious traditions there is 
increasing amount of research being done in reviewing the role of women in the religions and 
attempting to reinterpret religious scripture from feminist perspectives. And, more broadly, gender 
has become a crucial benchmark in the framing of social dynamics. No reasonable examination of 
any society can afford to omit a gender perspective. As far as the South African Muslim community 
is concerned, there is very little scholarship that looks at it as the subject of an examination that uses 
gender as a basis. This Research Report will contribute to the understanding of the influence of 
Islam in South Africa in that arena. 
 
I involve myself in this research not as an outsider but as a participant-observer. I have been 
involved in the Islamic Movement
4
 in South Africa since 1980 and thus have first-hand experience 
with the national liberation struggle and the phenomena of Islamic feminisms as their seeds 
germinated through the 1980s and as they emerged in the 1990s. These kinds of involvement 
obviously assist in shaping my understanding of the topic and my passion for the issues discussed. 
Further, being a participant-observer, I cannot allow this Research Report to be simply descriptive-
analytical. While the analysis is obviously based on my own perspectives of the issues at stake, I 
also provide suggestions for ways in which Islamic feminisms in South Africa may be helped to 
develop. Having stated my ideological position, I should also state, however, that I am male. I 
believe that however much a person might be committed to the struggles of oppressed peoples, if 
one is not of the oppressed group one can never completely identify with and appreciate those 
struggles. This is as relevant for anti-racist and anti-capitalist struggles as they are for the gender 
struggle.
5
 Of course, with an anti-capitalist struggle, a working-class sympathiser has the option of 
‘class suicide’. There is, however, no such thing as gender or race suicide. My views in this Report, 
therefore, are obviously coloured by my gender. 
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I have divided this Research Report into five chapters. This ‘Introduction’ is the first chapter. 
Chapter Two is a lengthy Chapter wherein I will look at and analyse the different strands of Islamic 
feminism in South Africa, their development in the 1990s and their roots in the 1980s. I divide the 
decade of the 1990s in this Chapter as well as the rest of this Research Report into two phases: 1990 
to 1998 when Islamic feminisms where on the rise and 1998 to 2000 when the phenomenon 
declined. In Chapters Three and Four I address the question: ‘How did we get here?’ by examining 
the two main factors contributing to the emergence of Islamic feminisms in South Africa in the 
1990s: liberatory ways of interpreting Islamic scripture (Chapter Three), and the national liberation 
struggle (Chapter Four). Chapter Three also examines the term ‘Islamic Feminism’, proposes a 
definition for it and discusses its place within South African Muslim discourses. Chapter Five looks 
at the future of Islamic Feminisms in South Africa. This Chapter is based on the analysis in the 
earlier chapters. It concludes this Research Report by proposing ways in which the Islamic feminist 
project in South Africa might be strengthened. 
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1
 The Taliban is the ruling military power in Afghanistan. They have some of the most conservative and 
fundamentalist notions about various aspects of Islam. One of their excesses for which they have achieved 
notoriety is their treatment of women. They have been responsible for preventing girls from attaining an 
education, forcing extremely repressive dress codes on women and forcing women out of employment. 
2
 Margot Badran, “Feminisms and Islamisms”, Journal of Women’s History, Vol. 10 No.4 (Winter), 1999, 
200. 
3
 The Arabic word jihād means a struggle or a striving for a particular cause. 
4
 The term ‘Islamic Movement’ carries very special meanings in South Africa. It developed out of the 
Islamic resurgence movements in the Middle East and the Indo-Pak subcontinent. It was a term that was 
imported into South Africa by the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM) in the 1970s (see Islamic Training 
Programme Manual, Durban: Muslim Youth Movement, 1981, 8-94 and Halqa Manual, Muslim Youth 
Movement, undated but from the early 1980s, 21H1-21H6). ‘Islamic Movement in South Africa’ was loosely 
interpreted as referring to those Muslims that believed in a ‘comprehensive understanding of Islam’. In the 
1980s it became a contested term as organisations apart from the MYM laid claim to it as well. The 
definition then changed to accommodate that contestation. It became ‘those Muslim individuals and 
organisations that have a comprehensive understanding of Islam and are part of the anti-apartheid struggle’ 
(Shuaib Manjra, Islamic Movement in South Africa, unpublished talk delivered at numerous MYM camps). 
Thus the definition of the Islamic Movement was broadened to include those organisations that formed the 
‘three strands’ (Farid Esack, “Three Islamic Strands in the South African struggle for Justice”, Third World 
Quarterly, 10(2), 473-498) of Muslim anti-apartheid activity in South Africa. I will use ‘Islamic Movement’ 
with this latter definition. 
5
 I should, however, express my agreement with Maryam Rajavi when she asks, ‘In a society where women 
are second-class citizens, deprived of their genuine rights how can any man claim to be free and not suspect 
his own humanity? [...] Are men not in bondage too?’ Quoted in Farid Esack, “Islam and Gender Justice: 
Beyond Simplistic Apologia” in (eds.) John C. Raines and Daniel C. Maguire, What Men Owe to Women: 
Men’s Voices from World Religions, New York: Suny Press, 2001, 189. 
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Chapter Two Different Strokes 
 for Different Folks 
 A SURVEY OF ISLAMIC FEMINISMS IN SOUTH AFRICA IN THE 1990S 
Introduction 
The Islamic feminist agenda and activism around it in South Africa have been extremely weak 
between 1998 and 2001. This after most of the decade of the 1990s had seen many of the peaks of 
Islamic feminist activity and Islamic feminist discourses. Nevertheless, there exist a range of 
feminisms in the Muslim community in ways that might often not be clearly visible or identifiable. 
Many of these might not even want to consider themselves feminist. 
 
The past decade has seen the rise of different strands of Islamic feminism in South Africa. I will 
look at some of these in this Chapter. For most of this Research Report I will use a working 
definition of feminism as used by Ziba Mir-Hosseini. She understands feminism as being ‘a general 
concern with women’s issues; an awareness that women suffer discrimination at work, in the home 
and in society because of their gender; and action aimed at improving their lives and changing the 
situation’.1 Apart from the feminist activities and thought that fall within this definition, there are 
also other forms of self-assertion by women in the public domain that I will not be discussing in this 
Chapter. While I would not consider these expressions as necessarily feminist, they are important 
indicators of the kind of impact that the Islamic feminist discourse has had on the Muslim 
community. It must be noted here that there are also many Muslim women that are feminists but 
whose basis for their feminism is not premised on Islam. These I refer to as ‘secular feminists’.2 
This is a group whose activities and contributions fall outside of the scope of this Research Report. 
 
This Chapter will focus on the most overt expressions of the attempts at the emancipation of women 
within the Muslim community. My objective here is not to focus on individuals but rather on 
discourses, flash point events and organisations. I will particularly use as examples the Muslim 
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Youth Movement of South Africa (and its Gender Desk), the Call of Islam and Muslim academics – 
most of whom were, at some stage, associated with one or other of the above organisations. While 
using these organisations as examples, I will also examine certain events, institutions and debates as 
contributing to the general state of Islamic feminisms in South Africa in the 1990s. These include 
the Muslim Personal Law Board; the Claremont Main Road Mosque in Cape Town; a short-lived 
but unique Muslim prayer congregation in Mayfair, Johannesburg; the monthly community 
newspaper Al-Qalam, the Muslim community radio station in Johannesburg, The Voice; the matter 
of the conservative Radio Islam and the funeral of an Islamic feminist. 
 
I will begin these discussions with a review of the way in which gender is perceived in certain 
sectors of the Muslim community. I do not here intend to cover all the Muslim positions around the 
issue of gender but only those positions espoused by people who argue for some kind of women’s 
public assertion. 
 
How equal is equal? 
The question regarding the equality of women and men is one that will result in many different 
answers if asked to a group of Muslims. Muslims generally would not want to give the impression 
that they believe that women and men are not equal in status. However, an objective examination of 
Muslim discourses about women will reveal a range of positions. Without unduly simplifying the 
issue, one can say that there are three broad positions on this question – internationally as well in 
South Africa. On the one extreme there are those that argue that women are inherently inferior to 
men; secondly, there are those who argue that women and men are not equal but that they are 
‘complementary’ to each other; and on the other extreme there are those who argue for complete 
gender equality. (I refer here to the theoretical positions held by people and groups. Whether their 
practice is consistent with the theory is another matter.) 
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As I pointed out, the division of the women discourse in Islam into these three categories is not 
unique to South Africa. Mir-Hosseini’s analysis of the debate around gender in Iranian society 
shows the parallels of these categories in that society and those discourses. She describes the 
categories as: ‘gender inequality’ (of ‘the traditionalists’), ‘gender balance’ (of the ‘neo-
traditionalists’) and ‘gender equality’ (of ‘the modernists’).3 I prefer not to use the labels 
(traditionalist, neo-traditionalist and modernist)
4
 but accept her nomenclature for the three positions 
(gender inequality, gender balance and gender equality) as being representative of the South African 
Muslim scenario as well. Her methodology and criteria in dividing the discourse is also one that I 
find useful for the South African context. 
 
The rest of this section will focus on the latter two of the above three positions – gender balance and 
gender equality. However, before proceeding, a few points need to be made regarding the first – 
gender inequality. 
 
It is certain conservative sections of the South frican uslim community that hold the position 
that Islam clearly promotes a regime of gender inequality. These notions are argued on the basis of 
certain  erses from the  ur’ n, some a  d th and statements by uslim scholars. The following are 
some of (the interpretations of) such quotations: 
Women shall have rights similar to the rights against them, according to what is equitable; 
but men ha e a degree o er them ( ur’ n 2:228). 
 en are in charge of women ( ur’ n 4:34). 
I have not seen anyone more deficient in intelligence and religion than you  women  
( ad th).5 
And stay quietly in your houses, and make not a dazzling display, like that of the former 
times of ignorance ( ur’ n 33:33). 
 
This position also includes in its discourse its perspective of the inherent nature of women. 
According to this perspective, women have been created defective in intelligence and in religion; 
women are gossip-mongers; women are untrustworthy; women are concerned mainly with their 
own adornment.
6
 These perspecti es on women’s nature ob iously influence their positions in 
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terms of the roles that women should or may have within Muslim society. I will return to re-
examine the kind of quotes above from the  ur’ n and  ad th from a feminist perspecti e in 
Chapter Three. For now, it is sufficient to note that such a position does exist in the South African 
discourse about women in Islam. 
 
Having briefly discussed the first position I will now discuss the two other positions – beginning 
with the one that espouses gender equality as being most consistent with Islam. 
 
Equal is Equal – Gender Equality 
Despite what might be regarded as androcentric sacred texts and despite majority Islamic scholarly 
opinion suggesting that Islam’s perspecti e is not one of gender equality, there is a strong position 
within Islamic discourses arguing that women and men are indeed equal. This is not an argument 
unique to South Africa; there are female and male scholars around the world who argue this 
perspective. In general, the exponents of this position are mainly Muslims in the West – though not 
necessarily born in the West. For many, their attempt has been to engage the West and to engage 
with modernity in developing a contextual understanding of Islam. To a large extent, those in the 
Muslim world who argued for gender equality generally did so from a secular rather than an Islamic 
perspective. Recently, however, there is increasing evidence of Islamic gender equality discourses 
having taken root in parts of the Muslim world as well. Iran is a good example of this kind of 
discourse. 
 
The South African Muslim gender equality lobby only really engaged in a confident discourse on its 
position in the early 1990s. Although the Call of Islam said in 1984 that it belie ed in ‘the equality 
of men and women and in the liberation of the Muslim woman from legacies pertaining to the 
period of uslim decline’,7 it did not explain what its ‘equality and freedom’ meant. Nor did it 
provide any objective criteria for understanding equality and inequality. This is not surprising 
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considering that the organisation was not too concerned about careful – especially written – debates 
but more concerned about ‘doing’.8 The Call’s position was, howe er, the most progressive position 
at the time. In the 1990s, however, the confidence of the Muslim gender equality activists increased 
to the extent that they were willing to openly argue for their positions and were willing to engage in 
scriptural debates around these positions. (The factors that assisted in the development of these 
strong and unambiguous positions will be dealt with in the next two chapters.) 
 
Thus in 1993 the uslim Youth o ement could establish a ‘Gender Desk’ and in 1994 the Gender 
Desk’s National Coordinator, Shamima Shaikh, could propose to the organisation’s National 
Executi e a ‘Gender Equality Campaign’.9 Throughout the 1990s the term ‘gender equality’ was 
extensively and unapologetically used. Esack says that the objective for Islamic feminists today is 
an uncompromising gender equality.
10
 While his earlier arguments have been that the seeds for 
gender equality do exist in Islamic scripture, of late he expounds a  iew that the  ur’ n itself is a 
patriarchal text – almost suggesting that gender equality within Islam must be attained despite rather 
than because of the  ur’ n.11 
 
 nother 1990s women’s rights acti ist, Sa’diyya Shaikh, also alludes to the new ‘equality’ 
discourses when she writes about that period: ‘Gender equality thus became an intrinsic part of the 
agenda for an Islamic struggle and earlier understandings of gender and women’s rights were 
subjected to interrogation and critique.’12 
 
Having discussed the two extreme positions in South African Muslim discourse regarding the 
position of women in Islam – that of gender inequality and that of gender equality – I will now turn 
to a discussion of the third and middle position – gender balance. 
 
 12 
Equal is not really Equal – Gender balance 
The middle position between gender inequality and gender equality is one of gender balance. This 
position is not misogynistic like the first one. Indeed, many of the women who strongly hold this 
position are active in the community, in the economy and in society generally. However, they argue 
that men and women have been created in complementarity rather than equality. Mir-Hosseini’s 
summary of this middle position in Iranian society mirrors that in South Africa: 
They are intent on finding an Islamic solution to the pressing issues of gender but, although 
they seek new interpretations of the shari’a, they dismiss equality in rights and duties as a 
Western concept with no place in Islam.
13
 
 
Those holding this position include a range of people. Many of them argue for the right of women 
to participate in Muslim public life, to work, to be educated, etc. However, for them, women and 
men have their respective places in society. Men are undoubtedly heads of households while 
women are the nurturers of children. These understandings are also based on the understanding of 
inherent differences between the genders. 
 
This group includes many women and women’s organisations in ol ed with welfare and 
propagation work. Organisations like the Women’s Cultural Group are  ery acti e in the uslim 
community in a range of activities that see women engaging in the public domain. Yet, their 
position on the relation of the genders is that women and men and complementary to each other 
rather than being equal. The Group’s Zuleikha ayat14 makes it clear that, for Muslim women, 
looking after the family is the priority. The same view is echoed by Fatema Hoosen,
15
 an early 
MYM female member and currently involved with a few organisations involved with social 
welfare. 
 
Before concluding this brief description of the position of ‘gender balance’ it is necessary to state 
that this position was also held until the late 1980s within the MYM. In this period, then, the Call of 
Islam was the only Muslim organisation using the equality rhetoric. Abdul Rashied Omar, then 
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president of the MYM, spoke as late as 1989 about ‘the full humanity and equi alence of women’.16 
‘Equi alence’ was the codeword for complementarity, as opposed to equality. Interestingly, he 
based his statement on his reading of the works of Mernissi, Riffat Hassan, Aziza al-Hibri and 
Nawal El Saadawi, all of whom argue strongly for gender equality. This was the period in the 
 Y  when the women’s rights discourse was taking front stage. 
 
A Decade of Gender Jihād 
In this section I will focus on some of the more overt expressions of Islamic feminism that have 
manifested themselves in South Africa in the 1990s. The focus here will not be on individual 
feminists but on organisations, significant moments and discourses. The organisations and moments 
I will discuss are: the Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa (and its Gender Desk), the Call of 
Islam, the Muslim Personal Law Board, the Claremont Main Road Mosque in Cape Town, the 
Mayfair prayer congregation, the newspaper al-Qalam, Muslim community radio station The Voice, 
the matter of Radio Islam’s pre enting women’s  oices on air and the funeral of Islamic feminist 
Shamima Shaikh. 
 
Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa and MYM Gender Desk 
The Muslim Youth Movement was established in 1970 in Durban, and since its inception had dealt 
with some elements of what could be part of a women’s agenda. These elements included in iting 
foreign women guests for speaking tours; establishing a Women’s Council; campaigning for women 
to be allowed spaces in mosques and attempting to form a ‘Women’s Islamic o ement’. The 
‘women in mosques’ campaign attracted the most  itriolic response from the ‘ulam .17 The MYM 
campaigned for mosques to provide some facilities where Muslim women could pray. Most 
mosques in South  frica’s northern pro inces ha e no such facilities. Abdulkader Tayob18 shows 
that in that period – the 1970s – the Y  argued for a ‘parallel de elopment’ of women within 
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society, implying that women and men should have separate spheres within which they operated. 
The ‘Women’s Islamic o ement’ was an attempt to entrench this separation. Such separation was 
also evident at most major MYM programmes until the mid-1980s. 
 
The MYM saw itself as part of an international Islamic resurgence movement and one of the tasks it 
set itself from the beginning was to bring to South Africa a range of international guest speakers to 
help develop its revivalist agenda. Many of these had some association with the Ikhwanul 
Muslimoon (Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt. Tayob presents an excellent analysis of the movement 
from its formation until 1990 and covers the various different phases it went through. As with other 
international Islamic resurgence movements at the time, the involvement of women in Muslim life 
was important for the Y . The mo ement’s insistence on the public involvement of women was 
one of the main reasons for it earning the ire of the conser ati e ‘ulam . For the ‘ulam , the 
 Y ’s call for women to be accommodated in the mosques – especially in the provinces of Natal 
and Transvaal – and its ‘mixed gatherings’ – conventions, youth camps and other programmes 
where men and women participated together even though segregated – were a deviancy from the 
Islam that they had been promoting. The Y ’s positions on these issues also ser ed as a 
challenge to the hegemony that the ‘ulam  held in terms of religious knowledge because the 
movement had to interpret Islam in different ways in order to justify its more women-friendly 
positions. Such reinterpretation flew in the face of the ‘ulam  who argued that only they had the 
right to interpret and explain Islam. 
 
Thus MYM members were labelled non-belie ers and hypocrites from the organisation’s earliest 
attempts – in the 1970s – to provide more public space for women.19 Indeed, its views on women 
was one of the pillars of its denunciation by the ‘ulam .20 I must point out, however, that the MYM 
was not the first organisation to fight for women’s public space nor was it the first organisation to 
be attacked by the ‘ulam  for this.  nother example is the Women’s Cultural Group, formed in 
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1954. Although focussing mainly on cultural activities and activities that are stereotyped as being 
women’s work and although not confronting the ‘ulam , the Group still managed to attract the 
anger of the conservative clergy.
21
 However, the MYM was more dangerous because it was the first 
national organisation to raise these issues, it made the issue of uslim women’s public 
participation an Islamic issue and, being led by men, could not as easily be dismissed or controlled 
by the ‘ulam . 
 
Having said this, however, it must be noted that the understanding of the reasons within the MYM 
of the involvement of women in public life was not uniform. On the one hand, Jadwat talks of 
women ‘being there’ in the Y  ‘from the beginning’ – mainly the wives of those who formed the 
organisation – and of their roles in various MYM activities. This includes their travelling around the 
country (only women) with female guest speakers in the 1970s. His account gives the impression of 
assertive women who confidently took their place in the organisation.
22
 Also, the fifth guiding 
principle of the Y  in the 1970s stated that ‘ uslim women  were  an integral part of the whole 
programme’ of the mo ement and that unity of the uslim community could not be achie ed 
without the active participation of women.
23
 On the other hand, we note that the articulation of the 
public role of women was a male articulation that was sometimes quite condescending. A good 
example is one of the motivations for wanting to get women to mosques: they were deprived of 
Islamic knowledge because their li es ‘pi ot around cinema, pop music, fashion-shopping, cheap 
love-story books, gossip’.24 Thus, the ‘discourse on the liberation of women in the first decade 
within the Y  had an ambiguous tenor’.25 
 
It must be noted here that the issue of women’s rights has been for many years the interface of the 
different discourses between conservatives and Islamists/modernists/progressives. Tayob explains 
how the Y ’s campaign to get women into mosques and its ‘mixed gatherings’ of women and 
men drew the ire of the ‘ulam .26 Women’s participation was an issue that neither side was willing 
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to compromise on. Yet, as with most such battles, both sides did compromise. Jadwat
27
 points out 
that in the circles of the ultra-conservative international Tabligh Jamaat, South Africa is unique 
because of its women’s programmes. These are weekly programmes organised for only women 
where Tabligh Jamaat books are read by women to each other. Usually the passages to be read are 
selected by the male members in the locality. Of late there have also been parallel programmes to 
the all-male ijtimas that the Tabligh Jamaat organises. The ijtimas attract thousands of Muslim 
males. The new trend has women having a parallel programme – usually at homes. This means that 
women often travel between cities (with male family members).
28
 According to Jadwat,
29
 this trend 
has been a direct result of the pressure on Muslim society in South Africa from groups like the 
MYM to involve women in Islamic activities. 
 
On the other hand, the Y  also responded to the pressure to cease their ‘mixed gatherings’. In the 
1970s and 1980s MYM national programmes sometimes resulted in tension between the more 
liberal (on the issue of female-male interaction) Cape contingent and the Transvaal and Natal 
contingents which were concerned about the conservative backlash. Such concern from the 
Transvaal and Natal members often resulted in an ambiguous response to the participation of 
women, a response which varied between regions and changed at different times. For example, the 
 Y ’s annual national Islamic Tarbiyyah Programme (ITP) in 1980 had women and men praying 
the same space, with women at the back. During the ITP in 1986, on the other hand, women and 
men were separated by an elaborate curtain which could be fully closed during prayers and partially 
opened during lectures. The MYM rallies (in the early 1980s) which attracted more than 1 000 
youth living together over a five-day period were also characterised by elaborate arrangements of 
hundreds of metres of sacking that provided a complete separation between women and men – 
whether in lecture venues or in the open field which connected these venues with the eating or 
sleeping quarters. All of these very creative devices were to prevent the organisation being attacked 
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by the conservatives. However, the MYM had resigned itself to a life in a separate sphere from the 
‘ulam  and this resignation protected it from greater capitulation. 
 
While in the 1970s the main ‘women’s issues’ that the Y  focussed on were mosque access for 
women and participation of women in Islamic activities like lectures and its own programmes like 
conventions and camps, in the 1980s that focus changed somewhat. The decade of the 1980s saw 
women entering the organisation on their own rather than as wives of male activists. Most of these 
were university and high school students. Many of them, like their male counterparts, occupied a 
hazy organisational space between the MYM and – what had by now become its student wing – the 
Muslim Students Association (MSA).
30
 The MSA was the more radical of the two organisations and 
the more politically acti e. Women’s participation in Islamic acti ities became less of an issue as 
the students were more relaxed on this issue and had a natural interaction between the genders at 
educational institutions. S  programmes were also not segregated like the Y ’s.  s the Y  
and MSA got more involved in political activity, women also automatically formed part of marches, 
demonstrations and protests. Thus, while in the 1970s the MYM tried to convince the Muslim 
community of the need for women to be in the mosques and lecture halls, in the 1980s it was 
drawing women into the streets as well. 
 
The latter part of the 1980s saw other issues around women making their appearance in the Y ’s 
discourse. The issues the organisation began grappling with included uslim women’s leadership 
in the community (including within its own structures) and – most significantly – the notion that 
Islamic scriptures should be reread in a contextual manner that revealed more women-friendly 
interpretations. This latter process was spearheaded in the organisation’s Western Cape region by 
then Deputy President of the MYM – Maulana Ebrahim Moosa.31 Indeed, both the women’s 
leadership and the contextualisation of scriptures issues became prominent with the accession to 
national leadership of Abdul Rashied Omar (as president) and Ebrahim Moosa (as National 
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Director).
32
 With their ideas of the contextualisation of scripture, they began a new phase in the 
history of the organisation. Increased political acti ity, interfaith relations and women’s rights 
became among the most important issues on the Y ’s agenda.33 
 
Moosa organised regular workshops with selected activists to reread the  ur’ n’s  erses on women. 
Suddenly, the organisation whose female activists had begun a new fashion trend in schools and 
universities early in the 80s with their insistence on wearing headscarves (at great personal cost) 
began asking whether headcoverings were even a requirement in Islam. This development was not 
an even one throughout the organisation. Most of this new thinking was happening in the Western 
Cape with only a handful of activists from other parts of the country attempting to keep abreast. 
Others were  ery uncertain about the new language of ‘contextualisation’ and ‘hermeneutics’. I 
remember that at the mo ement’s annual national Islamic Training Programme in December 1988 
there was acrimony even between female activists from the Western Cape on the headscarf issue as 
– for the first time – women without regulation headcoverings were chairing sessions and speaking. 
 
 s much as inno ati e readings of the  ur’ n made many Y  acti ists uncomfortable, the issue 
of women’s leadership also posed a dilemma for the MYM. While the MSA had elected two 
women to its National Executive in 1984,
34
 the MYM elected a woman to its National Executive 
only six years later, in 1990. Fatima Noordien became the first woman to become a member of the 
 Y ’s National Executive when the 1990 General Assembly decided to include regional 
chairpersons on the National Executive.
35
 Noordien had just been elected Western Cape regional 
chairperson. This followed about four years of debate about the level of leadership that women 
could occupy according to Islam. Noordien was very much part of this debate, arguing on the basis 
of the  ur’ n that women should be able to play leadership roles.36 Women’s oath of allegiance to 
the Prophet meant their full participation in the politics of the time, she argued. She based her 
argument on 60:12: 
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O Prophet! When believing women come to thee to take the oath of fealty to you, that they 
will not associate in worship any other thing whatever with Allah, that they will not steal, 
that they will not commit adultery (or fornication), that they will not kill their children, that 
they will not utter slander, intentionally forging falsehood, and that they will not disobey 
you in any just matter – then do you receive their fealty, and pray to Allah for forgiveness 
(of their sins): for Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful. 
 
 ccording to Firdouza Waggie, Noordien’s election was part of a larger ‘questioning of women’s 
roles’.37 
 
In 1990 the Y  launched its ‘Women’s Rights Campaign’. It was one of a package of changes 
that the organisation made at the 1990 General Assembly. Other changes included changing the 
membership structure of the organisation from its pre iously ‘cadre-based’ to a new ‘open-
membership’ structure. New regions were added and a decision was taken to focus the recruitment 
drive of the organisation in African areas. Its activities were separated into three areas: organising, 
education and campaigns. The women’s rights campaign was one of three campaigns the mo ement 
decided on.
38
 This GA also saw the election of the first African president of the MYM – Shaikh 
Tahir Sitoto. Sitoto belie es there’s a definite link between his election, the entry of  frican 
members into the organisation and the rise of feminism in the movement: 
At that General Assembly Africans were a handful. I think women members threw their 
votes behind us. Menfolk in the MYM were dead against electing an African president. The 
women’s  oice in the Y  made a big difference in terms of people influencing the 
leadership structures in the organisation. During that particular time a discourse developed 
that to make the Islamic movement relevant you must have African leadership and to make 
it rele ant it also had to focus on the women’s agenda. Thus  fricanising went hand in hand 
with gender issues.
39
 
 
 
According to Sitoto, African members in the organisation were not necessarily more gender 
sensiti e, but ‘the cultural background was much more relaxed and liberal when it came to 
interaction.’ For him the toyi-toyi culture embraced by the MYM was an example of such cultural 
influence. ‘There was no way you could ha e a toyi-toyi for the men and a [separate] toyi-toyi for 
the women.’40 
 
 20 
The two projects of ‘ fricanisation’ and the women’s rights campaign were to change the Y  
forever. ‘The problem of emancipating women,’ noted a Women’s Rights Campaign brochure, ‘is 
to change the o erall relationship between male and female.’41 The brochure lists as one of its 
objecti es: ‘To examine the  arious  erses in the  ur’an that contain “both the potential for 
oppression and liberation” of women and look at exploiting the latter.’ It lists 14 issues ‘in which 
women are unjustly treated’, including ‘women in mosques’, ‘ uslim personal law’ and ‘women’s 
leadership’. 
 
For the next three years, however, the campaign did not have a national character but was taken up 
in an ad-hoc manner and unevenly in the different regions. One of the strong manifestations of the 
campaign was in Trans aal where the focus became women’s access to mosques. Howe er, unlike 
in the past when the MYM contented itself with speaking and writing pamphlets about the issue, 
MYM women now decided on a more confrontational approach. Just before the Muslim month of 
Ramadan in 1993, MYM women activists anonymously printed and distributed pamphlets calling 
on women to attend the Tarāwīh prayer daily at the 23rd Street Mosque in Fietas, Johannesburg. 
Women’s defiance of the mosque committee and the committee’s almost  iolent responses to it 
drew much media attention – especially for the leader of the campaign, Shamima Shaikh, a rising 
star in the Y . The action was the main impetus for the Y ’s General  ssembly deciding later 
that year to form the MYM Gender Desk with Shaikh as its national coordinator. 
 
The mission statement of the Gender Desk said: 
Committed to the Islamic values of justice, freedom and equality, the MYM Gender Desk 
focuses on gender issues in order to transform society and affirm people’s humanity through 
education, campaigns and the empowerment of women.
42
 
 
The mission statement illustrated a shift in the thinking of the MYM. It did not speak of women or 
women’s rights but rather of ‘gender issues’. Further, its objecti es were clear: ‘to transform society 
and affirm people’s humanity’ (note, again, the deliberate omission of ‘women’ in fa our of 
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‘people’s humanity’. Howe er, key to the agenda of the Desk was also a transformation of the 
mo ement itself. Waggie says that following oosa’s classes and the women’s leadership debates 
upto 1990, women realised that they had been marginalized in the MYM. The Gender Desk, she 
says, was one response to such marginalisation.
43
 
 
The Gender Desk was represented on the National Executive of the organisation by its National 
Coordinator and became an effective structure promoting gender equality and the agenda of Islamic 
feminism within the organisation and the Muslim community as a whole. Yet the Desk never 
claimed for itself the title ‘feminist’. The first time that Shaikh publicly applied the label ‘feminist’ 
to herself was at an MYM training programme in 1997, three weeks before her death.
44
 Female and 
male members of the organisation from all over the country identified with the agenda of the Desk 
and its  arious campaigns. These included the attempt to get uslim women ‘equal access’ to 
 uslim institutions and the campaign for a ‘Just uslim Personal Law’. The Gender Desk also 
supported the idea of a national federation of Muslim women in South Africa and the development 
of ‘networks with local and international, uslim and other, women’s organisations’ – even those 
without the same feminist agenda – and publicity and lobbying for uslim women’s rights.45 
 
Crucial to these activities was an education programme and, particularly, the distribution to gender 
desk coordinators and MYM activists of publications explicating its Islamic feminist agenda. While 
Moosa had made some international Islamic feminist material available to MYM women 
previously, this was limited to a small group in the Western Cape. Now a broader range of members 
– even in remote rural areas – were recei ing Gender Desk ‘Education Packs’ on a range of issues. 
The packs contained readings by scholars like Amina Wadud, Fatima Mernissi, Fazlur Rahman as 
well articles by local gender equality activists. Issues dealt with in these readings included abortion, 
modernist interpretations of women in Islam and Muslim Personal Law. The Desk also organised a 
number of workshops on issues related to women and Islam. These were targeted not only at MYM 
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members but also at women and women’s organisations – an attempt by the Gender Desk to allow a 
broader range of women to take ownership of gender equality agenda. 
 
Another important development was the Gender Desk Divorce Support Group in Cape Town. This 
was one of the initiatives that the Gender Desk pointed to as one of its practical community 
outreach activities as compared to its educational, propaganda and lobbying activities. Through the 
group, divorced Muslim women and women with marital problems received emotional as well 
ideological support. The group served upto 30 women at a time.
46
 For Shamima Shaikh, the divorce 
support group – which began in 1996 and still exists – was an integration of the strategies of 
presenting the  ur’ n as a ‘source of empowerment for women’ and of providing immediate relief 
to those women who were victims of the lack of that empowerment.
47
 
 
Lest the abo e paints too rosy a picture of the Y ’s mo e towards feminism, it must be noted 
that the passage of these structures and campaigns in the organisation were not always smooth. 
Shaikh repeatedly complained about how marginalized she felt whenever she – as National Gender 
Desk coordinator – presented proposals to the organisation’s national executi e meetings. The 
proposals, she said, were never engaged with; they would simply be adopted. Waggie was even 
more critical. She also mentioned the ‘silence from the men’ as regards the Desk and its work. The 
Gender Desk, she said was ‘too ambitious; the Y  wasn’t ready for it’.48 (I will deal with more 
of these criticisms in Chapter Five when I look at the role of men in the Islamic feminist project.) 
 
I have shown that the Muslim Youth Movement has been active in attempting to provide more 
space for women within the Muslim community since its formation in 1970. These attempts have 
often had an ambiguous tenor with regional differences and  igorous criticism by the ‘ulam  
affecting how forcefully the organisation was willing to take up women’s issues. The women’s 
issues that the organisation dealt with also changed from the 1970s to the 1980s as women became 
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more active in the organisation and acquired leadership positions from the late 1980s. The 1990s 
saw a feminist discourse emerging within the Y  with its ‘Women’s Rights Campaign’ and the 
formation of the MYM Gender Desk. 
 
I now turn to the other organisation that played an important role in the emergence of Islamic 
feminisms in the 1990s – the Call of Islam. 
 
Call of Islam 
Despite holding some of the most progressive Muslim positions on women in the 1980s, the 
involvement of the Call of Islam in the Islamic feminist arena in the 1990s was extremely limited. 
Indeed, its ideological and strategic positions around the issue of women actually became less 
progressive. It is important, however, to review some of the positions and activities – related to 
issues of women – of the Call in the 1980s and examine how these affected the rise of Islamic 
feminisms in the 1990s. 
 
In 1983, ‘a small group of dissidents who refused to se er their links with the UDF’49 broke away 
from the MYM-MSA to form a group called Muslims Against Oppression. Within a year, it 
changed its name to ‘Call of Islam’ and became an organisation rather than the loose grouping of 
people it had been. Esack, Ebrahim Rasool, Adli Jacobs and Shamiel Manie left the MYM when 
they did not succeed in convincing it and the MSA to affiliate to the ANC-aligned United 
Democratic Front (UDF). From 1984 until the late 1980s the Call captured the forefront in the 
articulation of women’s rights among uslim groups. One of its ‘badges’ in the uslim and 
activist community in the Western Cape was its position on gender equality.
50
 An early Call 
brochure had ‘On Women’ as the first point under the heading ‘What is our line’ and said: 
We believe in the equality of men and women and in the liberation of the Muslim woman 
from legacies pertaining to the period of Muslim decline. We believe that our country will 
never be free until its women are also free from oppressive social norms.
51
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The four male founders of the Call ensured that they maintained control over the organisation for 
much of its life – even when it moved beyond just the Western Cape where it was started.52 Esack 
was national coordinator until his acrimonious departure from the organisation in 1989.
53
 
Thereafter, Rasool took over as coordinator. Especially in the early years, the organisation 
functioned like a typical vanguardist organisation with a tightly-controlled small membership core 
and secrecy but drawing in people from beyond its ranks to be involved in its campaigns. A person 
could not simply become a member of the organisation but was recruited. The recruitment included 
an interview which determined whether the person was acceptable membership material.
54
 In many 
ways, this method of working was adopted from the MYM. The Call managed, however, to pull 
together hundreds of Muslim activists – beyond its membership – to support its activities. 
 
One of the Call’s strong positions was its insistence that uslims needed to work with the 
oppressed from other religious communities in the struggle against apartheid. ‘It … broke new 
ground in South  frica,’ said Esack, ‘with its unambiguous embracing of Christians and Jews as 
“brothers and sisters” and “belie ers”.’55 The Call affiliated to the South African chapter of the 
World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP) soon after the WCRP was launched by Bishop 
Desmond Tutu in 1983. The Call was often attacked within the Muslim community for working 
with people of other faiths but it finally managed to make inter-faith relations more acceptable 
among Muslims. In 1987 it managed to also draw the MYM into this agenda.
56
 The Call’s inter-
faith focus, together with the attention it gave in its publication – Call of Islam – to women and the 
environment made it a very different organisation to any other in the country. 
 
However, its main focus was political activity and most of its work was subordinated to its political 
agenda. While initially the organisation held internal training programmes – especially halaqāt 
(study groups) similar to the MYM model, as the organisation grew it became consumed by the 
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political struggle – prosecuted from within the UDF. The effect of this will be dealt with in more 
detail in Chapter Four. Because of the manner in which it operated and its specific political focus, 
the Call was not forced to engage in the same internal struggles as the MYM did. It never really had 
an African membership and thus the internal balancing act of integrating people of different races 
into one organisation was not a challenge for it. Even when it expanded into the Transvaal province, 
the organisation operated as two organisations – one in the Western Cape and one in Transvaal57 – 
and therefore did not face the trauma of regional integration. 
 
Gender interaction within the organisation was very free and at a public level the Call attempted to 
force mixing between women and men. It deliberately appointed women marshals for marches and 
funerals and ensured that its activists mixed with members of the opposite gender in public 
meetings. Internally, men and women met together, prayed together and had mixed halaqāt. The 
issue of women’s leadership was an issue of debate only at the  ery beginning of its organisational 
life,
58
 about four years before it began to be debated in the MYM. Within a short period the issue 
was resolved – at least among the four founders – and there was then a move to put women into 
leadership positions within the organisation. 
 
Women became leaders of the halaqāt, but many were reluctant to take on more involved 
leadership roles. Adli Jacobs mentions Masthura Sadan who was active in the Call from the 
beginning and was a key person in promoting the involvement of women. She, however, was 
‘reluctant’ to take up a leadership position within the organisation despite her confident and acti e 
involvement in activities and structures outside the Muslim community. Many activist Call women 
had a general sense of confidence but ‘as soon as they stepped into’ the Call ‘a shyness descended’, 
said Jacobs.
59
 The organisation even attempted to force women into leadership positions but, as 
Jacobs said, ‘What was the point of eight men forcing three women to lead it’.  n attempt was then 
made to recruit women with leadership potential. In 1987 Rosieda Shabodien was accepted as a 
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member and was quickly appointed an ‘ameera’.60 The rapidity of her appointment, however, was 
the cause of some unhappiness among other members.
61
 Ne ertheless, by 1989 the Call’s 12-person 
executive consisted of seven women.
62
 Despite this, however, Esack said that the organisation did 
not have any women leaders and that it was always controlled by the four founding members.
63
 The 
implication seems to be that even though women were ameeras, they – together with the other 
ameers – actually functioned in a second-tier leadership capacity, the first tier being occupied by the 
(male) founder members. 
 
 part from a  ery successful ‘Women’s Week’ of acti ities in 1989, the Call did not organise 
acti ities especially focussing on women.  ccording to Jacobs, this was because the Call’s strategy 
was to mainstream certain issues into other aspects of its work. Hence its policy of having women 
chair meetings, being marshals, etc was supposed to serve the purpose of conscientising the Muslim 
community about the role women should play. This strategy of not being too upfront with the 
debates around women’s issues also, howe er, protected the Call from ha ing to defend and protect 
its ideological positions on women in a practical day-to-day manner. Thus the feminist agenda 
slowly slipped from the Call’s bigger agenda.  nd the heightened le els of anti-apartheid activity in 
the late 1980s meant that Call activists were drawn into national political issues with little time for 
internal (Muslim) issues. 
 
There were two other reasons for women’s issues becoming less important to the Call. Firstly, in its 
efforts to draw in the ‘ulam  into the liberation struggle, the Call was willing to compromise on 
some of its positions that were unpalatable to Islamic conser atism. One of these was women’s 
equality. I showed earlier how the Muslim conservatives responded to the gender mixing of the 
MYM and how the MYM responded to the attacks against it for its attempts at greater involvement 
of Muslim women in community activities. As with the MYM, the Call was not immune from such 
attacks and was also often forced to respond to maintain its legitimacy. When the Call was just a 
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Western Cape organisation, the need to be concerned about such criticism was not as great because 
of the more liberal attitude in the Cape to gender mixing. However, when the Call began recruiting 
members in Transvaal – around 1986 – and began to flirt with the ‘ulam  – particularly the Muslim 
Judicial Council (MJC) – in the Cape, its practical expressions of its position on women began to be 
diluted. An example was a play staged by the Call of Islam, which raised many controversial issues 
in the Muslim community – including the role of women.64 The play received very negative 
responses from the MJC and the Call decided to tone down some parts of it. 
 
Unlike the MYM, the Call was keen to develop relationships with the ‘ulam  fraternity to be able to 
draw them into the anti-apartheid struggle. Nationally, the ‘ulam  controlled the main 
communication medium in the Muslim community – the Friday mosque pulpit. The Call recognised 
that this could become an effective tool for mobilising the Muslim community for the struggle. 
Furthermore, the symbolism of ha ing ‘ulam  supporting a cause could be extremely useful to an 
organisation. With the Call having clergy like Esack and Imam Hassan Solomons in its leadership, 
it was easier for it (than for the MYM) to develop relationships with the MJC and to pull the MJC 
into the UDF. This relationship then also allowed the Call greater access to the mosques. 
Furthermore, the Call always argued that as an activist organisation it needed to use a policy of 
tadrij (gradualism) and to ‘take the community from where it is’.65 This in itself meant being 
cautious about how it articulated women’s issues.  lso, the Call’s position was that 
the ‘ulam  was a reflection of our community;  ery much part of our community. They 
articulated the more conservative positions in the community. The relationship between us 
and the ‘ulam  was mutual respect, disdain and awe.66 
 
Such a relationship persisted e en though, as Jacobs said, ‘The ‘ulam  is a mistress you don’t want 
to tell anyone else about.’67 And the relationship meant that the Call had to be cautious about what 
it said and did. In Jacobs’ words: 
There was guardedness but not because they were the ‘ulam . If they were to oppose us it 
would defeat the purpose of being an organisation. This guardedness did influence how we 
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interacted and put forward the issue of women. When we read ‘‘ulam ’ we read ‘the 
community’.68 
 
But such relationships had their own compromises – for both sides. One of those compromises for 
the Call was a toning-down of its women’s agenda from the late-1980s. 
 
The second issue that resulted in the Call being less  ociferous about women’s issues was its 
political role. This was so in the 1980s, but more so in the 1990s. In the 1980s everything had to 
form part of a strategy for an anti-apartheid struggle. Even though Call members, especially Esack, 
were  ociferous on public platforms about women’s in ol ement, most agendas had to be 
subservient to the political one. 
 
From 1989 the Call went through an extremely turbulent period. Esack left the organisation;
69
 the 
organisation was plagued by internal dissension on a range of issues; halaqāt disintegrated; ‘’89 
was a period we couldn’t cope with’.70 This was followed by a period during which the Call 
focussed on only two issues: the internal dissension and the dynamics of the UDF having to 
transform itself to become part of the ANC. Both of these were extremely trying for the Call. The 
Call’s  ery existence seemed to depend on the UDF, whose acti ists were lea ing and whose 
funding had dried up. 
 
Nevertheless, the 1990s saw exciting political activity in South Africa. Political organisations like 
the African National Congress were unbanned; Nelson Mandela was released from prison after 27 
years; negotiations between the broad anti-apartheid movement and the apartheid government 
began and required the vigilance of all role-players. Esack details some of the turbulence within the 
Call and the role played by the organisation in such a scenario.
71
 The negotiations were also to lead 
to South  frica’s first democratic elections.  nd the Call most definitely had a role to play in this 
process to ensure a clear and unambiguous election victory for the ANC – especially within the 
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Muslim community. From its heyday in the mid-1980s, the Call had, by now, become a weakened 
organisation. Its feminist agenda seemed to be a thing of the past – except in intention. 
 
Soon after the formation of the MYM Gender Desk in 1993, the Call of Islam had one of its few 
national meetings. The meeting was called as an attempt by the extremely weakened Call to 
visualise a role for itself beyond the 1994 democratic election. The meeting took resolutions 
regarding areas that it would like to work in (apart from campaigning for the ANC). Two of these 
were on ‘women’s empowerment’ and uslim Personal Law. The women’s empowerment 
resolution was because ‘it is in line with e erything we stand for’, said Call spokesperson Naweed 
Hassan.
72
 According to Hassan, the meeting had set up a task group to investigate how the Call 
should conduct the campaign. The task group ne er met and the campaign died at the meeting. ‘We 
realised there was some unfinished business in the Muslim community, some that we had put on the 
agenda… It was a resolution but we didn’t ha e the wherewithal to make it real. Nothing 
happened,’ said Jacobs. The only real in ol ement of the Call in the Islamic feminist agenda in the 
1990s related to the Muslim Personal Law Board. 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that, in many ways, it was the Call of Islam in the 1980s that 
sowed the seeds for the emergence of Islamic feminisms in the 1990s. I ha e shown that the Call’s 
emphasis on the issue of women in Islam began from the time it established itself. It also very 
quickly pro ided a range of spaces for women’s acti ism within and without the organisation. By 
1990, howe er, the Call’s focus on women’s issues decreased drastically as the organisation began 
fighting for its own survival. Also, its deference to the ‘ulam  and its focus on political acti ity 
forced the issue of women’s equality to the margins. The Call’s in ol ement in the 1990s, then, was 
limited. 
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The MYM and the Call were the two main organisations with a feminist outlook and attempting to 
prosecute an Islamic feminist struggle in South Africa. I will now look at a few events and moments 
that played an important role in the Islamic feminist struggle in South Africa. The first of these that 
I examine is the issue of women and mosques. 
 
Women and Mosques 
I have reviewed above how the MYM took on a campaign to secure space within mosques for 
Muslim women soon after it began its activities. It was a campaign that the organisation never 
dropped. However, in the 1990s, the campaign took a new turn and it is this new angle to the 
women’s access to mosque issue that I will co er in this section. I will discuss this with reference to 
three events: the 23
rd
 Street Mosque Tarāwih incident in 1993, the Claremont Main Road Mosque 
woman’s sermon incident in 1994 and a small gender-equal congregation in Johannesburg in 1995-
1996. 
 
While the MYM was confronted with a great deal of vilification for its attempts to secure space in 
mosques for women; for most Muslims in the Western Cape this was a campaign that they could 
not identify with. The reason was that the majority of mosques in the Western Cape had provided 
women with facilities in mosques for many decades – even centuries. Muslims in the Western Cape 
– who make up about 50 percent of South  frica’s uslim population – are mainly of Malay origin 
with a culture of more relaxed mixing of the sexes. The Muslims in the Northern provinces – what 
used to be Natal and Transvaal in apartheid South Africa – are mainly of Indian origin with a more 
restricted culture of gender interaction. Thus the battle for women to be able to pray in mosques was 
very much a Northern battle. The 23
rd
 Street Mosque incident was the beginning of a new way for 
the MYM to view the issue, one which would have national implications. 
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The 23
rd
 Street Mosque is situated in what used to be Fietas – just west of the Johannesburg city 
centre – from where a multi-racial community had been removed and relocated by the apartheid 
government in the 1960s. While houses and businesses had been demolished to make way for a 
White settlement, the two mosques in the area – which is now called Pageview – remained standing. 
These were the 15
th
 and the 23
rd
 Street mosques. The control of the 23
rd
 Street Mosque changed 
hands many times as committees found difficulty in filling the mosque whose congregants had been 
moved to about 30 kilometres away and which had no Muslim community living around it. Early in 
the 1990s, the mosque committee came under the majority control of erstwhile members of the 
MYM. They attempted to make some changes to the mosque culture in line with past MYM 
policies. These included the (unsuccessful) attempts to have khutbāhs (sermons) delivered in 
English rather than in Arabic; the introduction of a range of different speakers rather than just 
clergy and the appointment of an African imam. The mosque became the closest thing to an 
‘alternati e’ mosque in Johannesburg. It was not surprising, therefore, that some MYM members 
wanted to exploit this space in other ways as well. The month of Ramadan in 1993 was witness to 
one of these attempts. 
 
Ramadan is characterised by an additional daily prayer: the Tarāwīh prayer, which follows the late 
night ‘Isha prayer. While it is not necessary for Tarāwīh to be prayed in congregation, it is 
traditional to do so, especially since most mosques use the Tarāwīh to complete an entire recitation 
of the  ur’ n. In the Northern pro inces, women had been largely excluded from the 
congregational Tarāwīh prayers because no facilities were provided for them. In Johannesburg, 
women that wanted to attend the prayer would go to one of the ‘ alay’ mosques in Bosmont, 
Newclare or Riverlea which did provide some facilities for women. 
 
In the Ramadan of 1993 some MYM women – led by Shamima Shaikh – decided to claim their 
space in the mosque of their locality, Johannesburg’s ‘alternati e’ 23rd Street mosque. Just before 
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the beginning of Ramadan, they distributed pamphlets calling on women to attend the Tarāwīh at 
the Mosque. Although some members of the mosque committee initially reacted with anger, 
threatening to evict the women, the former MYM members on the committee tacitly supported the 
move. However, lines were sharply drawn on the 27
th
 night – the night that attracts the largest 
Tarāwīh congregation. The mosque committee decided for that night to put up a marquee behind 
the mosque to accommodate the women who had, upto this point, prayed on the mezzanine level of 
the mosque. About 200 women came for Tarāwīh that night. When they arrived they were 
redirected to the marquee to allow the additional men to occupy the mezzanine level. The 
committee was unanimous about this decision. Shaikh and a small group of women nevertheless 
attempted to pray as they had done before but were forced out.
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The next night this group of defiant women issued a pamphlet
74
 which raised more issues that just 
that of their ill-treatment the night before. The pamphlet claimed the mosque space for the women 
by the simple fact of their ha ing prayed there. It also berated the ‘preferential treatment’ that men 
who had not prayed there for the rest of the month had received. And the pamphlet demanded: 
It is about time that our community, especially the men, begins educating itself about issues 
that are crucial to our lives and survival as a community. Women and children are not 
second-class citizens to be denied access to mosques, to be hushed up whenever we begin 
talking, and to be shunted around at the whims of men.
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The issue received a great deal of media attention beyond the Muslim community. 
 
While this incident was one which Western Cape Muslims could not relate to – even members of 
the MYM – the pamphlet hints at further limits that needed to be transgressed, demands that women 
all o er the country would be able to resonate with.  nd that’s what the Y  Gender Desk 
decided to do when it was formed later that year. It altered its language to call not for ‘space in 
mosques’ for uslim women but to demand ‘equal access to mosques’. Shaikh claimed that this 
expression was introduced into Muslim discourse by the Gender Desk.
76
 ‘Equal access’ implied that 
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women and men should share the main space in the mosque rather than women being relegated to a 
separate space. And another mosque, this time in Cape Town, was to show the way in this regard. 
 
The ‘equal access’ demand became a reality at the Claremont ain Rd osque in Cape Town in 
1994. Islamic scholar and author, Professor Amina Wadud, visited South Africa in August of that 
year, four months after South  frica’s first democratic election. She had been in ited to speak at a 
conference on ‘Islam and Ci il Society’ organised by the Islamic Studies Department at Unisa. 
Besides her national speaking tour she also delivered a Friday pre-sermon lecture at the Claremont 
Main Rd Mosque. This was the first time in South Africa that a woman had delivered the Friday 
talk.
77
. The Friday ritual is divided into two important parts: the prayer and a khutbāh (sermon) 
preceding it. Many Muslims regard the khutbāh as a dhikr (remembrance of God) and hence argue 
that it must be in Arabic. Mosques which accept this position generally have a pre-khutbāh lecture 
in a local language. The Claremont Main Rd Mosque usually has its khutbāhs in English. On this 
day, however, the mosque – not willing to transgress too much – introduced the pre-khutbāh lecture 
to allow Wadud to speak without having her delivering the actual khutbāh. 
 
The Claremont ain Rd osque had already made many efforts to increase women’s in ol ement 
in the mosque: women had spoken at the mosque on occasions other than the Friday prayer 
(although this was usually from the upstairs women’s section); there were women on the mosque 
committee and the mosque had a separate women’s committee. Wadud’s lecture sparked an 
international controversy and in Cape Town there were violent responses. Wadud was subsequently 
prevented from speaking at another engagement at the Masjidul Quds in Gatesville (another Cape 
Town suburb),
78
 and six months later the Main Rd Mosque was picketed by members of the Muslim 
Judicial Council who physically prevented congregants from entering the mosque for its Annual 
General Meeting. Some congregants complained that they had been physically and verbally 
abused.
79
 After Wadud returned to the US and news of her lecture had spread internationally, there 
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was a campaign to force the university where she taught – the Virginia Commonwealth University – 
to dismiss her.
80
 And British newspaper, Q-News, lamented that: 
The South African Muslim community, which took on the Qadianis, and won; took on 
Rushdie and had both him and his lousy book banned;
81
 and is generally regarded as being 
one of the wealthiest, strongest and most stable in the world,
82
 has been rocked by – a 
woman!
83
 
 
What was surprising about the article was that Q-News is generally an enlightened, progressive-
leaning paper. But this act of Wadud and the Claremont Main Rd Mosque was too much to tolerate. 
The article went on to link Wadud’s lecture and the fact that she was in ited to the Unisa 
conference as part of an international conspiracy: 
Predictions that South  frica’s uslims would be targeted by secularists, and the 
modernists in their pay, were made a couple of years ago following a meeting of Islamic 
scholars in Makkah. The West, they believed, simply could not afford to let a Muslim 
community thrive in Southern Africa, especially once the bastions of apartheid had been 
demolished.
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Allied to the fact that a woman delivered the lecture was an associated very important issue that did 
not escape the attention of the Claremont ain Rd osque’s detractors. Pre iously, women had 
prayed at the mosque in an upstairs gallery section. On this day, the women ‘came down, sat in 
space normally reserved for men, separated by a piece of rope, and ne er went back again’.85 It was 
no surprise that the MYM put its full weight – physically and in terms of its newspaper and its 
writers and speakers – behind the mosque. Finally, here was a mosque that had ‘equal access for 
women’!  nd it is no surprise that the imam of the mosque, Abdul Rashied Omar, was a former 
president of the MYM. 
 
Despite the violent attacks – verbal and physical – against the supporters of the courageous Wadud 
lecture, the incident set the scene for more but quieter changes in the Muslim community. It is now 
commonplace for women to speak before the Friday prayer (and at other times) at the Claremont 
 ain Road osque.  nd a mosque in Johannesburg’s Brixton suburb – Masjidul Islam – followed 
the Claremont example, albeit in a more limited way. Masjidul Islam was started in 1996 by the co-
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convenor of the Unisa conference that Wadud addressed – Iqbal Jhazbhay – and members of the 
23
rd
 Street Mosque committee that had broken away. The mosque has a gallery section for women 
and women often deliver the Friday pre-khutbāh talk and speak on other occasions from the gallery. 
The mosque has not yet taken the step (officially) of having women pray in the main section of the 
mosque except on one occasion which I discuss later in this Chapter. Women have prayed in the 
main section behind the men many times after MYM halaqāt, but these were always done without 
the approval of the mosque committee. 
 
The Claremont Main Rd event was thus precedent-setting: it pushed the limits of uslim women’s 
participation in the Muslim public domain and it gave Muslim women a voice in the most important 
Muslim institution – the mosque. Many important Muslim scholars positively commented on the 
incident
86
 and the progressive Muslim monthly al-Qalam – which belongs to the MYM – published 
Wadud’s entire lecture87 after a resolution of an MYM Gender Desk meeting instructed it to do so.88 
 
The final example on the topic of women and mosques relates to a small congregation that started in 
Mayfair, Johannesburg in 1995. In this congregation there was no gender distinction in terms of 
who could fulfil any of the ritual roles; men and women delivered the sermon and led the prayer. 
For those who belie ed in the Y  Gender Desk’s ‘equal access’, this seemed the ideal model. 
The initiative for congregation was taken by members of an MYM halqā (study group) in Mayfair. 
The congregation met weekly for the Friday prayer and daily in Ramadan for the Tarāwīh prayer. In 
Esack’s words, it was ‘a little-known mo e, and an unprecedented one in the Islamic world’, where 
‘a number of comrades – male and female – started an “alternati e” congregation where gender 
equality and all its implications for Islamic thought and practice were the norm’.89 He explained his 
euphemism later: 
Since that occasion [the Amina Wadud lecture at the Claremont Main Rd Mosque] a rather 
small congregation has taken an even greater leap in the gender jihad. In the northern 
province of Gauteng up to twenty people meet on Fridays and have an entirely non-
discriminatory congregational prayer. Although separated on two sides of the prayer area 
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with the men on one side and, next to them, the women, who often preach and lead the 
prayers. During the month of Ramadan they have also been meeting, with women, more 
often than not, leading the prayers.
90
 
 
Part of the uniqueness of the congregation is indicated in the descriptive ways its space allocation 
has been written about – by Esack above and by Faaiza Shaikh. Shaikh wrote: 
At times men would pray in front and women at the back – the size of the congregation was 
small and there would be only two rows. At other times a brother and a sister or a husband 
and wife would stand next to one another so that men and women were in one row…  ll 
decisions regarding this congregation were made by all the congregants present – men and 
women.
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Shaikh’s last sentence in this quote highlights another element of the congregation: it was non-
hierarchical with no concern for titles or job descriptions. The congregation, however, lasted for just 
two years before disbanding. The congregants then switched over to Masjidul Islam, by then seen as 
the only ‘alternati e’ mosque in Johannesburg. 
 
The question of women’s space in mosques has been a contested one in South  frica for many 
years – especially from the early 1970s. Initially – particularly in Natal and Transvaal – the debate 
revolved around the question of women having any access to mosques. By the 1990s the debate 
shifted to the issue of equal access for women. This battle was fought by Islamic feminists in 
Johannesburg especially. By the mid-1990s the Claremont Main Rd Mosque had broken certain 
barriers with regard to women’s in ol ement in the mosque, particularly with regard to redefining 
gendered space and having women address the Friday congregation. Masjidul Islam in Brixton 
followed by also having female speakers on Fridays. Also in Johannesburg, a short-lived 
congregation broke through even more barriers in the space women claimed for themselves. 
 
This issue has been an enduring one for the past few decades in South Africa. Another issue that 
mobilised Islamic feminists, although for a shorter period of time, was that of Muslim Personal Law 
which I discuss in the next section. 
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Muslim Personal Law 
A set of developments in the 1990s in which both the Call of Islam and the MYM got involved, and 
which brought Islamic feminisms into sharp contrast with Muslim conservatism was the discourse, 
actions and structures around Muslim Personal Law (MPL). Muslim Personal Law has been a term 
gi en to a package of pro isions within Islamic law (or Shari’ h) that relate to family law. These 
include laws relating to marriage, divorce, succession and inheritance. MPL was developed during 
colonial rule in Muslim societies as these societies attempted to protect at least the basic private 
laws of Islam as the public expression of their cultures and religions were being repressed and 
fought against as being backward. MPL, then, was a compromise in colonial times rather than a 
body of law on its own. The idea was subsequently also taken up by Muslim minority communities 
as being relevant to their contexts. 
 
South  frica’s apartheid go ernment had attempted on many occasions – particularly in 1985 – to 
woo the Muslim community with promises of the recognition of MPL. This was significant for a 
community whose marriages were not recognised as legal by the state and many of whose children 
were therefore illegitimate in terms of South African law. This illegitimate status created enormous 
hardships for Muslims – especially for women. Such attempts by the state, however, were 
continually opposed and thwarted by anti-apartheid Muslims, particularly those associated with the 
MYM. Any handout by the apartheid state was viewed as an attempt at co-option into state 
structures and thus acceptance of such handouts were acts of dubbed collaboration with apartheid. 
The 1980s were characterised by such attempts by the Nationalist Party government to attract Black 
support: the Tri-cameral parliament to co-opt so-called Indians and Coloureds; the ‘homelands’ (or 
bantustans) for African elites; the legal recognition of registered trade unions;
92
 among others. MPL 
was regarded as one of these tools of co-option and was thus rejected by progressive Muslims. 
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In April 1994 – weeks before South  frica’s first democratic election – the ANC began a process to 
establish a representative body of Muslims to look at MPL, how it could be integrated into the 
South African legal system and to possibly prepare draft legislation for that purpose.
93
 Thus the 
MPL Board was launched in August 1994 with eight founding members: the Call of Islam, the 
MYM and six clergy organisations – the Muslim Judicial Council, Jamiatul Ulama Natal, Jamiatul 
Ulama Transvaal, Islamic Council of South Africa (ICSA), Sunni Ulama Council and Sunni 
Jamiyate Ulama.
94
 By April 1995, less than a year later, the Board was unilaterally closed down by 
the five clergy organisations (excluding ICSA) that constituted the United Ulama Council of South 
Africa (UUCSA).
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 The closure followed a period of intense organisation and mobilisation by the 
MYM Gender Desk and the Call. The last Board meeting was characterised by sharp debate and 
even personal attacks between the Call and MYM on the one hand and the UUCSA contingent on 
the other. It was, as one obser er said, ‘a war zone’.96 The Gender Desk mobilised women that were 
not members of the Board to attend the meeting as observers. These women walked out of the 
meeting in frustration at the refusal by the Board’s president, Shaikh Nazeem uhammad, to allow 
them to speak and at his ‘presidential decree’ that women had to wear headscar es to the meeting.97 
 
But the Islamic feminist interventions at the Board level were not only procedural; they were also 
substantive. For MYM and Call delegates it became a Campaign for a Just Muslim Personal Law – 
as it was called by the MYM Gender Desk.
98
 In particular, they argued that any new MPL regime 
must be based on the principle of gender equality and must be in line with the Interim South African 
Constitution. The UUCSA had been demanding that any MPL regime must be exempted from the 
Bill of Rights. As the representative of the Jamiatul Ulama Natal said at a constitutional assembly 
hearing: 
To avoid a conflict between Muslim Personal Law and other fundamental rights, it is 
recommended [that] the freedom of religion clause [in the Bill of Rights] be qualified to 
give it overriding effect.
99
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At the second MPLB meeting, Maulana Yunus Patel, president of the Jamiatul Ulama Natal, 
demanded that all members of the Board sign a declaration recognising MPL as supreme over any 
other law.
100
 This after the Call’s Rosieda Shabodien said uslims could not be exempted from 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. She was echoing positions that her organisation and the MYM had 
taken much earlier, after discussions had started regarding the recognition of African Customary 
Law. Both groups had insisted that any system of customary law could not be exempted from the 
bill. The Y ’s Shamima Shaikh, representing the position of many Islamic feminists throughout 
the country (as developed through various consultations and public statements), had argued that 
customary or religious law 
cannot be exempted from the Bill of Rights and be allowed to perpetuate inequalities. To 
even consider exempting any sector of society from being covered by the Bill of Rights is an 
injustice and makes a mockery of the Bill.
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The Call’s Fatima Hujaij said that she recognised the absolute equality of men and women ‘as 
sanctioned by the  ur’ n’.102 Following on such an argument, Soraya Bosch and Ebrahim Moosa 
called for a review of MPL to make it consistent with legal transformation in South Africa.
103
 The 
UUCSA obviously recognised the danger of such a gender equality position. Hence, after 
unilaterally closing down the PLB, UUCS  accused the Y  and the Call of ‘questioning the 
supremacy of uslim Personal Law in relation to the Bill of Rights and accused them of “opposing 
any legitimate efforts to achieve the legal recognition and implementation of PL”’.104 
 
But the role and significance of Islamic feminisms in the MPLB process was also relevant insofar as 
it reflected new forms of working among Islamic feminists themsel es. The Y ’s in ol ement in 
the MPL Board was firmly taken charge of by its Gender Desk rather than by its National 
Executi e. The Y ’s representati e on the PLB executi e was theologian-academic Maulana 
Ebrahim oosa who was the Board’s  ssistant Secretary. Yet, because the Y  had decided that 
MPL was a campaign to be driven by its Gender Desk, he – a former deputy president of the MYM 
– reported to the Gender Desk rather than to the National Executive. Other MYM MPL Board 
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members – including the organisation’s president and general secretary – were also accountable to 
the Gender Desk through its National Coordinator. The Gender Desk’s main legal mind on PL – 
Soraya Bosch – was also an advisor on legal aspects of MPL to Moosa and she thus influenced his 
academic writings on the subject. The Call’s Hujaij was elected as a  ice-president of the Board at a 
time when the clergy were refusing, on other occasions, to sit in the same meetings as women. The 
clergy members were also forced to accept that women would be represented on the Board ‘as 
women’ rather than only through organisations they might belong to. These de elopments show 
how within the Islamic feminist camp itself there were shifts in the way the women got involved in 
various processes and asserted themselves. After the collapse of the MPL Board, the Gender Desk 
continued with its ‘Campaign for a Just uslim Personal Law’. 
 
That continuation saw the Desk shift its focus to attempting to influence Muslim experience of 
family law through the courts. One view within the MYM was that MPL should not receive more 
than minimal acknowledgement by the state and that only Muslim marriages should be recognised. 
This, it was argued, would afford better protection to women because the civil courts were seen as 
more trustworthy than clergy organisations in safeguarding women’s rights. Bosch, as a lawyer with 
the legal aid clinic at the University of Cape Town, represented Thoerayah Rylands in the Rylands 
vs. Edross case in the Cape Town provincial court in 1996. Rylands sued her ex-husband for a 
range of maintenance and other benefits after he had divorced her. The decision of the court
105
 was 
a limited victory for Islamic feminists because although she was not awarded all that Bosch had 
hoped for (such as an ‘equitable’ share of the estate), she was awarded benefits that went beyond 
what the clergy would normally agree to award: arrear maintenance and a conciliatory gift. 
Furthermore, although the marriage in question was illegitimate in that it was only performed 
according to Muslim rites, the court nevertheless recognised it as a legal contract, thus allowing 
other aggrieved Muslim women the option of using the courts to obtain justice in the case of 
divorces. 
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Shaikh, Bosch and Moosa, particularly, also persisted in their attempts at educating Muslims about 
the issues surrounding the implementation of MPL in South Africa and in raising the issues in 
broader fora as well. This often resulted in clashes between the MYM and the ‘ulam . This is well 
illustrated in one case when Shaikh participated on a radio talk show on MPL.
106
 The show resulted 
in a brief three-letter dialogue between her and the UUCS . The ‘ulam  coalition initially 
demanded she retract her statements or face a ‘public rebuttal’.107 After her detailed refutation of 
their objections,
108
 they abruptly ended the conversation with a prayer that she receive guidance.
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That ‘dialogue’ was a reflection of the new confidence that Islamic feminists had de eloped through 
the 1990s. In her letter, Shaikh accused the ‘ulam  body of being discourteous, and in ited it to 
make good on its threat of a ‘public rebuttal’, expressing the hope that any such rebuttal would 
include her responses. 
 
The issue of MPL also afforded Islamic feminists another voice, a voice in the national rights 
discourse. This is discussed further in Chapter Four. It is important to note here, however, that the 
fact that Islamic feminists were willing to confront the positions of the ‘ulam  in public fora outside 
of the Muslim community was another reflection of their confidence and their sense that they were 
capable to unapologetically argue for their positions. 
 
MPL faded into the background of the agenda of Islamic feminists from around 1997 but has just 
been gi e new impetus when, in the middle of 2000, the South  frica Law Commission’s Project 
Team on MPL released an Issue Paper on MPL.
110
 The release of this document jolted many of 
those who had followed the MPL discourse closely in the past. It also saw the entry of new actors of 
the Islamic feminist project. 
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The struggle around Muslim Personal Law, I have shown, while being at one level a struggle waged 
by the Muslim community, was, at another level, a struggle waged for a feminist agenda. Debate 
around MPL had begin in the 1980s but became more vigorous around the establishment of a 
 uslim Personal Board. De elopments prior to the Board’s establishment in  ugust 1994, during 
its brief life and after its dissolution in April 1995 resulted in strenuous involvement of Muslim 
feminists attempting to ensure the best possible deal within any future MPL regime for Muslim 
women. the dissolution of the Board was followed by Islamic feminists turning their MPL focus in 
other directions, notably the South African courts. 
 
The issues of women and mosques and MPL have been two important campaigns that saw the 
involvement of women. Another area of involvement for Islamic feminists that allowed them a 
voice was the Muslim media. 
 
Islamic feminism in Muslim media 
The South African Muslim community has a range of media that it uses. The earliest medium was 
the minbar (the mosque pulpit) which allowed communication in the community (at least) on a 
weekly basis.
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 Of course, such a medium had limited usage. Also, by the middle of the 20
th
 
century it was dominated throughout the country by conservative clergy who used the minbar less 
to focus on contemporary issues of concern to the community and more on issues of ritual and 
tradition. In the 20
th
 century a range of print media were issued by different groups in the Muslim 
community as additional media services to the community. These included a range of pamphlets, 
newsletters, and two newspapers. From the 1970s, audio cassettes and, in the 1980s, video cassettes 
also became prominent information tools in the community.  fter South  frica’s first democratic 
election, with the establishment of the Independent Broadcasting Authority and the opening up of 
the airwaves, the community also established Muslim community radio stations. 
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The most important of the above are two newspapers: Muslim Views and Al-Qalam and the radio 
stations. Four radio stations operate throughout the year: Radio 786 and Voice of the Cape share a 
frequency in Cape Town; Radio 1584 in Pretoria; Radio Islam and The Voice in Johannesburg. In 
Durban, Radio Azaania and Radio Al-Ansaar have, at different times, obtained one-month ‘special 
e ents’ licences and in Port Elizabeth Voice of Guidance has done the same. 
 
Muslim Views is a newspaper that started in 1997 following the closure of its predecessor Muslim 
News which had been established in 1960. In the 1980s it had taken strong anti-apartheid positions 
and was often under threat by the state. Today, Muslim Views is very much a community 
newspaper, not linked ideologically to any particular organisation or tendency within the Muslim 
community. Al-Qalam was started in 1974 by the Muslim Youth Movement and has always been 
regarded as a mouthpiece of that organisation, even though its editors have generally maintained a 
sense of independence from the organisation. In the 1980s it faced bannings, closures, and warnings 
from the Nationalist Party government. Unlike Muslim Views, Al-Qalam remains an ideological 
mouthpiece (of the MYM). Of the five fulltime radio stations, three are firmly linked to particular 
organisations and follow their ideological leanings. Radio 786 belongs to the Islamic Unity 
Convention; Radio Islam belongs to the Jamiatul Ulama Transvaal and Voice of the Cape belongs to 
the Muslim Broadcasting Commission which is a project of the Muslim Judicial Council. The Voice 
belongs to an independent trust – the Muslim Community Broadcasting Trust – whose trustees are 
appointed by the MYM. The trust owns and manages the station and the MYM does not influence 
its operations on a day-to-day basis. Radio 1584 is owned by the Islamic Information Services in 
Pretoria and functions without strong ideological influence from any particular organisation. Of all 
of the above media, Al-Qalam and The Voice have been used extensively in the 1990s to further the 
Islamic feminist agenda. 
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Al-Qalam has served for the past 26 years as the mouthpiece of the MYM in terms of its broad 
vision. Although going through difficulties in terms of financial and human resources and 
vacillation in terms of the quality of the paper, it has managed to survive and has a circulation of 
25 000 – mainly within South Africa. From 1991, with the MYM having decided to focus much 
more on African Muslim communities, the paper also began reflecting this trend by covering more 
African community issues that went beyond the praising of proselytising efforts. Its team of regular 
writers also began to include Africans – particularly MYM members. Together with this new focus 
the paper also began developing a focus on women. This could be seen in its regular coverage of 
issues related to women in various parts of the world and in South Africa. 
 
 s the Y  began getting bolder in its articulation of women’s issues, so did Al-Qalam. Its 
coverage of three issues in particular are a good indication of the prominence that the paper gave to 
women’s issues: the uslim Personal Law Board, the Claremont ain Rd osque women’s lecture 
controversy and the activities of the MYM Gender Desk. An examination of literature on the first 
two of these issues is a clear indication of the role that Al-Qalam played in popularising debates 
around them and constantly raising the women question within them. The writings of Esack,
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Sa’diyya Shaikh113 and Faaiza Shaikh114 are examples that show how Al-Qalam’s co erage of these 
issues and debates influenced later analysis about them. 
 
An analysis of the articles in Al-Qalam from 1991 to 1997 shows a deliberate and definite attempt 
at promoting the ideas of Islamic feminism. The articles on the Muslim Personal Law Board and 
other articles on PL, for example, repeatedly raise the issue of women’s participation in the 
process of determining an MPL code for South Africa and focus on the insistence by Islamic 
feminists that women’s  oices must be heard regarding all issues concerning their lives. The brief 
coverage – over just three issues – given to the Amina Wadud lecture at Claremont Main Rd 
 osque was blatant and it became quite clear what the paper’s position – and that of the publishers, 
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the MYM – was on the issue. The first issue to cover the lecture screamed out its front page 
headline ‘ nother first for South  frica (and the world?!)’115 with two colour pictures of Wadud 
delivering her lecture. 
 
Apart from the feminist content of Al-Qalam in the 1990s, another aspect that placed it within the 
Islamic feminist arena was its appointment in 1995 of Shamima Shaikh as managing editor. Shaikh 
was, at the time, still National Coordinator of the Y ’s Gender Desk.  lso, she was the first 
woman to be the editor of a major South African Muslim periodical in South Africa – apart from 
periodicals for women.
116
 In that position she oversaw not only the content of the paper but 
managed its finances, administration and production. When she resigned in 1997 the feminist 
content of the paper immediately decreased and then faded into virtual non-existence. 
 
The other medium that played an important role in promoting Islamic feminisms in South Africa 
was The Voice, the Muslim community station in Johannesburg set up by the MYM. The station and 
its licence belong to an independent trust – the Muslim Community Broadcasting Trust (MCBT). 
However, the trustees are appointed every three years by the National Executive of the MYM. From 
its inception its positions on women were important for the station. Even the formation of the 
MCBT in 1994 indicates the importance given to the women agenda. The founder and first 
chairperson of the CBT was the Y ’s National Gender Desk Coordinator, Shamima Shaikh. 
She served as chairperson till her death in January 1998. 
 
The Voice began broadcasting in August 1997. While the other Johannesburg Muslim radio station, 
Radio Islam, had already been on air and had made it clear that it would not allow women 
broadcasters, The Voice’s launch broadcast had a woman anchor, Najma Khota. Its programming 
schedule also reflected its concern with women’s issues. ‘Saut al-Nisa’ (Women’s Voice) was a 
two-hour slot, five days a week. Different programmes were included in the slot for each day.
117
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These included ‘Lifting the Veil’ – hosted by Shaikh – which presented feminist interpretations of 
Islam and its scriptures. It also sought to reconstruct the histories of prominent Muslim women and 
confronted controversial issues in the Muslim community relating to women. ‘Breaking the Silence’ 
– hosted by author and feminist Julie Adam – focussed on women abuse and particularly domestic 
 iolence. Zaheera Bham hosted ‘Women Today’ which inter iewed and profiled prominent women 
in South Africa with a view to presenting them as role models. Apart from these shows in the Saut 
al-Nisa slot, there were other programmes which should be mentioned. ‘Our Voices’, hosted by 
Shaikh and  bdul Basit Bulbulia (who was also the station’s major donor) quickly became known 
as the most controversial show on The Voice mainly of its focus on women’s issues. The 
acknowledgement of the need to give women a voice is also reflected in a statement in station 
brochure: ‘The Voice is your voice, the voice of women and men, youth, children, the voice of the 
whole community, not just a small section of it.’118 
 
Importantly, however, women at The Voice were not ghettoised into women’s shows or shows 
about women. One of the most popular programmes was the weekly ‘In the Shade of the  ur’ n’ 
which discussed different topics in the light of  ur’ nic perspecti es. The programme was hosted 
by Farhana Ismail who had a good grasp of  rabic and the  ur’ n.  lthough she usually brought in 
guests, one of the attractions of the show was that it was not an interview but a dialogue where the 
host obviously was as educated as the expert guest. Programmes like this, as well as others like 
‘ ur’ n  uiz’ hosted by Nazlie Jada, daily current affairs programme ‘Dri eTime Li e’ hosted by 
Moefidah Jaffer, Shoneez Bulbulia and Julie  lly, daily children’s programme ‘Our Treasure 
Chest’ hosted by Rehana oosajee and Julie  lly’s magazine programme ‘Straight Talk’ meant 
that women were very much part of the mainstream of the programming at the station. Women were 
also involved in the health, legal and sports programmes. 
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The first Muslim Community Broadcasting Trust had only three trustees – Shaikh, poet and author 
Don Mattera and community activist Bilal Motsau. For the first few months of the life of the station 
Shaikh played a hands-on role in directing its activities. The second trust, appointed in January 
1998, consisted of eleven trustees. Five of these were women. And women soon headed two of the 
four committees of the trust, the programming committee and the complaints committee. Also, 
since its inception, the volunteer base of the station has always been more female than male. 
Currently, more than half of the 110 volunteers are women. And both its staff members are 
women.
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I have shown that these two media – Al-Qalam and The Voice – have played extremely important 
roles as propaganda tools for Islamic feminisms in South Africa, as much in terms of how they 
operated as in terms of what they said. They gave women an authentic voice in the Muslim 
community. But one cannot complete a discussion about media and women’s  oices within them 
without discussing the matter of the conservative Radio Islam. 
 
The Matter of Radio Islam and women’s voices 
Why would I discuss Radio Islam in a chapter dealing with manifestations of Islamic feminism? 
How could Islamic feminisms have been boosted by a radio station that had refused to allow women 
on air because they regarded women’s  oices as ‘awrāh (private parts of their bodies that should be 
concealed)? I include this section not because the station promoted Islamic feminisms but because 
of the impetus given to the ideas of Islamic feminism during the furore that erupted over Radio 
Islam’s decision to exclude women’s  oices. 
 
Owned by the Jamiatul Ulama Transvaal, Radio Islam began broadcasting early in 1997. The 
station had a clear policy of not allowing women’s  oices on air because of their belief that the 
 oice was part of a woman’s ‘awrah (private parts of their bodies that should be concealed). 
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Initially there were no objections to this position from any quarter in the Muslim community – or 
even from the regulatory authority, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) – until a small 
organisation in Lenasia, Youth for Islamic Enlightenment and Development (YIELD) approached 
the station complaining that the exclusion of women constituted gender discrimination. YIELD also 
submitted a complaint to the IBA, alleging that Radio Islam was in violation of its licence 
conditions.
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Radio Islam defended its position to YIELD and the IBA, arguing that it was within its licence 
conditions in serving the interests of the Muslim community of Johannesburg. It claimed to 
represent the  iews of that community in not allowing women’s  oices to be heard. It ‘does not 
discriminate against females, nor does it “condone the subjugation” of women,’ submitted Radio 
Islam’s station manager, Haider  li Dhorat.121 The station went further to say that ‘Throughout the 
Quran and the Hadith woman (sic) have been given equal status to men in every respect.’122 Having 
women hosting programmes on air, Radio Islam argued, would be ‘offensi e to the o erwhelming 
majority of uslims’.123 
 
The matter raised vigorous debate in the media with Radio Islam on one side, YIELD and the 
Commission for Gender Equality (CGE) on the other and various members of the public 
participating in one way or the other. The IBA heard the complaint and withdrew Radio Islam’s 
licence. The station continued broadcasting illegally for a period, then went off air and applied for a 
new licence. This time, however, it agreed that it would put women on air because, after a long and 
intense process of consultation internationally, it had obtained an Islamic opinion that women’s 
voices may be heard. The IBA was not convinced that the physical female voice on Radio Islam 
would constitute gi ing  oice to women and was concerned that women would end up ‘reading 
recipes’. Further, the IB  was concerned about the manner in which Radio Islam had redefined its 
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target community and felt this was too narrow a definition. It denied the station a licence. Radio 
Islam went to court and won; the IBA was instructed to issue the licence. 
 
Our main concern here is the role of Islamic feminists in this affair and what impact this case had – 
if any – on Islamic feminisms in South Africa. While Islamic feminists followed the case closely 
and watched and prayed for particular outcomes, their public interventions were minimal. It must be 
noted that the organisation that took up the issue – YIELD – has no history in women’s right 
struggles. Throughout the battle around the station, the MYM and Call – the two organisations at 
the forefront of Islamic feminism in South Africa – remained silent (publicly, at least). A few ex-
MYM members in Johannesburg, led by businessperson Abu Bakr Karolia, attempted to mediate 
between Radio Islam and YIELD. But much of this, in the words of Shamima Shaikh, was ‘another 
case of men fighting about women’.124 
 
At a public level, those identifiable from the Islamic feminist camp that took some positions on the 
issue were Esack, then a commissioner of the CGE and a few people from The Voice, notably 
Shaikh and her co-host on ‘Our Voices’,  bdul Basit Bulbulia. While continually insisting that 
Radio Islam was ‘our sister station’, the latter two vigorously took on the Islamic arguments 
presented by Radio Islam and presented the progressive positions on these – particularly the 
question of the permissibility of women’s  oices being heard in public. It was an attempt at pushing 
forward the agenda of women’s  oices and a means to increase listenership and credibility for The 
Voice. Esack’s was mainly a media campaign and an attempt to draw together an alliance of Islamic 
feminists and others to support the CGE and YIELD’s position. The question that begs an answer 
is: Why did Islamic feminists not get involved in an issue that obviously was within their domain of 
activity? 
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A few reasons might be advanced for this. Firstly, YIELD was not one of the organisations that had 
a good relationship with either the MYM or the Call. Indeed, because of previous experiences, 
people like Shaikh and Bulbulia were suspicious of its motives.
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 Secondly, as a flagship for 
progressive Muslims in Gauteng, The Voice did not want to present itself as wanting to benefit from 
the misery of its ‘sister station’. Hence, it ne er called for Radio Islam to be denied a licence by the 
IBA. Thirdly, I believe that within the progressive Muslim camp there was not real clarity about the 
limits of freedoms that should be allowed within an open society. Did an organisation with a sexist 
perspective, like Radio Islam, have the right to express that perspective in a free society? Could 
they use a public resource – a radio frequency – to express such an perspective – which is 
unconstitutional? What does an imposition of a particular religious understanding – even if it is a 
gender equality position – on another religious group mean for freedom of religion and the right of 
minorities? Fourthly, the personality of Esack and the confrontational vigour with which he 
addressed the issue became an issue of dispute in the progressive Muslim camp. Fifthly, there was 
no agreement about whether it would be better for the cause of women for Radio Islam to be closed 
down by the IBA or not. Finally, Islamic feminists were too confident at this point in their own 
relative strength in the Muslim community and were willing to just ride the issue with others – 
YIELD and the CGE – doing the dirty work while they believed they did not need to prove 
themselves. The forces of Islamic conservatism were relatively weaker and this fact made the 
progressives complacent. 
 
However, Islamic feminists did not isolate themselves from the issue. A closed email list was set up 
to brainstorm ideas and develop strategy. And a memorandum entitled ‘In defence of a Positi e 
Image of Islam – the Issue of Women’s Voices’126 was submitted to the IBA days before the 
hearing where Radio Islam agreed to allow women on air. The memorandum affirmed that ‘Islam is 
a religion of justice and promotes the equality of men and women’ and expressed the authors’ belief 
that ‘discrimination on the basis of gender goes against the  ery spirit of Islam’. The document did 
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not once mention Radio Islam by name and did not call on the IBA to take any particular course of 
action. 
 
The importance of the matter of Radio Islam for this Research Report is, I have argued, in the 
manner in which Islamic feminists used the issue to mobilise public opinion and themselves around 
a critical issue – the necessity of women having a voice. Debates and action around the Radio Islam 
issue also formed the last phase of concerted Islamic feminist activity in the decade of the 1990s. I 
will now discuss a moment which came in the midst of the Radio Islam furore and which resulted in 
much confidence within Islamic feminist circles – the funeral of Shamima Shaikh. 
 
The Funeral of Shamima Shaikh 
On 8 January 1998, Shamima Shaikh, former national coordinator of the MYM Gender Desk, 
former editor of Al-Qalam and founder of The Voice, died of cancer.
127
 Her death came in the 
middle of the Radio Islam controversy. It was a period when Muslim progressives were feeling 
particularly confident and Muslim conservatism was particularly vulnerable. While not intervening 
directly in the Radio Islam issue, progressives regarded this as a time to push the limits and make as 
many gains as possible.
128
 It was inescapable then that Shaikh’s funeral would play a part in 
enhancing this buoyant feeling. ‘The day of her death and burial was a day of the relentless pushing 
of the religio-cultural limits,’129 especially in how it thrust women’s participation into the forefront. 
Shuaib anjra refers to Shaikh’s death and funeral as a continuation of her legacy of ‘challeng ing  
e erything’.130 I look at some of these ‘challenges’ to ‘e erything’. 
 
 s per her request, Shaikh’s (first)131 funeral prayer was led by a woman friend, Farhana Ismail. 
Ha ing a woman lead the funeral prayer was a highly unusual act and, according to Esack, ‘it came 
to pass that for the first time in the last few centuries, a uslim’s funeral ser ice, albeit at her home, 
was led by a woman and followed by women and men’.132 Ismail herself was a fellow gender 
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equality acti ist of Shaikh’s. She often led the Tarāwīh prayer at the short-lived Mayfair 
congregation and was the host of the popular ‘In the Shade of the  ur’ n’ on The Voice. 
 
Shaikh’s funeral prayer at asjidul Islam in Brixton witnessed women participating in prayer in the 
main space with the men. This was the first time that this had happened with official sanction at the 
mosque. The mosque officials took it upon themselves to offer this as a tribute to the woman who 
fought for ‘equal access to mosques’ for uslim women.  t Shaikh’s burial in Pietersburg women 
again would not be denied their place. They attended the funeral prayer at the cemetery and 
participated at the burial with the men. 
 
These events were remarkable in their own right. But their propaganda potential was not to be 
ignored by Islamic feminists. Esack’s obituary, which recounted these unusual events, was 
published in the Mail & Guardian,
133
 in a Philippines’ feminist magazine, Women in Action134 and 
included in his next book, On Being a Muslim.
135
 In addition, his and anjra’s136 obituaries were 
circulated on more than a dozen Internet mailing lists internationally. It was a deliberate attempt at 
pushing the gender equality envelope within and without South Africa and, perhaps, chalking up 
‘another first for South  frica’.137 
 
Much criticism poured in after the funeral, much of it directed against Shaikh’s family. Howe er, 
the Islamic feminist euphoria at the time meant that the criticism was faced squarely, counter-
arguments quickly presented for each criticism and the event claimed as a victory.
138
 It was the last 
major victory for Islamic feminists in the 1990s; the only one subsequent to it that might be 
regarded as a ‘ ictory’ was Radio Islam’s agreeing to allow women on air. 
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Conclusion 
The decade of the 1990s saw the emergence of Islamic feminisms in South Africa. It was an 
expected phenomenon after the women’s rights campaigns and the in ol ement of women in 
Muslim communal life that was promoted in the 1980s – particularly by the Call of Islam and the 
 uslim Youth o ement. These two organisations had had women’s rights as part of their agendas 
since their inception – the MYM in 1971 and the Call in 1983. However, the manner in which they 
addressed the issue and the extents to which they were willing to go differed. 
 
The Call began using the rhetoric of gender equality from its beginnings in 1983. For the MYM, 
moving from a standpoint of gender balance to one of gender equality took longer and it only 
adopted such a position by the end of the 1980s after thorough debate and study. In the 1990s, 
Islamic feminism came into its own through  arious e ents, structures and discourses. The Y ’s 
Women’s Rights Campaign led to the formation of its Gender Desk, which became an aggressi e 
role-player in the arena of women’s rights within the uslim community. The Call, howe er, had 
become a weak organisation by the 1990s and this was reflected in its involvement in the Islamic 
feminist terrain. 
 
Various processes, campaigns and debates around the Muslim Personal Law Board also provided 
avenues for Islamic feminisms to be expressed. These expressions were through the involvement of 
women in attempting to control the progressive responses to the MPL Board and the attempts of 
Islamic feminists to ensure that ordinary Muslim women were involved in discussions around MPL 
and how it would affect their li es. The ‘Campaign for a Just PL’ was a strong mobilising centre 
which helped to get both the Call and the MYM working together and with other organisations – 
particularly women’s organisations. 
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That women should have access to mosques had been a firm position for the MYM since its 
inception. It was an issue that the MYM kept pursuing – especially in the northern provinces. In the 
1990s, however, the issue began to be addressed differently. No more was the demand for women 
to ha e ‘facilities’ in mosques, but the call became one for women’s ‘equal access to mosque 
space’. While there were many practical campaigns and battles around this, to date only one 
mosque in the country has ‘equal access’ for women – the Claremont Main Rd Mosque in Cape 
Town. However, the Claremont example opened up spaces for certain other mosques to at least 
believe that were other options. These campaigns have received substantial support in the Muslim 
community from particularly two community media. 
 
The monthly newspaper Al-Qalam and the Johannesburg-based radio station The Voice are both 
linked to the MYM. Both have, in the 1990s, played an important role in furthering the objectives of 
Islamic feminism – both at a propaganda as well as at a substantive level. Both have served as tools 
for women’s empowerment.  nd both ha e promoted the agendas of Islamic feminisms by the 
angles taken in their coverage of various issues within the Muslim community. A survey of various 
editions of Al-Qalam in the 1990s – particularly upto 1997 – reflect the deliberate attention given to 
women’s issues by the paper.  lso, The Voice has been successful in allowing airtime for members 
of the Muslim community to debate issues that are otherwise not debated publicly. The issues of 
women’s  oices, domestic  iolence against women, women’s access to mosques, domestic workers 
and MPL are just some of these issues. 
 
The last major issues addressed by Islamic feminism in the 1990s have been the funeral of gender 
equality activist Shamima Shaikh and the controversy surrounding Radio Islam’s decision to 
disallow women from being on air. This was arguably a period when Muslim conservatism was at 
one of its weakest periods in the past two decades in South Africa. And this situation resulted in an 
extra-confident attitude within progressive Muslim circles. However, the Radio Islam controversy 
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also saw the end of aggressive Islamic feminisms in the decade of the 1990s. An important reason 
for this was the internal dissension among progressive Muslims resulting from the positions taken 
on the issue – particularly the opposition to the approach taken by CGE commissioner Farid Esack. 
Islamic feminisms, since then, have been largely dormant – though not dead. These issues will be 
addressed further in Chapter Five. In the next two Chapters I will look at two of the main impetuses 
that resulted in the development of Islamic feminisms as outlined in this Chapter. Chapter Three 
will examine the development of Islamic feminist thought in South Africa, following on similar 
developments in other parts of the world; Chapter Four will look at the impact of the national 
liberation struggle on the rise of Islamic feminisms in South Africa. 
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Chapter Three Re-Reading 
 and Re-Thinking 
 INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC FEMINIST THOUGHT 
 AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LINK 
Introduction 
Despite their isolation from most of the Muslim world, Muslims in apartheid South Africa had been 
able to maintain contact with their co-religionists in other parts of the world in a variety of ways. 
Such contact had been at various socio-religious levels and in many instances resulted in 
international ideological influences being imbibed by South African Muslims. Some of these 
ideological influences have included the Deobandi and Brelvi schools of thought from the Indo-Pak 
subcontinent and the Murabitun Sufi order from Europe. Significant influences on Islamic resurgent 
movements since the 1970s through the 1990s have been the Egyptian Ikhwanul Muslimoon, the 
Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami and the 1979 Iranian revolution.
1
 In the cases of the resurgent movements 
the influences have been via personal contact through visits to South Africa by members of these 
movements and meetings in international fora, and books and cassettes from these movements 
being imported and distributed in South Africa. In the late 1980s and in the 1990s these outside 
influences have included Islamic feminist literature. 
 
This last influence will be one of the issues of discussion in this Chapter. I will examine the thought 
and activity of some Islamic feminist scholars and activists who have influenced their counterparts 
in South Africa. In doing so, I will also examine some expressions of Islamic feminism in the 
Muslim world. South African Islamic feminists, however, have not simply distributed the ideas of 
these foreign scholars in South Africa; they have also developed their own thought and activism 
around women’s issues. In this Chapter I will also look at some ideological perspectives articulated 
by South African Islamic feminists as they sought to understand their struggles, draw inspiration 
from Islamic scriptures and to contextualise this inspiration. I will show that there are differences in 
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the articulation and meanings of the discourses and examine the influences on them from the rest of 
the world. 
 
But before dealing with issues of feminist thought it is important to arrive at some understanding of 
what the term ‘Islamic feminism’ means. Thus far I have used the term, a term that is not without its 
problems, without having defined it. However, to proceed with the discussion on Islamic feminisms 
in South Africa – especially as regards Islamic feminist thought – it is crucial to define ‘Islamic 
feminsm’. In this Chapter, then, I will briefly discuss the notion of feminism, look at how Islamic 
feminists in other parts of the world understand the relationship between Islam and feminism and 
propose a definition for ‘Islamic feminism’. 
 
Not everyone’s feminism 
For many Muslim women (and men) – whether in minority contexts like in most of the Western 
world or in Muslim majority communities – the label ‘feminist’ is not worn comfortably. For these 
Muslims, ‘feminism’ generally carries a specifically Western meaning with particular historical and 
ideological baggage. Most Muslim activists prefer not having to be accountable for such baggage. 
Thus such activists often avoid the label ‘feminist’ for strategic purposes, as American Muslim 
women’s rights activist Laila al-Marayati explains: 
[F]eminism… is a bad word among some Muslims… It’s often been associated with other 
movements – imperialism, colonialism, Zionism even. Among Muslims here it is a kind of 
buzzword that we try to avoid because of the perception that feminism is somehow about 
depravity, particularly sexual depravity, birth control, individualism, no family concerns, no 
morals.
2
 
 
The kind of apprehension expressed by Marayati is not exclusive to Muslims, however. Many Third 
World
3
 feminists have similar concerns. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, for example, while 
emphasising that ‘I always call myself a “feminist”’, nevertheless warns that ‘we must be willing to 
give it [the term “feminism”] up if there is reasonable resistance to it from groups we respect.’4 
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Many women in Muslim societies do, however, regard themselves as part of some kind of project 
for the upliftment or emancipation of women – even if they don’t use the ‘F’ word. This has seen 
the development in parts of the Muslim world, as well as in the West, of ‘Islamic feminisms’ where 
Muslim women (and men) articulate a discourse about and struggle for the establishment of 
women’s self-worth, for gender equality and for the subversion of patriarchy. 
 
But what is Islamic feminism and who is an Islamic feminist? This is a fundamental question that 
needs to be answered. The place to begin answering the question is to look at the term ‘feminism’, 
its genesis and its meanings. The term feminism has been increasingly used since 1895 to refer to 
the theory of sexual equality and the movement for women’s rights.5 Contemporarily, however, it 
has gone beyond being simply about equal rights between women and men; it is also ‘an ideology 
of social transformation aiming to create a world for women beyond simple equality’.6 While the 
hegemonic feminist discourse – particularly within Western feminism – is still just about equality 
between women and men, gender equality and social justice are increasingly becoming persistent 
themes in current articulations of feminism. 
 
However, what has been the dominant expression of feminism – Western feminism7 – has come 
under much criticism from gender equality activists in the South, particularly the manner in which 
much of Western feminist theory has homogenised the oppression and the struggles of women 
throughout the world or, at least, homogenised women throughout the Third World.
8
 Joanna Hicks 
writes about this when she critiques the approach of Western feminists from the perspective of 
women of the South: 
The enunciation of the foundations of the women’s movement and feminist ideology within 
the industrialized world has been dominated by white, middle-class women. These women 
often unreflexively set forth their concerns within their societal context as most important, 
uncritically use their culture’s norms to judge others, and finally, leave unexamined their 
positions of privilege as citizens of formerly colonialist and, in many cases, neo-colonialist 
countries. Although these feminists, who try to help women in the ‘Third World’ liberate 
themselves, might be well-intentioned, they still bring their own ethnocentric and racist 
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assumptions along with their trenchant critiques of patriarchy in the deployment of context-
insensitive feminism.
9
 
 
Hicks’ critique of Western feminism is not unique. Her thoughts on this matter are common to 
many expressions of what are often called ‘Third World feminisms’. This criticism is also 
articulated eloquently by women in the South like Chandra Talpade Mohanty
10
 and Desiree 
Lewis.
11
 In the main, Western feminists are seen as being from the industrialised world, White and 
middle class. Many Third World women have criticised feminist movements (in the West) 
on the grounds of cultural imperialism, and of short-sightedness in defining the meaning of 
gender in terms of middle class, White experiences, and in terms of internal racism, classism 
and homophobia.
12
 
 
Talking about the Caribbean region, for example, Patricia Mohammed says that for many people 
feminism ‘represents an imported set of ideas about women’s rights and struggles, the latter which 
is felt to be unnecessary in these societies where the colonized black woman is deemed to have 
emerged as independent and aggressive in her own right.’13 Despite such criticism, many Third 
World feminists prefer to redefine the term ‘feminist’ and use it for themselves14 rather than to 
change the terminology.
15
 This has resulted in the development of ideologies such as womanism 
and mujerista. Other Third World women ‘have always engaged with feminism, even if the label is 
rejected in many instances’.16 Such criticism is also present in Muslim discourses about gender 
equality and many Muslim women take the option of engaging with feminism but rejecting the 
label. 
 
Deniz Kandiyoti traces the opposition that Muslims display towards Western feminism to the 
legacy of colonialism. 
Both colonial administrators and Christian missionaries attempted to reform the sexual 
mores and family traditions of Muslims as part of their ‘civilising’ mission. The interest in 
liberating oppressed Muslim women produced in the minds of many Muslims a close 
association between feminism and cultural imperialism.
17
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Muslim women activists also critiqued Western feminism for a range of other reasons. For Azizah 
al-Hibri,
18
 the homogenisation that some Western feminists apply to women is a problem. Amina 
Wadud refuses to call herself a feminist, as Badran points out.
 19
 Wadud’s writings have been very 
inspirational to Islamic feminists all over the world, including in South Africa. Yet, talking about 
those who approach the issues of women’s equality in Islam from ‘feminist ideals and rationales’, 
Wadud says that although they are often concerned with ‘valid issues’, they would sometimes 
‘vindicate the position of women on grounds entirely incongruous with the Qur’anic position on 
women.’20 She ‘gets tired’, she says, of ‘the ideas that come to us in so-called global dialogue. Most 
of that discourse suggests that we should put religion aside so we can get real women’s problems on 
the table. As Muslims we can’t do that, religion is the base… I can’t separate religion from my 
identity. It’s just not possible.’21 
 
Similar concerns exist among South African Muslim women. Sa’diyya Shaikh interviewed a range 
of women in Cape Town ‘from those who called themselves religiously “conservative” to those that 
considered themselves “progressive and modernist” Muslims’. In these interviews, ‘Some 
progressive women indicated that while there were problems which all women had in common, 
Western women had their own yardstick for measuring freedom which was not necessarily the same 
for Muslim women.’22 
 
Having noted the above criticisms of Western feminism, I believe that Muslims can reclaim the 
word ‘feminism’ so that it might be used on their own terms. Such an exercise would require a 
redefinition of the term and the addition of the qualifier ‘Islamic’. 
 
Islamic Feminism: An Oxymoron? 
Can there be such a thing as ‘Islamic Feminism’? Is it not a contradiction in terms? For many non-
Muslims and Muslims alike the term would be seen as an oxymoron. Some non-Muslims view the 
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treatment of women under Taliban rule in Afghanistan, media images in movies like Not without my 
Daughter and the controversy over Muslim schoolgirls wearing headscarves in France as examples 
that assist in creating a perception of Islam as inherently oppressive to women. Thus the notion of a 
movement for the liberation of women having the qualifier ‘Islamic’ might seem strange. For many 
Muslims on the other hand, the term seems to be an attempt to use Islamic texts and symbols in the 
cause of Westernism and it would be rejected on that basis. Expressing this kind of concern, Al-
Hibri, referring to the feminist organisation Sisterhood is Global Institute, says that it ‘adopt[s] 
religious discourse – including Qur’anic verses – as a tool to achieve secular goals.’23 
 
What then are the possibilities for defining ‘Islamic feminism’ in a way that takes it beyond being 
‘a tool to achieve secular goals’? Since even the meaning of ‘feminism’ is contested, defining 
Islamic feminism should begin with an understanding of feminism. I use Margot Badran’s 
description of feminism as a useful one in this instance. Discussing feminisms in Egypt, she refers 
to 
women’s coming into an awareness that being born female meant that they would lead their 
lives very differently from those of similar classes and circumstances who were born male. I 
refer to women’s questioning why this was so, under what authority and what they started to 
do about it. The why was the beginning of an analysis of patriarchy – that is, the power that 
men had accorded themselves, irrespective of class, to make rules and to impose their rules 
on women to keep them subordinate. The what was feminism – ideas and actions expressed 
individually and collectively about personal life, family life, societal life;… in short, about 
being a woman in its totality and plurality of meanings – about gender and power.24 
 
Taking this, then, as an adequate understanding of feminism, the question that remains to be 
answered is what makes an ‘Islamic feminism’ different. Lamya’ al-Faruqi25 attempts to define an 
Islamic feminism by discussing the elements within Islam that make it different from Western 
feminisms and which feminist movements must understand in order for there to be cooperation 
between feminisms and Islam. The first of three points she makes in arguing that there can exist an 
Islamic feminism is that it would be an ideology where the Qur’ān and the life example of the 
Prophet Muhammad (the Sunnāh) would represent the ideal for women. Asifa Quraishi is more 
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forthright about using the term Islamic feminism; she does not regard it as an oxymoron or as 
illusionary. ‘Islam holds the potential for a really vibrant kind of feminism. The basis of 
egalitarianism is there in the Qur’an,’ she insists.26 
 
For Shamima Shaikh, ‘[t]he Muslim feminist looks to the Qur’an and the Prophet as a force for 
liberation.’27 And while the Call of Islam called on Muslims in the 1980s to ‘unleash a debate on 
the question of women so that equality and freedom become achievable,’ it quickly added that 
‘[t]his debate need not depart from the pages of the Qur’an.’28 For Islamic feminists, are Islamic 
scripture used in the service of their feminism or does it flow from them? Shaikh answers that 
question from a personal perspective: 
I am often asked by people who are not Muslim why I do what I do; why struggle for the 
rights of women – and particularly Muslim women. What happened in my past that drove 
me to this? The answer is simple: we respond to the injunction of the Qur’ān to ‘enjoin what 
is right and forbid what is wrong’, as we did when faced with the terrible injustices of 
apartheid and oppression on the basis of race and class.
29
 
 
Following from the above perspectives of al-Faruqi, Quraishi and Shaikh, I propose a definition of 
Islamic feminism for the purposes of this Research Report. Islamic feminism is, firstly, an ideology 
which uses the Qur’ān and Sunnāh to provide the ideals for gender relationships as well as the 
weapons in the struggle to transform society in a way that gender equality is accepted as a principle 
around which society is structured. Secondly, it is the struggle of Muslim women and men for the 
emancipation of women based on this ideology. Islamic feminists ‘insist that they are inspired by 
Islam and the women heroes of Islam who stood up for justice and human rights. And that Islam is a 
force of empowerment rather than of disempowerment.’30 
 
Such an approach does two important things. Firstly, it applies a qualifier to the understanding of 
feminism in that the principles of the feminism that it refers to and the inspiration for it are rooted in 
Islamic scripture. Secondly, while Shaikh says that ‘Islam is a force of empowerment rather than of 
disempowerment’, Islam has been used for the disempowerment of women as well. This approach 
 67 
then brings into sharp focus the issue of hermeneutics and interpretation of Islamic scriptures. 
Islamic feminists seek to read scriptures on the basis of a liberatory theology of justice. Discussing 
the ways in which Islamic feminists have sought to read Islamic scriptures ‘as a force of [women’s] 
empowerment’ is the purpose of the next section. 
 
International Islamic Feminist Thought 
While Islamic resurgence in South Africa was greatly influenced by resurgent movements from 
outside of South Africa, as I had mentioned earlier, the influence of foreign Islamic feminists, in 
contrast, was different although still significant. There were no strong links that were developed 
with Islamic feminist organisations or Muslim organisations with feminist tendencies. Further, the 
person-to-person contact was very minimal. Despite this, it is interesting that there are many 
parallels in the development of Islamic feminisms in South Africa and other Muslim communities. 
For South Africans, however, the influence was mainly through Islamic feminist literature that 
found its way into South Africa. I will, in this section, briefly look at some of these outside 
influences: what they were and what they were saying. In the next section I will discuss some of the 
important elements of Islamic feminist thought in South Africa. 
 
For the Call of Islam, the earliest international feminist influence (around 1986) was Kaukab 
Siddique.
31
 According to Adli Jacobs, one of the early debates within the Call was that of women’s 
leadership. Resorting to Siddique’s book32 quickly solved the problem. Siddique, a former Pakistani 
who relocated to Canada, makes a strong case in his book, The Struggle of Muslim Women for the 
absolute equality between women and men. He includes within his sphere of women’s rights the 
right to lead a state and the right to lead the congregational prayer – of men and women. The Call 
accepted his arguments about women’s leadership. However, the Call never really promoted 
Siddique’s books in South Africa. It seems the organisation’s supposed obsession with homegrown 
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solutions for South African Muslim activists
33
 meant that even foreigners that influenced its own 
ideas were not promoted. 
 
The 1990s saw the publication and/or distribution of a number of progressive books on women and 
Islam. Two books from early in the decade that did not get much attention in South Africa were by 
Siddique
34
 and Asghar Ali Engineer.
35
 This was unfortunate because both books were for popular 
rather than academic audiences. Because of their popular format and style, the wide distribution of 
the books of these two scholars by Islamic feminists might have assisted in the wider dissemination 
of Islamic feminist ideas. 
 
Feminist literature that started gaining popularity in the mid-1990s among Islamic feminists in 
South Africa was, by contrast, more academic. Further, this literature also dealt with the more 
complicated issues of textual interpretation and hermeneutics in greater detail. The need to consider 
hermeneutics as important was introduced to South Africa by Parvez Mansoor when he introduced 
readings of Fazlur Rahman to participants at the MYM’s ITP in 1987. Rahman was ‘critical of 
contemporary critical Islamic resurgence, particularly its anti-intellectual emphasis. Rahman 
insisted on a creative reading of the sources of Islam for modern application.’36 While Rahman’s 
thought laid a basis for new readings of Islamic scripture – Qur’ān and  ad th – the feminist 
readings of scripture was provided by other scholars. 
 
Three of the most influential of these scholars have been Fatima Mernissi, Leila Ahmed and Amina 
Wadud. The latter two have visited South Africa. Ahmed’s visit in 1997 lasted for about 24 hours 
while Wadud travelled the country on a lecture tour. In each of the three cases one book was the 
most significant for South African Islamic feminists. Mernissi’s Women and Islam,37 Wadud’s 
Qur’an and Woman38 and Ahmed’s Women and Gender in Islam39 were avidly read, quoted and 
debated. All three concentrate on Islamic scripture and feminist interpretations of these. Wadud’s 
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focus is the Qur’ān, Mernissi’s is the  ad th, and Ahmed – while discussing both of these – is more 
focussed on Muslim history and the subversion of the position of women as history progressed from 
the era of the Prophet Muhammad. 
 
Generally, these three scholars argue that the denial of women’s rights is not inherent in Islam or 
part of Islamic scripture – especially the Qur’ān – but is a later development. That later 
development might be the accretions to  ad th literature40 or the new political structures that 
developed with the expansion of the Muslim empire.
41
 
 
‘It was not the text which restricted women,’ says Wadud, ‘but the interpretations of that text which 
have come to be held in greater importance than the text itself.’42 Her work seeks to review the 
Qur’ān ‘with its principles of social justice and human equality, and its objective of guidance.’43 
She insists that 
Femininity and masculinity are not created characteristics imprinted into the very primordial 
nature of female and male persons, neither are they concepts the Qur’an discusses or alludes 
to. They are defined characteristics applied to female and male persons respectively on the 
basis of culturally determined factors.
44
 
 
According to Mernissi, 
If women’s rights are a problem for some Muslim men, it is neither because of the Koran 
nor the Prophet, nor the Islamic tradition, but simply because those rights conflict with the 
interests of a male elite.
45
 
 
In her Women and Islam, Mernissi attempts to scrape away the additions to Qur’ānic 
interpretations, particularly a ād th that she argues are based on the ‘interests of the male elite’ in 
order to reveal an Islamic tradition which does not regard women’s rights as ‘a problem’. 
 
For Ahmed, the Qur’ān displays a tension between ‘pragmatic’ and ‘ethical’ perspectives as far as 
the position of women is concerned.
46
 She argues that the pragmatic perspective was context-bound 
and the ethical perspective is the one that should persist and determine gender relations. Engineer
47
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argues similarly that the Qur’ān contains provisions that are ‘contextual’ and those that are 
‘normative’. In Muslim history, argues Ahmed, the pragmatic [and legal] perspectives overwhelmed 
the ethical, thus resulting in an understanding of Islam which was misogynistic. 
 
These scholars tackled issues of Muslim women’s oppression as they related to the inherent nature 
of women as well how such oppression, disadvantage or discrimination manifested itself in the 
public and private domains, showing that the objective of Islamic scripture was the empowerment 
and emancipation of women rather than their subjugation. At the level of women’s nature this 
included issues such as the notion that women were inherently weaker or less intellectual than men. 
On the public level, questions of women’s leadership and other roles within the community were 
addressed. And on the private level, the relative roles of women and men in the family were dealt 
with. Such an approach – which looked at the Qur’ān and Sunnāh for inspiration for the 
emancipation of women – was one which appealed to South African Islamic feminists. These were 
people who were committed to their faith and were grappling with seeming contradictions they saw 
in their religion and how those contradictions related to their lives. That the scriptures on which 
their faith and religious practice were based held the potential for the emancipation of women 
meant these contradictions could be resolved in favour of a gender equitable understanding of 
Islam. These women-liberatory elements of Islamic thought internationally then manifested 
themselves in Islamic thought within South Africa. 
 
South African Islamic Feminist Thought – the 1990s 
Within South Africa, a more sophisticated understanding of the position and role of women took 
root in the 1990s. As pointed out earlier, however, these issues had already started to be debated in 
the late 1980s. Esack says that there is not ‘sufficient of a discourse’ within Islamic feminism to talk 
of trends. One should rather talk of attitudes towards gender justice, he suggests.
48
 The ‘attitudes’ 
he refers to he labels as ‘traditionalist’, ‘modernist/apologist/loopholist’ and ‘radical’. I prefer not to 
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use these descriptions because I regard them as being too judgemental and I do not believe the 
attempt to understand Islamic feminisms in South Africa is served by these categories. 
 
I do, however, assert in this section that in praxis, the rethinking about women in Islam manifested 
itself as a range of ideas and positions. This range included positions with nuanced differences in 
praxis from each other. I will discuss here mainly two categories within the range – realising that 
there were positions in between: the gender activist and the academic categories.
49
 The first position 
includes those people who were primarily activists, working in the community and whose primary 
task is the practical alleviation of the plight of Muslim women and the struggle for women’s rights. 
The second category includes those Islamic feminists who have focussed their energies on the 
development of thought around gender issues and whose primary contribution has been academic. 
This is a difficult categorisation to make because none of the Islamic feminists can be said to be 
only activists or only academics. All have contributed both at the level of thought and activism, but 
my distinction is in relation to their primary activities (in the 1990s). The effects of my 
categorisation will become clearer as I proceed. While there are a large number of people that could 
fall into each of these categories, I will discuss the first category with reference to Shamima Shaikh, 
and the second with reference to Farid Esack.
50
 I will also, however, refer to interviews and writings 
of other Islamic feminists as well. 
 
‘I’m just a housewife,’ was a favourite refrain of Shamima Shaikh.51 While her Islamic feminist 
comrades might not agree that she was just a housewife, Shaikh’s statement makes a point about 
how she viewed her role in the world of feminist activism. For her, feminist activism was primarily 
about action in support of the rights that women were denied. Her ideas, positions and approach to 
Islamic scripture – like that of others in this ‘activist’ category – are informed by their activism and 
the experiences of women they interacted with. Shaikh and Firdouza Waggie, for example, both 
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worked with divorced Muslim women; Shaikh in an informal manner and Waggie through the 
Divorce Support Group which she was instrumental in initiating. 
 
Both of them were also centrally involved in drawing up and distributing a questionnaire to Muslim 
women nationally. The questionnaire was a project of the MYM Gender Desk and the objective was 
to collect information from Muslim women about their experiences as women. It focussed 
particularly on issues related to marital life and women’s expectations of marriage. Part of the 
purpose of developing the questionnaire was for the Gender Desk to understand the challenges 
Muslim women face and to develop programmes around those challenges – particularly as regards 
the issue of Muslim Personal Law. Such projects meant that the activist Islamic feminist attempted 
to allow her feminism to be influenced by the needs of Muslim women on the ground. 
 
While Shaikh has been hailed by many for the radical positions that she articulated and the radical 
and courageous actions that she undertook in support of those positions,
52
 she was less concerned 
about developing radical positions than about the practical alleviation of women’s difficulties. In 
the last paper she presented before her death, ‘Women and Islam – the Gender Struggle in South 
Africa: The Ideological Struggle’, she speaks out against an anti-intellectualist position that she 
believes was characterising progressive Muslim discourse. At the same time, however, that paper in 
itself does not pretend to be an academic paper and the arguments that she makes there substantiate 
my assertion about her. One example that will suffice is the manner in which she interprets the 
contentious qawwamūn verse of the Qur’ān (4:34). This verse has been one that Islamic feminists 
internationally grapple with and attempt to reconcile with their notions of gender equality. The 
verse states: 
Men are qawwamūn (maintainers/protectors) of women, for Allah has preferred (faddalā) 
some over others, and (on the basis) of what they spend of their property. So the righteous 
women (salihāt) are qanitāt (obedient), guarding in secret that which Allah has guarded. As 
from those whom you fear nushūz (rebellion), admonish them, banish them to beds apart, 
and scourge/beat them. Then, if they obey you, seek not a way against them. 
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Shaikh’s approach to the verse is a simplistic, practical one that might be useful for activists relating 
to abused women but not satisfactory in terms of the ideals of gender equality that she promotes. 
Regarding the most contentious part of this verse – ‘As from those whom you fear nushūz 
(rebellion), admonish them, banish them to beds apart, and scourge/beat them’ – she suggests that 
there are three stages of correcting: admonish them, banish them to beds apart, and then beat 
them lightly. The one that causes most grief in the community is that men are allowed to 
‘beat’ women or one individual is allowed to beat another, especially in a marriage… But if 
I look at the stages through which one goes, through the process, first it’s ‘admonish them’. 
(If it says ‘beat them lightly’ then admonishing would be, for example, just saying ‘stop it’ 
or something like that. Not yelling or shouting, but something light.) And then ‘banish them 
to beds apart’. I don’t believe anybody, any rapist or abuser – according to the profiles for 
such people – will get to this second stage. Rapists and abusers (that are spouses), generally 
they’d sleep with her first. Generally they sleep with the victim then beat them, then sleep 
with them again. A normal, good Muslim will never reach that stage, the stage of banishing 
them. An abusive husband will do things the other way around.
53
 
 
This is clearly a defensive and apologetic position that does not seriously grapple with the text and 
does not attempt to either deconstruct or contextualise the verse (even though she argues that the 
Qur’ān and  ad th must be contextualised). Despite her recommendation to read Ahmed, Wadud 
and Mernissi who agonise about interpretation, Shaikh avoids getting into an interpretive debate 
about the verse. It seems that for her such a debate seemed unnecessary; the more important issue 
was subverting the oppressive interpretations of the verse in any way – even an apologetic one – in 
order to ease the plight of abused women. 
 
While activists like Shaikh do not shy away from dealing with difficult verses like 4:34 and difficult 
a ād th, they prefer to focus on other verses and traditions that clearly promote gender equality. 
Hence Shaikh could say that, ‘The Qur'an declares the absolute moral and spiritual equality of men 
and women,’54 and support her assertion by quoting Qur’ān 33:35: 
For Muslim men and Muslim women, for believing men and believing women, for devout 
men and devout women, for true men and true women, for men and women who are patient 
and constant, for men and women who humble themselves, for men and women who give in 
charity, for men and women who fast (and deny themselves), for men and women who 
guard their chastity, and for men and women who engage much in Allah’s praise, for them 
has Allah prepared forgiveness and great reward. 
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Shaikh concludes that, ‘This passage makes a clear statement about the absolute equality of the 
human moral condition and identical spiritual and moral obligations placed on all individuals 
regardless of sex,’ (emphasis mine). She also quotes other verses (3:195, 49:13, 19:17-19, 28:7, 
27:22-23) to argue for the equality of women and men, to argue that women received revelation 
from God and to show that the Qur’ān praises and therefore supports the leadership roles of women 
– even as rulers of nations.55 
 
Shaikh is characteristic of those in the activist category who, while very critical of contemporary 
Muslim society and its practices towards women, are defensive of the scripture and the early 
Muslim community: 
Despite the overwhelming and strong position of Muslims that Islam liberated women 1400 
years ago, you still find there’s a problem. Some thought and practice within Muslim society 
does not reflect this conviction, giving rise to the accusation that Islam oppresses women, to 
which the Muslim community reacts emotionally with denial and animosity, without 
reflecting inwardly and addressing the existing problems.
56
 
 
This manner of interpreting scripture (interpretation which will be easily acceptable to other 
Muslim women) of the ‘activist’ Islamic feminists is also reflected in their attitude to the ‘feminist’ 
label. Waggie makes a statement typical of this group when she says: ‘I would feel that I am an 
Islamic feminist, but I wont say so publicly,’ because ‘Muslims are opposed to the notion of women 
being superior.’57 
 
Such caution is also reflected in the way ‘activist feminists’ prefer to deal with conflictual issues. 
While the obituaries about Shaikh reflect her courage in the face of opposition and people like 
Waggie, Fatima Nordien and Sa’diyya Shaikh were unflinching in their support of Islamic feminist 
causes – such as the Wadud lecture at Claremont Main Rd Mosque in 1994 – they are sensitive to 
the effects that their positions and actions have on the broader community. Sa’diyya Shaikh’s58 
insistence that issues of conflict must be dealt with ‘with compassion’59 is a reflection of that 
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attitude, as is Shamima Shaikh’s insistence for dialogue with the United Ulama Council of South 
Africa.
60
 
 
It is important to note that despite the relatively less sophisticated discourse of the ‘activist feminist’ 
of the 1990s, she was not unconfident in her positions in relation to the ‘academic feminist’. 
Chapter Two highlighted some of that confidence of the 1990s. Earlier, in the 1980s for example, 
activist women generally took direction – even in terms of issues of women and Islam – from the 
‘more knowledgeable’ men. Mahdi Samodien, an MYM activist from the early 1980s and husband 
of Waggie – reflects on the new confidence of the 1990s: ‘Women are wanting to give expression to 
reinterpreting Islam from a woman’s perspective and assert themselves according to Islam. Only a 
female can appreciate the depth of the oppression of women… The trump is the woman’s view.’61 
 
Having briefly examined the views and attitudes of the ‘activist Islamic feminist’ I now turn to the 
‘academic feminist’. In this category I will examine mainly the views of Farid Esack. Others in the 
academic category include Ebrahim Moosa and Abdulkader Tayob.
62
 I have decided to focus on 
Esack because I believe he represents the extreme position –furthest from the ‘activist’ – in the 
academic category. He refers to himself as being on the ‘radical edge’ of Islamic feminism.63 I want 
to briefly unpack here what that ‘radical edge’ is. 
 
Esack was one of the four founder members of the Call of Islam. He left the organisation in 1989 
and devoted himself to academia, getting a PhD and pursuing post-doctoral studies in Germany. In 
1997 he was appointed to South Africa’s Commission on Gender Equality. According to Esack, his 
recent article ‘Islam and Gender Justice: Beyond Simplistic Apologia’64 is ‘the furthest that people 
have gone in looking at the Qur’ānic text and its patriarchal nature and the patriarchal nature of 
God.’65 An analysis of this article will therefore form the main part of my explication of Esack as 
someone belonging to the ‘academic’ position.66 
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Esack sees the Islamic feminist struggle leading to ‘the absolute equality of men and women; 
unqualified equality as far as imams, inheritance, etc are concerned’.67 However, he does not seem 
keen to uncover the liberatory aspects of scripture that actually assist in moving society in that 
direction. The activist approach of focussing on the verses and traditions that promote ‘the absolute 
equality of men and women’68 is not one that Esack favours; and this is a significant difference 
between the two approaches. While the activist’s imperative is the women she has to deal with on a 
regular basis, the academic’s imperative seems to be more one of taking further the process of 
textual deconstruction and developing hermeneutics than the application of such deconstruction and 
hermeneutics in the lives of ordinary women. Esack’s ‘Islam and Gender Justice’ is an example of 
this. 
 
While the activist grapples with the scripture in order to use it to uplift the condition of Muslim 
women, the academic project has the danger of being more selfish. In Esack’s words: 
So, whom am I writing for? I write for myself. I want greater clarity about how and why it is 
possible for me to be a Muslim with a passionate commitment to both the Qur’an and to 
gender justice.
69
 
 
And, ‘Our view of what we owe to women, is really a view of what we owe to ourselves.’70 
Pointing out that gender injustice results in men also being in ‘bondage’, he says: ‘Although I, as a 
male, may therefore owe women many debts, the debt is essentially to myself. I owe it to my own 
humanity to be free and for this reason work for gender justice.’71 Such an approach liberates the 
reader-academic from the need to be sensitive to, firstly, the women for whose sake the 
reinterpretation of scripture is undertaken and, secondly, to those who oppose gender equality and 
who impose their gender unjust views on Muslim society. The activist, who is not liberated in the 
same kind of way, would not be able to openly state that ‘if a choice has to be made between 
violence towards the text and textual legitimization of violence against real people, then I would be 
comfortable to plead guilty to the former.’72 
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This approach manifests itself in the methodology Esack uses in interpreting various contentious 
verses of the Qur’ān (which, as I pointed out, are the ones he prefers to focus on). He often provides 
the most patriarchal and misogynist translation of a verse simply in order to then be able to critique 
it as being patriarchal. In doing so, he does ‘violence towards the text’, imposing words and 
meanings that might not exist. I will examine Esacks’ interpretation of Qur’ān 4:34 to illustrate the 
above assertion. 
 
Esack’s reading of the contentious verse 4:34 is the clearest example of his imposition onto the text. 
He translates the verse in the following way: 
Men are qawwamun (the Protectors and maintainers) of/over (‘ala) women, 
Because God has faddala (preferred) some of them over others, 
and because they support them from their means. 
Therefore the salihat (righteous) women are qanitat (devoutly obedient), 
and guard in their husbands’ absence what God would have them guard. 
As to those women on whose part you fear nushuz (ill-conduct \ disobedience) 
Admonish them, refuse to share their beds and beat them 
But if they return again to obedience seek not means against them  
for God is the most high, Great above you.
73
 
 
I will not engage in a full critique of Esack’s interpretation of this verse. It will suffice to raise a few 
points. While he gives some of the key words of the verse in the Arabic before translating them, 
Esack does not attempt to problematise these key words but prefers to accept traditional 
translations. This does an injustice to the excellent work done by feminist scholars like Amina 
Wadud
74
 and Riffat Hassan
75
 who deal with this verse in detail, problematising these key words and 
attempting to present all possible readings of the words and of the verse as a whole. Barbara 
Stowasser analyses some of these views – of Rahman, Amina Wadud-Muhsin, Abdullahi al-Na’im 
and Nasr Abu Zayd – relating to this verse, showing how their interpretations differ from the 
traditional ones.
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‘The Qur’an actually has a word for female disobedience, nushuz,’ claims Esack in reference to this 
verse.
77
 A quick response would be to quote the first part of 4:128: ‘If a wife fears nushūz on her 
husband’s part, there is no blame on them if they arrange an amicable settlement between 
themselves.’ Clearly, the Qur’ān uses the word nushūz in the context of the verse that it is located 
within. In 4:34 it is about women’s nushūz; in 4:128 it is about husbands’ nushūz. It is not, as Esack 
alleges, a word created by the Qur’ān especially for ‘female disobedience’. 
 
Referring to the word qanitāt, Esack says: ‘While liberal readers insist that… qanitat (the obedient) 
refers to obedience to God, most of the traditional interpreters have viewed this as obedience to the 
wishes of the husband and suggest that this, in fact, is an extension – even a condition, of 
righteousness.’78 Esack continues, in his attempt to give the most patriarchal view of the verse, by 
then concluding that all the feminist scholars are actually wrong and ‘the traditional exegetes are 
nearer to the truth in their fusion of duty to God and to husband’.79 His next sentence is perhaps the 
most obvious attempt at imposing meaning on the verse. He repeats his translation of the fragment 
of the verse: ‘The righteous wives are those who “guard in their husbands’ absence what God would 
have them guard”.’ The problem with his translation is that the word ‘husband’ does not occur here. 
Indeed, the word ‘husband’ does not occur even once in the verse. Yet he imposes it onto the verse 
to prove a ‘fusion of duty to God and to husband’. 
 
Since the objective of Islamic feminisms is the emancipation of Muslim women, it does not help for 
Islamic feminists to suggest to Muslim women that they cannot ‘be content with a Transcendent 
who speaks about you and rarely to you’.80 Such an approach could actually serve to disempower 
women who look to Islamic feminists for their empowerment and emancipation. The difference in 
the manner that Qur’ānic verses about women are problematised by activist feminists and by 
academic feminists like Esack are an indication of the location of each. The activist locates 
her/himself among disadvantaged Muslim women; the academic is liberated from them. 
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In this section I have discussed some elements of Islamic feminist thought in South Africa. There is 
a range of such thought and not all positions could be covered. My purpose was to analyse two 
extremes
81
 within the spectrum. I thus looked at what I called an activist Islamic feminist 
articulation and an academic articulation; the former being represented (in this Report) by Shamima 
Shaikh and Firdouza Waggie and the latter by Farid Esack. Some implications of these different 
articulations will be dealt with in Chapter Five. 
 
Conclusion 
The term ‘feminism’ is a contested term among many people who struggle for the emancipation of 
women. Many Third World women activists apply it to themselves with circumspection and often 
after redefining it. Many Muslim women’s rights activists face a similar dilemma. I have examined 
this issue in this Chapter. Further, taking into consideration the views of Muslim feminist activists, I 
have proposed a definition of Islamic feminism as an ideology that promotes and struggles for 
gender equality using the Qur’an and Sunnāh as the motivating factors and the tools. Thus, I have 
argued that Islamic feminisms are different in certain important respects from Western feminisms 
and such differences shape the form and substance of Islamic feminisms differently. 
 
I have looked at the thought of certain prominent international Islamic feminist scholars who have 
had a profound impact on the South African scene. Such scholars as Amina Wadud, Fatima 
Mernissi and Leila Ahmed have proposed feminist readings of Islamic scripture – the Qur’ān and 
 ad th – and of Muslim history. These readings and the hermeneutical theories that informed them 
were appropriated by Islamic feminists in South Africa and developed into local Islamic thought 
that would also influence feminist action. 
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Feminist thought and action in South Africa, however, fall within a spectrum of positions. 
Attempting to analyse all these positions or tendencies is a task that cannot be accomplished in this 
Research Report. I therefore critically analysed two positions within this spectrum: what I called the 
‘feminist-activist’ and the ‘feminist-academic’ positions. Having argued that Islamic feminists in 
South Africa have been influenced by international Islamic feminist thought, I will look – in the 
next chapter – at another significant influence on the emergence of Islamic feminisms in South 
Africa: the impact of the national liberation struggle. 
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Chapter Four Re-Acting 
 THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE 
 ON THE EMERGENCE OF ISLAMIC FEMINISMS 
Introduction 
Apartheid was an all-pervasive ideology that affected the all aspects of the lives of South Africans: 
where we lived, where and how we were educated, whom we could marry, whom we could have 
sex with, what we said, who we said it to… in short, apartheid defined who we were. It is not 
surprising then, that the struggle against apartheid (and capitalism, depending on where on the 
opposition political spectrum one located oneself) also became pervasive for those engaged in the 
struggle’1. For anti-apartheid activists, the national liberation struggle in South Africa deeply 
affected how people thought, how they behaved, who they befriended, how they prayed, how they 
worked… 
 
This Chapter will briefly examine how feminisms in South Africa emerged out of the national 
liberation struggle. The political involvement of sections of the Muslim community in the struggle 
against apartheid had a definite impact on how they viewed a range of issues. How the national 
liberation struggle shaped Islamic understandings and struggles around women and, more broadly, 
gender, will be explored in this Chapter. I will argue that there was a similar development within 
Islamic discourse as the anti-apartheid Islamism that swept South Africa in the 1980s – and located 
itself within the broad national liberation struggle – provided the impetus for the emergence of 
Islamic feminisms. Thus, an important focus of this Chapter will be the interaction between the 
Islamic Movement and the national liberation struggle and how such an interaction influenced 
Islamic feminisms. In order to accomplish this I will again look at the manifestations of Islamic 
feminisms in the Call of Islam and the Muslim Youth Movement. Finally, I will argue that there 
was a difference in the articulation of gender issues between men and women who entered the 
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Islamic feminist terrain depending on whether they entered through the Islamic Movement or 
through the national liberation struggle. 
 
Feminism in South Africa in the 1990s 
In this section I will briefly examine the development of feminism in the South African context in 
the 1990s and how such a development was related to the national liberation struggle. This section 
will provide a parallel with the next section which will examine the impact of the national liberation 
struggle on Islamic feminisms in South Africa. 
 
Many South African scholars have argued that there was no real feminist movement in South Africa 
until the beginning of the 1990s.
2
 Others suggest that a feminist movement did exist – although not 
self-conscious. The Malibongwe Conference held in January 1990 in the Netherlands – two weeks 
prior to the unbanning of the liberation movement – and which brought together women from 
within and without South Africa for the first time, is heralded by many as the beginning of the 
emergence of feminism or of a feminist movement in South Africa.
3
 
 
The 1980s saw the development of strong women’s organisations like the United Women’s 
Organisation, the Natal Organisation of Women and the Federation of Transvaal women. This was 
also the period of increased anti-apartheid resistance in the townships and women emerged a 
powerful force fighting around ‘bread and butter issues’. However, the relationships between class, 
race and gender were only seriously explored in the trade union movement.
4
 The increased role of 
women as political actors generated new political debates about the possible transformation of 
political organisations so that they might take account of women’s interests and facilitate women’s 
participation.
5
 Thus, the Malibongwe conference came at an opportune time. It ‘legitimated 
feminism as a political discourse’6 and ‘the position and status of women were legitimated as 
political issues to be addressed within the process of national liberation’.7 An important aspect of 
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the conference was the networking between South African women and women from other 
countries: Palestine, Mozambique, Angola, etc.
8
 
 
Hassim’s prediction that the political transitionary period to follow Malibongwe would provide the 
space for a feminist movement to emerge
9
 was proven to be true soon after the unbanning of the 
liberation movements. Four months after the Malibongwe conference the ANC issued a landmark 
policy statement on women’s emancipation.10 For the first time in the liberation struggle, an official 
position from a major section of the liberation movement acknowledged the centrality of gender 
equality to national liberation and its role in a future constitution. The document also called on the 
ANC Women’s League to initiate a debate that will result in a Charter of Women’s Rights. This call 
led to the establishment of the multi-party and multi-organisational Women’s National Coalition 
(WNC). The WNC was a broad front of women from across the racial, political, cultural and 
religious divides for the singular purpose of ensuring equality for women in the new constitution. It 
‘helped to bring [gender equality] directly into the mainstream of public discourse at a critical 
political moment – that of negotiating the new democracy.’11 But it also served as a platform on 
which to mobilise women and women’s organisations for gender equality. By 1994 when it 
presented its ‘Women’s Charter for Effective Equality’ to a Women’s Convention, the WNC had 90 
national organisations and 14 regional coalitions as its members.
12
 
 
Besides women being organised in the WNC, the various negotiations processes leading up to 
democratic elections in April 1994 also saw increased women involvement. CODESA I virtually 
excluded women completely; CODESA II saw a symbolic feminist victory with the formation of 
the multiparty Gender Advisory Committee (GAC) as a result of pressure by the ANC Women’s 
League (ANCWL). The ANCWL’s policy section also made input into the terms of reference of the 
CODESA working groups and into ANC positions in the negotiations. And the GAC also allowed 
civil society gender activists and academics to get intimately involved with the process. Women had 
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even more impact in the second round of negotiations as they were included in all negotiating teams 
in the Multiparty Negotiating Process (MNP). The WNC was also involved in the MNP. The end of 
the negotiating processes saw the adoption of the interim constitution which was widely recognised 
as having tremendously advanced the cause of gender equality. The rest of the decade was witness 
to even more political gains being made as women were included in large numbers (albeit still not 
in terms of their demographic proportion) on party lists for election and the strengthening of the 
‘triple alliance’ of women politicians, activists and academics.13 
 
The Emergence of Islamic Feminisms in the 1990s 
While the Muslim scenario did not mirror the above national process in the emergence of 
feminisms – especially in terms of party politics,14 I will argue in this section that there were similar 
developments, at around the same time, in the emergence of Islamic feminisms. Diagram 1 
illustrates some of these similarities. 
 
Islamic feminisms of the 1990s developed out of organisations and through individuals that had 
played a role in the struggle against Apartheid – notably in the 1980s. From the previous section it 
is clear that the development of general feminisms in South Africa followed a similar path. The 
nationalist struggle (converging with a class struggle) in South Africa led to the development of a 
strong human rights discourse among left activists and intellectuals. This then led to feminist 
discourses. From a Muslim perspective the process began with an Islamist discourse influenced 
mainly by international Muslim politics. Islamic anti-Apartheid activists were also part of the 
nationalist struggle (and class struggle) and attempted to develop Islamic discourses of this struggle. 
These discourses, overlapping with the general human rights discourses, led to attempted Islamic 
discourses of human rights. These ‘Islamic human rights’ discourses then interfaced with the South 
African women’s rights / feminist discourses, and was heavily influenced by international Islamic 
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modernist discourses and international Islamic discourses on gender equality to result in the 
emergence of indigenous South African feminist discourses. 
 
 
Diagram 1 
 
From Chapter Two it becomes clear that in terms of two organisations – the MYM and the Call – 
the beginning of the 1990s saw some differences in their approach to feminist issues. By 1990, 
increased political activity, interfaith relations and women’s rights became among the most 
important issues on the MYM’s agenda.15 On the other hand, by 1989 the Call had begun to 
somewhat downplay its message of gender equality. This development was, to some extent, also 
attributable to the Call’s involvement in the struggle. In its efforts to draw in the ‘ulamā into the 
liberation struggle, the Call was willing to compromise on some of its positions that were 
unpalatable to Islamic conservatism. Chapter Two has explored in more detail the attitude of the 
Call towards the ‘ulamā. One of these issues that was compromised was that of women’s equality. 
Secondly, while the Call began as an Islamic organisation attempted to develop a comprehensive 
Islamic programme, its focus soon became political activity and for the sake of mobilising support 
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for the national liberation struggle, compromises had to be made. The women agenda was one of 
those. Tahir Sitoto says that the Call was 
reacting to things that were happening in the broader South African socio-political milieu. 
There were perceived to be priority items [for the Call]. If it meant that if you took up the 
gender issue you are going to be marginalized within the Muslim community (and they 
wanted to politically see themselves as having some hegemony)… and their political 
following would be at stake, they would rather sacrifice principle for political expediency.
16
 
 
In this respect the Call mirrored the strategy of its political mentor, the ANC. Hassim points to the 
August 1990 re-launch of the ANCWL as a ‘depressing affair for feminists’ and argued that ‘the 
priority for the Women’s League remains organising women for national liberation’.17 She also 
talks about the ‘macho nature of politics’ in which the UDF was involved in the 1980s.18 And 
Patricia Horn laments that women’s 
fear of creating divisions in the national liberation struggle has led to the development of a 
women’s movement which is afraid of seriously challenging patriarchal domination. This 
timidity comes through in the general avoidance within the mass women’s movement of 
strategic gender interests.
19
 
 
Farid Esack criticised these attitudes in 1991 when he was a spokesperson for the UDF. He called 
for a feminist appreciation by the liberation movement and slated it as being male-dominated and of 
wanting to postpone women’s issues to after the non-racial struggle has been won.20 
 
The influence of the national liberation struggle was also seen in the fact that by the late-1980s the 
MYM and the Call often linked political questions with women’s issues. An example was at a 1988 
conference organised by these organisations – under the name of the ‘Campaign for Muslim 
Awareness’ – ostensibly to discuss Islamic Law but in reality to encourage a boycott of the 
municipal elections. Calling for a boycott of the elections or organising meetings that called for 
such boycotts were illegal and the organisations planned a mass meeting in Lenasia, Johannesburg, 
under the seemingly-innocent theme of ‘Shari’ah and South African Law’. At the meeting, a 
‘women’s caucus’ – led by veteran anti-apartheid activist Fatima Meer – resolved to ‘disarm’ the 
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‘ulamā organisations and called for a number of actions to support the struggles of Muslim 
women.
21
 
 
In 1990 the MYM adopted three national campaigns. One of these was the Women’s Rights 
Campaign; another was the Living Wage Campaign. These two, particularly the latter, was a clear 
indication of the influence of the MYM’s interactions within the national liberation struggle.22 ‘The 
problem of emancipating women,’ noted a women’s rights campaign brochure, ‘is to change the 
overall relationship between male and female.’23 One of the objectives listed in the brochure – ‘To 
examine the various verses in the Qur’an that contain “both the potential for oppression and 
liberation” of women and look at exploiting the latter’ – was another instance of the language of the 
liberation struggle permeating the work of the MYM and influencing, particularly, its women’s 
rights agenda. 
 
Soon after the launch of that campaign, the MYM in Transvaal focussed on the women in mosques 
issue. However, unlike in the past when the MYM contented itself with speaking and writing 
pamphlets about the issue, MYM women now decided on a more confrontational approach. There 
were two reasons for this new approach. Firstly, women themselves now ran the campaign. While 
in earlier years the MYM could speak and write about the need for women to have space in 
mosques, they – as men – never had to flagrantly defy mosque’s policies by actually going to 
mosques. This is exactly what the women had to do. Secondly, the decade of the 1980s, with its 
political activism, seemed to have given the younger activists a greater sense of bravado. This 
confrontational approach was also one that required more mobilisation, and mobilising was a skill 
MYM activists had learnt well through political activity in the 1980s. Just before the Muslim month 
of Ramadan in 1993, MYM women activists anonymously printed pamphlets calling on women to 
attend the Tarawīh prayer daily at the 23rd Street Mosque in Fietas, Johannesburg. The pamphlets 
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were distributed at shopping centres and, reflecting 1980s-type political activity, through door-to-
door visits.  
 
The manner in which Islamic feminists got involved in the Muslim Personal Law Board (MPLB) 
also reflected some of the influences of the national liberation struggle. Various pieces of 
correspondence between particularly the MYM and the either the executive of the MPLB or the 
United Ulama Council of South Africa (UUCSA) are indications of the ‘struggle language’ that was 
in vogue among these activists. And the last Board meeting – which was what caused the UUCSA 
to decide to disband the Board – showed how 1980s-type political organising had become normal 
methodology for progressive Muslims. The disbandment followed a period of intense organisation 
and mobilisation by the MYM Gender Desk and the Call. The last Board meeting was characterised 
by organising and debating techniques that these two organisations brought from their legacy in the 
national liberation struggle. The Gender Desk also mobilised women that were not members of the 
Board to attend the meeting as observers in its effort to promote ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’. 
 
The issue of MPL also afforded Islamic feminists another voice, a voice in the national rights 
discourse. Members of the MYM Gender Desk represented the organisation at various 
Constitutional Assembly hearings to put forward the idea of a ‘Just MPL’. The stark contrast 
between the feminist and conservative positions is well illustrated by the debates around the clause 
on religious systems of family law in the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
Members of the UUCSA argued that this clause and the clause on freedom of religion should be 
allowed to trump other clauses in the Bill of Rights. Their main concern seemed to be that the 
Equality Clause might be used to interfere in their interpretation of MPL. Islamic feminists, on the 
other hand, argued that MPL was consistent with gender equality and there was no need for any 
such exemption. It must be noted that their passionate defence of the constitution and its equality 
clause was not only motivated by their Islamic ideology. These anti-apartheid activists were 
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defending a document which they believed they had struggled for for decades and which 
encapsulated the achievements of that struggle. Shaikh, echoing the views of progressive Muslims 
throughout the country, argued that customary and religious family law ‘cannot be exempted from 
the Bill of Rights and be allowed to perpetuate inequalities. To even consider excluding any sector 
of society from being covered by the Bill of Rights is an injustice and makes a mockery of the 
Bill.’24 Hujaij said that she recognised the ‘absolute equality of men and women as sanctioned by 
the Qur’an.’25 Bosch pleaded for a review of Islamic law to bring it into line with the transformation 
taking place in the country and with constitutional provisions.
26
 For Islamic feminists the positive 
outcome of the anti-apartheid jihad had become a terrain for the gender jihad. 
 
I have already pointed out that by the early 1990s Islamic feminists in South Africa were being 
influenced by the likes of Amina Wadud, Fatima Mernissi and Leila Ahmed, whose methods and 
ideas were being effectively employed to argue for discourses of gender equality. But one of the 
local developments that also assisted in developing these discourses was the establishment of the 
Women’s National Coalition which both the MYM Gender Desk and the Call became members 
of.
27
 While both organisations had small representations in the WNC, the demands developed there 
were enthusiastically taken up and both organisations promoted the Women’s Charter idea within 
the Muslim community through their various structures.
28
 
 
In conclusion, it might be noted that no interaction results only in a one-way transfer of knowledge. 
Indeed, some Islamic feminists would argue that the Islamic feminist discourse was much more 
active in the national scene and was not just a passive recipient. Esack – then a member of the 
Commission on Gender Equality – wrote that 
the Call of Islam’s pioneering, regular and consistent use of the term ‘non-sexist’ [in the 
slogan ‘non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa’] at a time when it was not 
cliché loaded means that was our own vision long before it became a cliché in the liberation 
movement.
29
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While some of his claims like this one might seem far-fetched, it is important to note that Islamic 
feminists believes their feminists efforts did impact on the national discourses. Perhaps he goes too 
far, however, when he says that the national liberation struggle had no impact on the Call. Indeed, 
according to him, 
the Call of Islam was the only non-women’s organisation [in the UDF] that consistently put 
women on the agenda of the national liberation struggle. We didn’t pick up the vibes from 
them, we enriched the vibes… At Women’s Day meetings we would lay down the line; 
[UDF leader] Cheryl Carolus would follow suit.
30
 
 
He goes even further: ‘I was the first user of the phrase “non-sexist South Africa”. It is quite 
conceivable that I coined the term.’31 He suggests that his efforts were probably responsible for the 
insertion of – or, at least, for the ‘widest coverage’ of – the ‘non-sexist’ in the ANC’s call for a 
‘non-racist, non-sexist democratic South Africa’ in the 1980s.32 
 
Same Struggles, Different Struggles? 
The foregoing discussions suggest that the intersection with the national struggle did not have 
uniform results on the progressive Islamic Movement. Other factors were also significant. These 
include race, political allegiances, socio-economic background, gender, etc. It will not be possible 
for me to cover all of these distinctions here. However, I will use a brief discussion of certain 
membership trends in and interactions between members of the MYM and the Call to argue that 
activists’ political and Islamic backgrounds and their gender influenced their responses to the 
feminist challenges presented to them. I will refer to four groups of people and their entry onto the 
terrain of Islamic feminism: women who enter from a background in the liberation movement; men 
who enter from a background in the liberation movement; women who enter from a background in 
the Islamic Movement; men who enter from a background in the Islamic Movement (see Diagram 
2). 
 94 
NATIONAL LIBERATION 
STRUGGLE
The Terrain of Islamic 
Feminism
ISLAMIC MOVEMENT
men
women
women
men
 
Diagram 2 
 
Bosch and Shaikh were among the most vociferous in the MYM’s articulation of feminism. 
Interestingly, although both were committed Muslims, their entry into the Islamic Movement was 
through nationalist liberation organisations. Bosch was a member of the Gender Desk of the 
National Association of Democratic Lawyers before she was recruited to the MYM and its Gender 
Desk. She was recruited to the MYM when the MYM identified her as an ideal candidate to work 
on Muslim Personal Law. She entered the MYM with the experience obtained from a professional 
association that was anti-apartheid and in the Congress tradition. This experience included ways of 
working, strategising and even understandings of concepts like negotiation, compromise, the 
relationship between strategy and principles, etc. Shaikh had been an activist with the Black 
Consciousness organisation, the Azanian Peoples Organisation (Azapo). About five years after 
having already been involved in the heat of struggle through Azapo, and having also gotten 
involved with Muslim student organisations, she joined the MYM. She, then, also came to the 
Islamic Movement with her own political baggage. 
 
In contrast to these two activists, most of the earlier female MYM activists had been schooled in 
politics, organisation and struggle within the Islamic Movement. In the 1980s, many of these 
women often followed the feminist tendencies of the influential men in the organisation – like 
Ebrahim Moosa and Abdul Rashied Omar – and looked to these men for leadership and for their 
understandings of women’s rights in Islam. Men like Moosa and Omar were inspired in their 
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feminist inclinations by a new tendency internationally to re-examine Islamic scripture. For some of 
this re-examination, women’s issues were convenient pegs, for others Muslim women’s oppression 
was the impetus. Since men had been the leaders of the MYM for 20 years and provided the major 
ideological and other direction, it was not surprising that the women took their cue – as in the past – 
from the men in leadership. This time, however, the direction was regarding issues that affected 
them directly. By contrast, Bosch and Shaikh insisted – as seen in the MPL Board case – that as 
women it was their right to take the lead as far as women’s issues were concerned. 
 
The membership of the Call was somewhat different in their backgrounds. The Call, as was 
mentioned earlier, was formed by MYM members who broke away from that organisation. The 
original four – Esack, Rasool, Jacobs and Manie – were based in Cape Town where the Call started 
and where its initial ideology was shaped. They – all male – were schooled in the Islamic 
Movement in the form of the MYM and then entered the national liberation struggle with their 
particular understandings of principles, strategies and negotiations shaped by the Islamic Movement 
dynamic. ‘Our initial ideological hinterland was the “Islamic Movement”,’ wrote Esack. ‘The South 
African endeavour to rethink Islam for us is, in fact, the result of a marriage between the Islamic 
Movement idea of a comprehensive Islam and “the Struggle”, the battle against apartheid.’33 The 
Call’s initial forthright positions on women’s rights were drafted by this group led by Esack. This 
was the period in which – as I have argued in Chapter Two – the Call took the women’s rights 
initiative away from the MYM. 
 
By the late 1980s, as the Call grew, it began developing a group of members in Johannesburg. Most 
of these (male) members entered the Islamic Movement (the Call) with a background of 
involvement in the national struggle. They were mostly members of the Transvaal Indian Congress 
(TIC) and thus the UDF. They, then, also entered their new ideological homes with their peculiar 
political and organisational baggage. In their case that baggage was the Congress tradition of 
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struggle. While many of these men were politically fairly radical in their anti-apartheid stances, they 
were theologically conservative. They did not have the benefit of the radical Islamic schooling that 
their Cape colleagues – who came from the MYM – had. 
 
While in the MYM the group of women and the notion of women’s agency represented by Bosch 
and Shaikh had achieved ascendancy in the 1990s, the Call’s two groups (the men whose 
background was the Islamic Movement and the men whose background was the Congress 
Movement) existed side-by-side. Two examples of exchanges between Call and MYM members 
will illustrate the differences in the articulation of Islamic feminism that resulted from the different 
ideological starting points and the different genders of the protagonists. Both relate to the issue of 
women in the Muslim public domain. 
 
The day before the launch of the Muslim Personal Law Board in Durban, the leadership of the Call 
and the MYM met to discuss the possibility of a merger between the organisations. Such an 
initiative was important for progressive Muslims especially since, at about the same time, the six 
clergy founding members of the MPL Board had united to form the United Ulama Council of South 
Africa in order to have a bloc against the two progressive organisations. Thus the imperative of the 
merging of the Call and MYM became more critical. The meeting was not very fruitful. As Esack 
said, the Call ‘played the difficult suitor’.34 One of the criticisms of the Call was that the MYM did 
not respect the community because of its anti-‘ulamā stance. 
 
Within two weeks of that merger exploratory meeting, the National Chairperson of the Call, 
Johannesburg-based Yusuf Saloojee, informed me that the proposed merger would ‘never take 
place’. The Call had made this decision, he said, following the Claremont Main Road Mosque 
incident with Wadud where the MYM gave its full organisational and media backing to the mosque 
in the face of violent ideological and physical opposition from the ‘ulamā. This had proved to the 
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Call (or rather, to the Johannesburg Call) that the MYM was – in Saloojee’s words – ‘ultra-radical 
and ultra-leftist’. Saloojee’s message signalled the end of the merger talks. It was interesting that 
this was the issue on the basis of which the Call decided to end negotiations. Interesting because 
Call members in Cape Town (particularly Ebrahim Rasool, Rosieda Shabodien and by now ex-
member Esack) had supported the mosque and the MYM. This highlighted again their different 
backgrounds: Saloojee being of the group that entered the Islamic Movement from the liberation 
movement and the latter three representing the group whose background was the Islamic 
Movement. 
 
Another example occurred in Ramadan of 1997 in Johannesburg at the Masjidul Islam, a mosque 
whose ex-coordinator, Iqbal Jhazbhay, is generally regarded as being progressive. Jhazbhay, a Call 
member, was the coordinator of the mosque for the first four years of its existence. On the fourth 
Sunday in Ramadan, during a lecture at the Mosque after the Zuhr (noon) prayer, the sound system 
in the (upstairs) women’s section broke down. Two MYM female members, Shamima Shaikh and 
Jennifer A’isha Roberts, entered the men’s section of the mosque to listen to the rest of the lecture. 
Roberts was another of the women whose entry into the Islamic Movement came through the 
national liberation struggle: she had been an activist in the National Union of South African 
Students. Their action resulted in a confrontation outside the mosque the following Friday between, 
on the one hand, Shaikh and Roberts, and on the other, the mosque chairperson Akhtar Thokan, 
Jhazbhay and Muhammad Dangor, a Call member who was also an ANC member of the Gauteng 
provincial legislature.
35
 
 
According to Roberts, Dangor was the ‘least progressive’ of the three men. He had angered Shaikh 
with his reference to the 23
rd
 Street Mosque incident four years earlier and his accusation that she 
had ‘taken the women’s struggle 20 years back,’ implying that her confrontational manner was 
detrimental to the cause of women’s rights. ‘As if he knows anything about the women’s struggle,’ 
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she later retorted angrily. During the altercation Jhazbhay kept insisting that the altering of 
gendered space in the mosque must be a slow process so as not to upset ‘the community’. This was 
two years after members of the Cape Call had exposed themselves to violent retaliation by 
supporting Claremont Main Road Mosque. A year after this altercation at Masjidul Islam, on the 8 
January 1998 – the day of Shaikh’s death –women were officially allowed to pray in the main 
section of Masjidul Islam for the first time. Before the funeral prayer, Thokan approached this 
writer and informed me that he had instructed Jhazbhay to direct the women to pray in the main 
section because ‘we must set a precedent’. For the rest of that month two women that decided to 
follow through on the ‘precedent’ and pray in the main section of the mosque were begged not to 
and harassed by Jhazbhay.
36
 It is curious that Thokan, who had no political agenda, capitulated to 
the women while ANC and Call member Jhazbhay did not. 
 
This incident illustrates, again, that women asserting their agency – even their right to be part of 
Muslim public life – is seen as transgressive and destabilising to the entire community. So much so 
that it is regarded as undermining even a progressive agenda. The question that is raised, then, is 
how progressive was the Call agenda and, by implication, the TIC’s and the UDF’s. 
 
This Masjidul Islam confrontation pitted two of the four groups that I referred to at the beginning of 
this section, against each other. These two groups were 1) men who entered the Islamic feminist 
terrain with a national liberation struggle background, and 2) women who entered the Islamic 
feminist terrain with a national liberation struggle background. The difference in the understanding 
of Islamic feminism between these two groups can be symbolised by the world (representing the 
national domain) and the mosque (representing the Muslim domain). It was as if the women had the 
world and were trying to find their space in the mosque. The men, however, had the world and the 
mosque; they were willing to share the world but were afraid that if they shared the mosque they 
would lose the world. Those men’s main concern was not the feminist struggle that the women were 
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prosecuting but the result of that prosecution on their national agendas. It was the same timidity that 
Horn wrote about (see above). 
 
Conclusion 
While in Chapter Three I looked at Islamic ideological influences that assisted in the rise of Islamic 
feminisms in South Africa, in this Chapter I traced another important factor that led to the 
emergence of Islamic feminisms in South Africa in the 1990s – the national liberation struggle. I 
have argued that the manifestations of Islamic feminisms arose out of the involvement of Islamic 
activists in the anti-apartheid struggle and that their articulation of Islam and the role of women was 
shaped by the discourse of national struggle just as their articulation of feminism was shaped by 
their perspectives on Islam. I have further argued that women and men in the project of Islamic 
feminism respond differently to the stimulus provided them by the national liberation struggle and 
that while women are more committed to their feminist agendas, men are often more concerned 
about how those agendas affect national agendas. 
 
However, the types of Islamic feminisms that have developed in South Africa and the various 
stimuli to which they responded need much more study. Having noted that many Islamic feminists 
had been involved in or came from different liberation political tendencies, we need to ask how the 
ideologies of these different tendencies affect their feminist outlook. Beyond the national struggle, 
did the pushing of the limits of women’s participation in the public domain by women and men 
from the 1960s to the 1980s influence the emergence of Islamic feminism in the 1990s? Did the 
movement into the public domain by Muslim female cultural or social activists who might have had 
little understanding of feminism or of a liberatory reading of Islamic scripture serve as an impetus 
for the confidence of the feminists in the last decade? And finally, what is the substance of the 
‘liberatory potential’ of Islamic scriptures. The answers to these questions will assist in taking 
forward the project of Islamic feminism in South Africa.
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Chapter Five Phambili Makhosikazi! 
 THE POTENTIAL FOR THE FUTURE 
Looking Back on a Decade 
Islamic feminism in South Africa requires a revival. The factors that gave rise to this phenomenon 
in the 1990s still exist: the disadvantages faced by Muslim women, the patriarchy that oppressed 
women and the exclusion of most Muslim women from the Muslim public domain. But is there 
potential for such a revival of Islamic feminism? I will argue that there is. However, before 
examining the potential for the renewal of Islamic feminisms in South Africa, I will briefly review 
their existence in the past decade as I have discussed in the previous chapters of this Research 
Report. 
 
I have shown that the existence of Islamic feminisms in South Africa should be examined as two 
periods in the 1990s: from 1990 to 1998 when this phenomenon emerged and developed, and 1998 
to 2000 when it weakened and declined. Any attempt at Islamic feminist renewal needs to consider 
both these periods and the factors that resulted in each. In order to discuss these periods and the 
feminist activity therein, it was necessary for me to propose a definition of Islamic feminism so that 
the use of the term might be clearly understood and might not be trapped in misunderstanding. 
 
As far as Islamic feminisms are concerned, the developments of the 1990s, of course, followed the 
debates and activities of the 1980s. In particular, the involvement of Islamists in the anti-apartheid 
struggle in the 1980s and the development of Islamic feminist thought in South Africa – following 
on similar developments in other parts of the world – had a significant influence on the rise of 
Islamic feminisms. I have shown how both these factors were important in assisting the emergence 
of Islamic feminisms in South Africa. 
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The first of these factors was the anti-apartheid struggle of the 1980s which saw the increasing 
involvement of Islamists, especially those involved with Qibla, the Call of Islam and the Muslim 
Youth Movement. One of the results of such involvement was the increasing politicisation of these 
organisations and – in the case of the latter two – the assimilation of ideas, methodologies and 
struggles that they encountered in the struggle into their own programmes. Thus, for example, one 
witnessed in the 1980s a new discourse around Muslims struggling together with non-Muslims and 
around inter-faith cooperation in the struggle for justice. The Islamic discourse around human rights 
and the manner in which such a discourse intersected with the broader national discourse on human 
rights led, I have argued, to an Islamic discourse on women’s rights. 
 
Further, I argued that as feminist agendas developed in the broader South African society as part of 
the anti-apartheid movement, so did one find somewhat parallel agendas in the Muslim community 
– promoted especially by the Call and the MYM. Thus, for example, as the Women’s National 
Coalition assisted in developing the confidence of women in putting forward a feminist agenda and 
feminist demands, a similar confidence was also reflected among Islamic feminists who began more 
forcefully struggling for their own parochial agendas within their community. 
 
By the late 1980s and into the early 1990s, there was an additional important influence that led to 
the rise of Islamic feminisms in South Africa: the development of Islamic feminist thought within 
this country following similar developments in other parts of the world. Islamic feminist literature 
by scholars such as Amina Wadud and Fatima Mernissi became standard reading for the women 
and men who were to become Islamic feminists. The influence of such literature saw the 
development of South African Islamic feminist thought along similar lines. 
 
The above influences gave rise to a range of Islamic feminist activity in South Africa until 1998. 
Most of this centred on the activities of two Muslim organisations: the Muslim Youth Movement 
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(and its Gender Desk) and the Call of Islam. Activities or moments that characterised this phase of 
feminist activity included the campaign for women’s ‘equal access’ to mosques, the Campaign for a 
Just Muslim Personal Law, the publication of the newspaper Al-Qalam, the broadcasts of the 
community radio station The Voice, the matter of Radio Islam which had refused to allow women’s 
voices to be heard on air and the funeral of feminist activist Shamima Shaikh. 
 
Beyond the glorious past 
While the decade of the 1990s witnessed the highpoints of Islamic feminisms in South Africa, I will 
show in the rest of this Chapter that the phenomenon is currently on the wane. What are the critical 
issues that characterise the current weakness of Islamic feminisms in South Africa? Are there any 
possibilities for the revival of an effective Islamic feminist movement? If so, what are the issues 
that will need to be addressed for such potentialities to be realised? These are the questions that 
demand urgent answers if there is to be a revival of Islamic feminisms. I will attempt answers to 
these questions in the hope that this concluding chapter might be the beginning of new and positive 
developments in Islamic feminisms in South Africa. 
 
To answer the above questions I will divide the rest of this Chapter into three sections. In the first of 
these sections I will show why I assert that Islamic feminisms are on the wane in South Africa. The 
next section will present my assessment of some of the critical issues affecting Islamic feminisms in 
South Africa today and the reasons for their extreme weakness. I do not intend to focus on issues 
external to Islamic feminists and their organisations – a task which would yield much useful 
information and which could be explored in another study. I will argue that the most important of 
these issues are internal to the arena of Islamic feminisms and these are the ones that Islamic 
feminists need to urgently focus on. In the third of these three sections I will explore the 
possibilities for Islamic feminisms in the immediate future. I will also, in this Chapter, suggest areas 
within my broad research interest that need further research. 
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And Now? Floundering Feminisms 
‘We thus find that not only is the country in the wilderness, but so is progressive Islam1,’ wrote 
Farid Esack in 1997.
2
 Since Islamic feminism is an expression of progressive Muslims living their 
Islam, Esack’s statement equally applies to Islamic feminisms. And now, at the beginning of the 
next decade (after the 1990s), Islamic feminisms in South Africa are dying in the wilderness! In this 
section I will briefly revisit some of the manifestations of Islamic feminisms as discussed in 
Chapter Two and show that however glorious they might have been in the 1990s, they are now – at 
best – shadows of their former selves, either substantively or symbolically. 
 
At an organisational level, those that were in the forefront of issues Islamic and feminist have not 
taken forward an Islamic feminist project. In the middle of 1996 the Muslim Youth Movement 
decided that its Gender Desk Coordinator would not be a member of its National Executive but 
would be appointed by that executive committee. That was effectively the end of the Gender Desk 
as a national structure. It existed thereafter in stops and starts in the Western Cape. There are no 
records of the new coordinator, Khadija Magardie, having carried out any tasks in that position. Nor 
is there any record of the National Executive attempting to make the Desk accountable for its 
inaction or in any other way until the end of 1999. In November 1999 a national meeting was held 
in Durban with women representatives from the five MYM regions: KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, 
Western Cape, Free State and Gauteng. The meeting was presided over by the organisation’s 
president and deputy president – both men. The purpose of the meeting was to ‘relaunch’ the Desk. 
The relaunch did not take place as the meeting ended up debating the need for such a structure. A 
committee was tasked with examining the possibilities for a Gender Desk and proposing ways to 
move forward. The committee has not met and no report has come from it. While the Desk exists in 
name in the Western Cape, at a national level it is dead. 
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The MYM itself is in a weak position with a lack of human resources and most of the current 
membership being new people who have not been through the old method of education and training. 
Esack wrote in 1997 that ‘while the MYM is still very much alive, even if not always well, in the 
Cape one can safely write out a death certificate for the Call, without the corpse protesting.’3 In 
Gauteng, I venture to add, ‘one can safely write out a death certificate for the Call, even if the 
corpse protests’. The activity of the Call since 1994 has been to publish a pamphlet just before each 
election, calling on Muslims to vote for the African National Congress. The Gauteng Call has plans 
for a low-cost housing project, plans that have existed since 1995.
4
 
 
The ‘Campaign for a Just Muslim Personal Law’ was a flagship campaign for Islamic feminists of 
the 1990s. However, when the South African Law Commission (SALC) Project Team released an 
Issue Paper on MPL in May 2000,
5
 the interventions of the former Islamic feminist activists was 
minimal. The consultation workshops throughout the country that the MYM had promised did not 
materialise. The organisation subsequently decided that the Issue Paper was a step too early in the 
process for it to conduct community workshops on it. 
 
However, many MYM and Call members and other feminists participated in workshops convened 
by the Commission on Gender Equality. And the MYM made a submission to the SALC critiquing 
the Issue Paper. The MYM’s submission reflects its previous positions that any MPL regime must 
have as an objective the granting of substantive rights to women within marriage situations and 
divorces.
6
 
 
Despite the weak response to this new MPL development by these organisations, new Islamic 
feminist initiatives are on the horizon to address MPL. Particularly significant is the formation in 
Cape Town of an organisation called Shurah Yabafazi. The name is a curious mix of the Arabic 
word Shūrāh (consultation) and the Xhosa Yabafazi (with women). The group consists of only 
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women, mostly lawyers. Its objective is to impact on the law reform process regarding MPL. 
Significantly, Shurah hopes to help the debate ‘expand beyond ‘ulama and professionals’ so that 
‘women’s voices are heard’ and ‘the debate is not limited to experts’, according to one of its 
members.
7
 While currently operating only in the Western Cape, the organisation hopes to expand 
into the Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal provinces as well. One of the key people in this initiative is 
Fatima Seedat, parliamentary officer for the Commission on Gender Equality (CGE). She 
coordinated the CGE’s response to the Issue Paper and organised workshops and meetings around it 
in Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg. She also encouraged the formation of a women’s group 
in Durban to look at MPL. 
 
One way in which Islamic feminists in the 1990s were able to raise consciousness around MPL and 
other women’s issues was through the MYM’s newspaper Al-Qalam. From 1997, Al-Qalam’s focus 
on women’s issues decreased. Currently an occasional article or column dealing with women and 
Islam sees the light of day in the paper. Seemingly, the MYM has not developed a new strategy to 
use the paper in the promotion of its Islamic feminist agenda. 
 
The other medium that the organisation controlled or influences, the community radio station The 
Voice still has women’s empowerment as part of its mission. Its mission statement agreed on in 
1999 says: ‘Empowering people to live Islam in a changing society through broadcasting 
excellence.’8 In a document teasing out the implications of this mission and an explication of the 
vision for the station, ‘non-sexism’ is listed as one of the station’s values. ‘In accordance with the 
guidance of the Qur’an we should not tolerate any form of sexism, be it violence against women, 
sexist language or even stereotyping,’ says the document.9 However, on air, the emphasis that The 
Voice had placed in the past on Islamic feminist positions seems to have been watered down. Most 
significantly, its weekday programme “Saut al-Nisa” (Voice of the Women) seems to deliberately 
evade feminist issues. “Breaking the Silence”, the weekly programme about violence against 
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women, is no more. And “Lifting the Veil”, which was the feminist exposition of Islamic scripture 
and the reconstruction of the lives of prominent Muslim women has become a current affairs 
programme. Nevertheless, women still play as important a role in the station as they have since it 
started – at the level of the Trust, staff and volunteers. 
 
One of the flashpoint events of the mid-1990s that resulted in much publicity for Islamic feminists 
was the 1994 lecture of Amina Wadud at the Claremont Main Rd Mosque. This event also saw the 
first South African mosque to arrange ‘equal access to mosque space’ for Muslim women. The 
event – and the mosque – however, did not result in continual re-evaluation among Islamic 
feminists about what the role of women in the mosque should be and how that could be exemplified 
in Claremont. Why did the mosque not take the ‘gender jihad’ further? Was there any further that 
the mosque could have taken the Islamic feminist agenda? Could women have been incorporated 
into the mosque in a more meaningful way? With the emotion raised by the lecture and with the 
spirited defence of the mosque and the person of Wadud by Islamic feminists, one would have 
thought that these questions and this mosque would feature more strongly in their deliberations. 
Women are involved in the activities of the mosque, but the extent of that involvement is somewhat 
ambiguous. 
 
Esack notes how he, after an obituary for Shamima Shaikh that he delivered at the mosque, called 
on the congregation to ‘remove another symbol of gender discrimination in our mosque, by 
enabling the women to move to the front two rows’.10 Since the 1994 lecture, women had shared the 
main space with the men but – for some inexplicable reason – the first two rows remained all-male. 
After Esack’s call, women moved to the front two rows – for just two nights. And, Seedat told me 
that she had felt somewhat uncomfortable at the mosque at times. She gives the example of the talks 
after the Tarawīh prayer. Abdul Rashied Omar, the mosque’s imam until August 2000 and the 
person who was instrumental in planning the 1994 incident, ‘spoke about various things but 
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inevitably the idea that came through was the centrality of the family, normalcy of marriage’11 
which Seedat, as a single woman, could not identify with. She mentions how Omar once 
congratulated his wife on her birthday and followed that with ‘and to all the women who support us 
in what we do’. For her, this is how women have been portrayed – as the supporters. When Omar 
spoke of women, says Seedat, he spoke of them ‘as wives and mothers’, neither of which she could 
relate to. And, since Omar’s leaving the mosque for his studies in the United States, the absence of 
his strength has seen the mosque take an even more cautious approach. 
 
The issue of access to mosques also needs to be addressed in terms of the two congregations in 
Johannesburg mentioned in Chapter Two. The Mayfair congregation fizzled out in 1997. Most of 
the congregants moved to Masjidul Islam, which had facilities for women, albeit in a gallery. It was 
regarded as a somewhat progressive mosque. Also, the mosque had established a practice of having 
women sometimes delivering the pre-khutbah lecture on Fridays – from the upstairs women’s 
section. Nevertheless, the mosque initiated a new ‘Id prayer in 1996 – a prayer on the open field. 
This is not an unusual practice for the ‘Id prayer, but it was the first one organised by Masjidul 
Islam, and it was one of less than five throughout Johannesburg that had facilities for women. 
Significantly, in this instance the women did not pray upstairs (there was no upstairs on the football 
field), nor did they pray behind the men. They prayed alongside the men separated by a two-metre 
swathe of grass. That ‘Id practice continues. And the Masjidul Islam Management Committee took 
a decision early in 2001 to consult with its congregants about the possibility of creating a space for 
women in the mosque’s main section – a la Claremont Main Rd. 
 
This section has attempted to give a brief overview of the current state of the initiatives mentioned 
in Chapter Two as the hallmarks of Islamic feminism in South Africa in the 1990s. I have shown 
that with the exception of a little activity – for example, proposed campaigns around MPL – Islamic 
feminism is virtually non-existent. I will now discuss some of what I regard as the critical issues 
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currently facing the Islamic feminist project in South Africa. These are factors that I believe have 
contributed to the weakness of Islamic feminism that I have written about in this section. 
 
Critical Issues 
In this section I will address some of what I regard as the most critical issues facing Islamic 
feminisms in South Africa today and the reasons for their current virtual impotence. These issues 
derive out of the previous section as well as out of Chapter Two. I will bring these issues together 
into three main groups: the danger of the academicisation of Islamic feminism, the relationship of 
Islamic feminists with the community and the question of male feminists.  
 
In Hallowed Chambers 
In this section, two important points need to be made which refer to the issue of theory. At a 
superficial level these might seem contradictory. However, they most definitely are not. The first 
point is the importance of the development of Islamic feminist theory. The second is with regards to 
my contention that Islamic feminism in South Africa has become an academic pursuit and has 
moved away from its objective of emancipating women and fighting the struggles of women on the 
ground. 
 
Charlotte Bunch says of the significance of developing feminist theory: 
Theory enables us to see immediate needs in terms of long-range goals and an overall 
perspective on the world. It thus gives us a framework for evaluating various strategies in 
both the long and the short run and for seeing the types of changes that they are likely to 
produce. Theory is not just a body of facts or a set of personal opinions. It involves 
explanations and hypotheses that are based on available knowledge and experience.
12
 
 
Bunch highlights here the importance of developing theory for the prosecution of the feminist 
struggle. Her argument applies equally to Islamic feminism. Because of the fundamental basis of 
Islamic feminism being Islamic scripture, the first level at which Islamic feminists need to sharpen 
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their theoretical frameworks is around the notion of developing an Islamic feminist hermeneutic 
with which to approach the Qur’ān and Sunnāh. Much work has been done in this regard 
internationally, even more work remains to be done. Beyond this, however, Islamic feminists in 
South Africa have often been ad-hocist in their efforts to develop theories for the furtherance of 
feminist objectives in this society. Short- and long-term goals have not been well thought through 
and articulated, and strategies have not been carefully developed in order to meet these objectives. 
While the peaks of Islamic feminisms in South Africa were witnessed in the 1990s, the different 
strands of such feminisms did not consolidate themselves; there was no serious internal dialogue 
and no serious critical engagement among feminists themselves on such theoretical issues. Ignoring 
both these levels of theory-development will result in Islamic feminisms in South Africa continuing 
to flounder and come under increasing attack by a conservative expression of Islam that is on the 
rise.
13
 
 
There is, however, an important caveat to my insistence on the importance of developing theory: the 
problem of the increasing academicisation of Islamic feminism in South Africa. I turn now to this 
phenomenon which I regard as dangerous for the agenda of Islamic feminism. In 1997 Esack wrote: 
While progressive Islam in the 1980s was manifested on the streets, in townships, in church 
halls, mosques and in a plethora of organizations, it now seems to be located in the portals 
of academia and in a single mosque.
14
 
 
His lament about ‘progressive Islam’ applies also to Islamic feminism in the late 1990s and the 
present: its location seems to have shifted from the mosques, the debating forums of MPL, the 
media, the house visits, the women’s workshops and other fora where women were challenged to 
consider their positions within Islam to the relatively safer arena of academia. And, despite his 
warning, Esack was one of those responsible for the academicisation of Islamic feminism. His 
‘Islam and Gender Justice’15 and interview with me are both indications of Esack’s own retreat into 
academia away from community activism. 
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Part of the reason for the ‘retreat’16 into academia has been the loss of some of the important 
personalities from the Islamic feminist scene. Sa’diyya Shaikh left South Africa for the United 
States in 1996 to pursue a PhD in religious studies – focusing on women in Islam. Soraya Bosch, 
the feminist lawyer who took up issues and cases of MPL, died in 1997; a few months later, in 
1998, Shamima Shaikh also died. Ebrahim Moosa left South Africa to teach in the United States 
after his house was bombed in 1998, Abdul Rashied Omar followed in 2000 and Farid Esack left 
the country at the beginning of 2001 to teach at various universities in Europe and the United States 
for two years. The departure of Bosch and the two Shaikhs severely affected the activist component 
of the Islamic feminist project. In the absence of on-the-ground activities, Islamic feminists began 
to rely on academic discourse to give them a sense of existence. 
 
One negative aspect of the increasing academicisation is the focus on theory as opposed to a focus 
on women. Chandra Talpade Mohanty
17
 makes valuable arguments for why women’s local and 
lived situations need to be always researched when developing theories about women’s oppression 
and the alleviation of that oppression. ‘Feminist scholarship… is not the mere production of 
knowledge about a certain subject. It is a directly political and discursive practice,’18 she writes. 
 
Sa’diyya Shaikh’s dissertation19 is a good example of the attempt to provide theoretical 
understandings of the practical situation that Muslim women find themselves in, while deriving 
knowledge of that practical situation from the affected women themselves. She examines the 
situation of Muslim women in the Western Cape that are survivors of domestic violence and 
theorises how such violence fits into different Muslim discourses. The MYM Gender Desk’s 
questionnaire project also attempted to achieve a similar objective. Hundreds of questionnaires were 
distributed to Muslim women throughout the country on a random basis. The questions related to 
issues of marriage and divorce and asked women directly what their feelings were regarding issues 
of patriarchy in the family, polygyny, divorce, etc. The Desk hoped that the results of the 
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questionnaires would guide its activities and direct it to focus on areas of work that Muslim women 
themselves felt strongly about. The academicisation of Islamic feminisms that has existed in South 
Africa in the last three years of the 1990s has largely ignored the need to develop empirical research 
about the lived experiences of Muslim women and about their needs and interests. The result could 
easily become one where Muslim women are told what they should want by academics rather than 
them deciding that for themselves. 
 
Some of the other results of the increasing academicisation of Islamic feminism will be shown in 
the next sections when I discuss the weakness of various structures that were involved in the 
feminist project, the distance from the community and the role of men.  
 
Structures 
Islamic feminisms in South Africa are more than just a few prominent organisations; they also 
manifest themselves in various organisations that might not be themselves feminist and among 
various individuals within Muslim society. Nevertheless, their most visible manifestations have 
been through particular organisations, most notably the Call of Islam and the Muslim Youth 
Movement (MYM) – in the case of the latter, mainly through its Gender Desk. Further, the two 
media organisations linked to the MYM – Al-Qalam and The Voice – have also played key roles in 
the Islamic feminist arena. All of these structures have become increasingly ineffectual after 1997 
in promoting the Islamic feminist agenda. As a result of these organisational weaknesses, there have 
been no clear definitions of new objectives, new campaigns and new strategies forthcoming from 
the Islamic feminist camp. As I have shown above, the current state of Islamic feminisms is 
therefore extremely weak. 
 
One reason for the current state is the inability of the two organisations with the most potential as 
regards Islamic feminism – the Call and the MYM – to work cooperatively. While there was 
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cooperation around issues related to the Muslim Personal Law Board, that cooperation was not 
translated into more concrete unity. The MPL Board provided a convenient conjuncture for the two 
to come together in more meaningful ways. However, 
the Call, misjudging the durability of its struggle pedigree and burdened with a misplaced 
political arrogance, played the difficult suitor. The Call also misread the leadership orientation 
of the MYM and overestimated the modernist, as opposed to the liberative, element therein.
20
 
 
As pointed out in Chapter Four, the main reason for the Call-MYM merger not taking place was the 
Call’s concern about the ‘ultra-radical’ position of the MYM towards women’s issues. 
 
The Community, Comrades, The Community! 
‘The community’ was a common refrain used by anti-apartheid activists in the 1980s. Such activists 
often spoke on behalf of ‘the community’; often such representation was assumed rather than 
bestowed. But the passionate sentiment was always to do that which was supposedly good for the 
community, that which the community wanted. Of course, the fact that the activists lived within ‘the 
community’ meant that they were plugged in to the pulse of ‘the community’. A similar link with 
the pulse of Muslim women by Islamic feminists has been missing in the last few years of the 
1990s. This is, of course, linked to the issue of the academicisation of Islamic feminisms. 
 
The first issue to be mentioned here is that of the consultation with the community of Muslim 
women. This issue was mentioned earlier when I referred to the question of the academicisation of 
Islamic feminisms and raised the concern about Islamic feminist theory developing in isolation 
from the needs of women as proposed by them. 
 
While it might be comfortable and easy (for feminists themselves) for Islamic feminisms to be 
developed as a safe space outside of society, that is not what the objective of feminism should be. 
Jeanne Gross responded to Mary Daly’s call to give up ‘the securities offered by the patriarchal 
system’ and to create new space that would be women-centred by writing: 
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Creating a ‘counterworld’ places an incredible amount of pressure on the women who 
attempt to embark on such a project. The pressure comes from the belief that the only true 
resource for such an endeavour are ourselves. The past which is totally patriarchal is viewed 
as irredeemable… 
If we go about creating an alternative culture without remaining in dialogue with others (and 
the historical circumstances that give rise to their identity) we have no reality check for our 
goals. We run the very real risk that the dominant ideology of the culture is re-duplicated in 
the feminist movement through cultural imperialism.
21
 
 
The Mayfair congregation was one such alternative space that was created by Islamic feminists. It 
was perhaps inevitable that it did not last for more than two years. As hooks commented about 
Western feminism: ‘Equating feminist struggle with living in a counter-cultural, woman-centred 
world erected barriers that closed the movement off from most women.’22 Sad at leaving their 
comfortable space, the members of that Johannesburg congregation were nevertheless not unhappy 
about rejoining with the rest of the community in order to prosecute their feminist struggle with 
ordinary Muslim women. 
 
Further, the attitude of doing things for the marginalized (women, in this instance) rather than with 
them at their own pace runs the risk of any imagined gains being reversed by the women who are 
the supposed beneficiaries of those gains. In 1997, thousands of Muslim women signed a petition 
supporting the position of Radio Islam of excluding women’s voices from being broadcast. Esack 
asked about this: ‘Will this be another case of the masses cheering while their “liberators” are being 
fed to the lions?’23 The crucial question is not whether the women will cheer at the deaths of ‘their 
liberators’, but, rather, whether the action of a few activists on behalf of those women – without 
having worked with those women about the need for such action – is really the liberation of such 
women. Can activists and intellectuals assume the responsibility to decide what the paradigm of 
women’s liberation should be without engaging with those women about their understanding of 
their liberation? ‘How connected to women and their concerns are these progressive Muslims?’ 
Esack correctly asked.
24
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Earlier, I noted an incident from the Claremont Main Rd Mosque which has relevance here as well. 
Esack referred to the incident at the mosque which happened after the death of Shamima Shaikh. He 
and Firdouza Waggie had opened up the front two rows for women to be able to pray right to the 
front of the mosque. The women used the two rows for the two nights that he was at the mosque, he 
said. When he left, the situation reverted to what it had been. According to Esack: 
I felt a bit like a presumptuous White trade unionist wanting to organise Black farmworkers in a 
couple of days and then fleeing back to the comfort of his trendy suburb after a nice speech to 
the workers, leaving them to deal with the farmers.
25
 
 
This incident highlights the need for Islamic feminists to locate themselves within the community 
which they claim to work with and for. Not having a rootedness to a community and then claiming 
to be working on its behalf would yield the kind of result Esack laments. Also, Islamic feminists 
have themselves to blame when they do not engage in the most important task of consciousness-
raising among the women they claim to want to emancipate or uplift. It is important to note that the 
Claremont women that Esack refers to were not left to the mercies of the equivalent of a ‘white 
farmer’. Instead, they were left to the mercies of their own consciences and that of a ‘progressive’ 
mosque committee. And yet there was a reversal of his action. 
 
Two important questions are raised by Esack’s story. Firstly, have Islamic feminists become 
contented with making symbolic points rather than engaging in the substantive tasks of education 
and consciousness-raising for women about their roles and rights? Secondly, why should Islamic 
feminists expect that their actions would be defended by people who do not understand the reasons 
for those actions? Further, the reality is that it is much easier for the activists and academics to 
extricate themselves from a dangerous situation than it is for the ordinary women who are called 
upon to take radical actions. The ‘flight’ of Moosa, Omar and now Esack bear testimony to this. 
The tenuous link and commitment to the community of women that Islamic feminists claim to be 
striving for is a critical issue. 
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But Men are Not Women 
There are very few women interpreters in the history of Islam because women are seen to be the 
subject of the Islamic shari’a and not its legislators. Yet even the few interpreters who have 
appeared during the long history of Islam have been kept at the periphery, their views never 
allowed to influence Islamic legislation. Moreover, even men interpreters who were open-
minded about women were marginalized and, in some cases, found their authority questioned.
26
 
 
Shaaban’s observation above is an important note when considering the significant role that men 
have played in the development of Islamic feminisms in South Africa. While women themselves 
took the ‘frontline’ in the Islamic feminist struggle in the 1990s – as shown in earlier chapters – the 
seeds for this were, to a large extent, sown by men who were concerned about Islamic resurgence 
but whose primary focus was not necessarily feminism or women’s rights. As with the emergence 
of Islamic feminisms in various parts of the Muslim world,
27
 in South Africa too their emergence 
owes much to Muslim men. It was men who began the process of deconstructing scriptural 
interpretations of women. It was also men that started the organisations that ‘allowed’ women 
greater space and allowed them to express their feminisms. And, as in various parts of the Muslim 
world, in South Africa too women then took up the issue of their emancipation and began 
articulating their own scriptural interpretations and encouraging ‘reading the Qur’ān as a woman’28. 
In many – though not all – instances, women then took the issue of their emancipation further than 
the men would dare to. While the acknowledgement of the role of men in this process is important, 
it is even more important to realise that men are not women and that this fact is important when 
evaluating Islamic feminisms and discussing the future of this phenomenon.  
 
Margot Badran wrote of the men that assisted in the emergence of feminisms in Egypt that, ‘While 
women were motivated by reflection upon their own lives and in the first instance sought improved 
conditions for themselves, men began more abstractly.’29 The ‘more abstractly’ for many South 
African Muslim men was the engagement with the texts – often an exciting endeavour in itself – 
rather than engagement with the reality of women’s oppression. A sentiment expressed at a national 
MYM meeting in 1996 holds true for many men: 
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Women and women’s issues are important enough on their own as a focus for the MYM, given 
the raw deal women get in the Muslim community and the broader society. However, for the 
MYM they also take on a particularly important status because women’s issues are the main 
battleground and also the beacon in the battle between Islamic Progressiveness and 
Conservatism. Thus this as a focus for the MYM serves as a way of taking forward the project 
of Progressive Islam in South Africa.
30
 (Emphasis mine.) 
 
For men, women’s rights is often ‘a way of taking forward’ some other project. It might be 
‘Progressive Islam’ or the struggle against apartheid (as seen in Chapter Four). Fatima Seedat issues 
a similar concern when she talks about ‘Progressive Islam appropriating the women’s issue’.31 The 
fact that Islamic feminist women in the 1990s began to take charge of the feminist agenda was a 
positive development. It also reflected the new confidence that the women had in their Islam and 
the importance they gave to their experiences as women. The discussion in Chapter Two about the 
MPL Board is a good indication of this new initiative. Incidentally, the phrase ‘as women’ was one 
that was often used in the 1990s. One example was the insistence by the Call and MYM that a 
sector that should be represented on the MPL Board was ‘women, as women’. Fully realising that 
such women might not promote a progressive (and pro-women) agenda on the board, they 
nevertheless felt it was a principled position to take that in an area where women had been largely 
excluded, they should be represented ‘as women’ and not only through different organisations. 
 
Islamic feminist women seemed to be quite sensitive to the sometime-ambiguous role of men. 
Shamima Shaikh, in what has come to be regarded as her final testimony on women’s rights, made 
a statement that men who regard themselves as Islamic feminists would do well to note: 
Another problem is that men write women into their experiences. For a long time men have 
been writing about women, men have been writing the interpretations. Even if a progressive 
man writes about women, it’s from a male perspective. They write us into their experiences. 
Ebrahim Moosa experiences life much differently than I do. He’s progressive, fine! But I’d 
rather Firdouza [Waggie, at the time the MYM Gender Desk coordinator in the Western 
Cape] wrote it. It would be more real. Our experiences are different because we’re in an 
oppressive situation.
32
 
 
And such sensitivity is not due just to theoretical considerations about the role of women in feminist 
struggles but based on experience as well. Fatima Nordien, hailed as the woman who forcefully 
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raised the issue of women’s leadership within the MYM and as the first woman on the 
organisation’s national executive,33 did not stand for a second term as Western Cape regional 
chairperson. She felt intimidated by ‘ambitious males’ in the MYM, new entrants who were 
‘growing up and very ambitious people’.34 She also spoke about the personal costs to her of being a 
feminist. While a student activist and beyond, she was often told that ‘someone like you’ would not 
be able to get married because men were not comfortable with a woman as strong and assertive as 
she.
35
 These personal costs are not experienced by the men – particularly the male academics for 
whom ‘feminist’ credentials are very useful. 
 
The tensions around the role of male Islamic feminists were raised several times during my 
interviews for this Research Report – including by some men themselves.36 When asked about the 
role of men in the arena of Islamic feminism, Tahir Sitoto was extremely cautious and reluctant to 
comment. ‘I’m not sure about men,’ he said. 
Of course Farid Esack comes up, yourself perhaps. I’m reluctant to name the others based on a 
simple fact and that is that perhaps at the level of public discourse they took up these issues but 
to what extent did they apply this in their lives? Did we allow the conventions to dictate how 
they should react and respond? And hence I’m not comfortable with coming up with a list of 
names.
37
 
 
Sitoto’s allusion to the private-public divide is an important one. Men’s ‘feminism’ seems to often 
manifest itself publicly while in private their patriarchy comes to the fore. For women, of course, 
patriarchy is all-pervasive and their feminism needs to be asserted at all levels. 
 
Esack refers to those men who think they are ‘doing women a favour’ by their feminism. There is a 
tension, he says, between ‘where their heads are and where their hearts are. Their heads are with 
gender justice but not their hearts.’38 He also makes the private-public distinction about such men, 
saying that the way many of them treat their own wives is as if they were patriarchs. For many of 
them, he argues, an Islamic feminist discourse is ‘trendy’ and ‘no different from Whites who pay lip 
service to affirmative action’. However, he has also been criticised for treating women 
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condescendingly and for deciding what is good for women. Further, his recollection of the history 
of women in the organisation he founded, the Call of Islam, is important to note. Asked about 
women’s leadership in the Call, he said that the Call had four founder members39 who ‘owned the 
organisation’. ‘Men were in charge of the organisation; it was men who preached the gender 
equality message,’ he asserted. While his version seems to be incorrect in that the Call did have 
(even if just de jure rather than de facto, which is possibly what Esack suggests) women in its 
leadership (see Chapter Two), it is significant that this is his recollection. Does it imply that despite 
the fact that women were in the leadership positions of his organisation, he did not place much 
value on that leadership? 
 
Firdouza Waggie
40
 also spoke passionately about certain men known to be in the forefront of the 
Islamic feminist struggle. She gave an example of a woman from her divorce support group who 
she referred to a prominent male who is known for his pro-women positions. Waggie was extremely 
angry at his response, which favoured the husband and told the woman that she would be better off 
with him and that she should return to him – despite the fact that the woman wanted a divorce. 
Waggie also refers to the period when she was a coordinator of the MYM Gender Desk and the 
response of a male national executive member that the task of the Desk was to simply deal with 
‘women’s issues’ and not more broadly the issues of gender. She says the Gender Desk was perhaps 
‘too ambitious’ because the men ‘were not ready for it. Men in the organisation did not see it as 
mainstream MYM work. Men felt threatened by the Gender Desk.’ 
 
Such ambiguity among men was present throughout the 1990s. In 1993, with the 23
rd
 Street Mosque 
incident which gave an impetus for the formation of the MYM Gender Desk, there was vacillation 
among the men in the MYM. That was the reason that neither the pamphlet issued by the ‘23rd 
Street Women’s Jamaat’ nor the article about the incident in Al-Qalam41 even mentioned the MYM 
or the leading involvement in the action by Shamima Shaikh – a national executive member of the 
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MYM. The MYM – not ready for the criticism that would inevitably follow this action – distanced 
itself from the action by its silence. Not long after this incident the Weekly Mail & Guardian
42
 
published an article examining Shaikh’s ideas about the issue of women in mosques and her 
involvement in the 23
rd
 Street Mosque incident. Two Transvaal (male) regional executive members 
publicly distanced themselves from their chairperson and her views. 
 
Perhaps the most damning criticism of the role that men had played in the emergence of Islamic 
feminisms in South Africa in the 1990s is an article soon to be published as a chapter in a book by 
Amina Wadud.
43
 She writes about her experience in Cape Town in 1994 when she delivered the 
lecture at the Friday prayer at the Claremont Main Rd Mosque – the first woman to perform such an 
act in South Africa. She writes about how she – as a woman – felt marginalized by the whole 
incident. She was not properly consulted about the issue, she contends. But, her main criticism is 
that the organisers of the event and the progressive Muslim men were more concerned with form 
than with substance. They were not interested, she argues, in the content of what she said but only 
with the fact that she was saying it. She quotes Esack, for example, as telling her – when she asked 
him after the lecture what he had thought about it, ‘Honestly, I didn’t listen,’ because he was too 
elated by the fact that a woman had delivered the lecture. For her, it was another way in which a 
woman was marginalized and her voice not listened to. For her,  the message of her experience was 
that South African (male) progressives were saying: ‘Our struggle to eradicate the formality of 
gender disparity in Islamic public ritual leadership in South Africa is the struggle that all Muslim 
women should embrace’ even ‘if the cost was our very womanhood’.44 
 
Many of the organisers of the event and other observers might take objection to some of her 
assumptions and conclusions – as I would too, as a keen observer of that event. However, the 
important point for us is the feeling of marginalization that a woman was left with after such an 
important interaction with male Islamic feminists. It was a feeling which led her to lament: 
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The conservatives allow me to maintain my womanhood, as long as I don’t try to be fully 
human. The progressives allow me to be fully human, as long as I am not too much woman. 
What a choice. I prefer to reject both limitations.  I perceive of myself as fully equal in my 
humanity as I am embodied in my womanhood.
45
 
 
I have addressed in this section some of what I regard as the most critical issues currently facing 
Islamic feminisms in South Africa. With Islamic feminisms now facing an impasse, these are 
issues, I believe, that need urgent attention if there is to be a revival of Islamic feminist discourse 
and action within the Muslim community in South Africa. 
 
Conclusion 
In this concluding Chapter I have argued that Islamic feminisms in South Africa are currently weak 
and floundering. There are various reasons for this. I have highlighted some of the more critical 
issues. Any attempt at reviving Islamic feminisms and moving forward beyond the peak of this 
phenomenon in South Africa – in the mid-1990s – requires close attention, in my opinion, to these 
issues. I raised concerns around the questions of the academicisation and the organisational 
weakness of Islamic feminisms, the distance that has developed between Islamic feminists and 
ordinary women on whose behalf they claim to act and the often ambiguous roles played by men in 
the Islamic feminist struggle. While I discussed these issues in this Chapter, they are really a 
distillation of the earlier chapters. 
 
In moving forward, the question is, how might Islamic feminists address these critical issues. I do 
not claim to be able to answer all these questions and will not attempt to do that in this conclusion. 
Nevertheless, I wish to raise a few points related to these critical issues. 
 
For me, the most important factor in attempting to find resolution to the above critical issues is to 
re-place women at the centre. The most consistent effect of the above issues is the displacement of 
women from the centre. This displacement might be in favour of men, theory, politics or 
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organisational expediency. But the result is always this displacement of women. Put in another way, 
women are marginalized for the sake of these other factors. Women then become ‘the gendered 
other’46 and their voices become the voices of the other. This language of otherness implies, of 
course, that the male is the norm. 
The point is neither to subsume other women under one’s own experience nor to uphold a 
separate truth for them. Rather, it is to allow them to be while recognising that what they are 
is just as meaningful, valid and comprehensible as what we are…. Indeed, when feminists 
essentially deny other women the humanity they claim for themselves, they dispense with 
any ethical constraint. They engage in the act of splitting the social universe into us and 
them, subjects and objects.
47
 
 
While Lazreg writes in the above paragraph about the othering of Third World women by Western 
women, the same warning applies to Third World feminists themselves in their relations with each 
other, as Mohanty reminds us.
48
 
 
Sometimes feminists (and I am particularly referring here to Islamic feminists in South Africa – 
male and female) talk as if they know better what women want and need than the women 
themselves. While I do not deny the existence of false consciousness, I also believe that women 
must speak for themselves and be heard. Abdulkader Tayob raises an interesting question about 
women’s right to work – a right that Islamic feminists often fight for. Firstly, almost all women do 
work –whether in or outside the house. Secondly, he points out that while women’s work outside 
the house might be a big issue in middle class situations, in working class communities in the 
Western Cape, for example, where most women do work outside the home, they might not be as 
enthusiastic about ‘the right to work’ and might actually prefer ‘the right not to work’.49 
 
It is therefore important that Islamic feminists focus more attention on empirical research which 
allows women to speak for themselves about their experiences. 
Since the basis of Islamic history has been patriarchal, we must make a concerted effort to 
correct the imbalance this has caused in the ummah. We need to give ear to women and 
women’s experiences, not forming a new consideration of Islam, but forming a new public 
voice.
50
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Sometimes, feminists themselves could be surprised at the results of such an exercise. I remember 
in the mid-1980s the lone but consistent voice of Zuleikha Mayat at MYM public meetings, 
protesting at the MYM’s policy of segregating men and women in such a way that women were 
often disadvantaged – for example, seating women in the gallery of a hall while the men were 
seated in the main hall. Hardly anyone would regard Mayat as a feminist, nor would she regard 
herself as such.
51
 Wadud warns that: 
If gender bias in Islamic practices is ever to be genuinely removed, women need to articulate 
from the center of our own marginality. Those stories need to become models for the over 
arching process of Islam: engaged surrender.
52
 
 
The question of the centring of women is also important in addressing the imprisoning of Islamic 
feminism in academia. Academic discourse about women and Islam itself needs to be tempered in a 
way that it addresses the experiences of disadvantage and oppression that Muslim women face 
rather than addressing only ‘abstract’ questions. Women’s experiences and voices need to be 
granted greater importance. While I regard the issue of the centring of women as the most 
fundamental issue in the attempt to revive Islamic feminism in South Africa, other issues also need 
to be addressed. I turn to some of these now. 
 
From the early years of the MYM, the organisation had spent a great deal of energy and effort in 
setting up institutions. Many of these subsequently became independent organisations.
53
 Some of 
those organisations are today important and entrenched parts of the communal life of Muslims in 
South Africa.
54
 From the late-1980s the MYM began paying less attention to setting up such 
institutions and began to shed them from its organisational stable. This experience points to an 
important lesson: the institutionalism of certain communal objectives has often resulted in such 
objectives and projects developing lives of their own and growing in independent directions which 
allowed the original objectives to be better achieved. Unfortunately, no such thought of 
institutionalisation was given by Progressive Muslims to the project of Islamic feminism. Perhaps 
this is an opportune time for such an idea to be mooted, for an institution/s to be created to develop 
 125 
Islamic feminisms and take them forward with a dedicated group of people. I will not propose what 
form such institutionalisation might take; such proposals can only be developed through intense 
debate and consultation. 
 
The final proposal I would like to make relates to the need for further research. This Research 
Report scrapes the surface of a range of extremely important areas and what it does, in fact, is to 
issue the demand for much more research in these areas. While I considered some important 
manifestations of Islamic feminisms in South Africa in the 1990s, I omitted an important area from 
that spectrum. I would argue that Islamic feminisms exist in not-so-overt ways in various niches of 
Muslim society. The possibility of such existence and the ways in which they are manifested needs 
close examination. I think here of the assertiveness of women within organisations like Pagad. The 
women and men in such an organisation might baulk at the idea of their being called feminists. 
Nevertheless, the fact is that Pagad, as an example, has affected the relations between women and 
men even in the private sphere by bringing women out onto the streets.
55
 The assertiveness of 
women in this scenario would make for interesting study. 
 
Another fascinating study would relate to the results – after two years – of Radio Islam’s ‘allowing’ 
women broadcasters to go on air. What effect has this development had on the women involved? 
And on the men? How has it affected the notion of gendered space in a public structure like a radio 
station and how has it affected Radio Islam and its listeners’ perceptions of the acceptability of 
women’s activity outside the home? How do they now relate to the idea of listening to women’s 
voices when in 1998 they still regarded such an act as being prohibited? Do women really have an 
authentic voice on Radio Islam? What are the possibilities for Islamic feminists exploiting this 
space that has been ‘given to’ women? 
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The development of an Islamic feminist hermeneutic is an important and necessary endeavour. 
There has been work done on this internationally; however, much more study is required to develop 
such a hermeneutic. A comprehensive theory of the texts, together with specific feminist 
approaches to these texts, is necessary. Such an effort would develop a hermeneutic for the Qur’ān, 
the  ad th and Muslim history. 
 
Islamic feminisms in South Africa are not quite dead. There might have been a temporary coma 
afflicting feminists, but there are signs of resuscitation. That a group of women have taken their 
own initiative to set up an organisation to deal with the question of Muslim Personal Law
56
 is an 
indication that while the strong, aggressive and public positions of the mid-1990s have been absent 
in the past few years, the fervour for an Islamic feminist project has persisted. 
 
Phambili Makhosikazi, Phambili!!! 
Forward Women, Forward!!! 
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Appendix A 
 STATEMENT BY THE 23RD STREET MOSQUE  
 WOMEN’S JAMAAH 
 
In the Name of Allah, Most Gracious, The Dispenser of Grace 
Statement by the 23
rd
 Street Mosque Women’s Jamaah 
(28 Ramadan 1413) 
Muslim women in the Transvaal have been for long denied our right of performing our salah in 
jamaah. We were thus very grateful to the trustees of the 23
rd
 Street Mosque last year when special 
facilities were provided for us on the 27
th
 Ramadan. 
 
This year Muslim women have been performing salah at this mosque on this level since the 1
st
 
Ramadan. We exercised great tolerance, especially on the first night, just so that we could fulfil this 
Sunnah of our Nabi Muhammad (saw). On the first night we were shouted at, intimidated, and some 
women’s salah was broken, after which they left to perform salah at another mosque over five 
kilometres from here. We did not expect such behaviour from a trustee of a mosque. Yet we 
continued attending salah here, and this practice enhanced our appreciation of Ramadan. 
 
Last night we were shocked and disappointed that after performing tarawih here for 26 nights we 
were forced to offer our salah behind the mosque in a marquee with wet mats. There were about 
150 women, and there would have been enough space here for all of us. 
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What hurts us is that while we had performed salah here for the whole month, and many of us 
arrived at 7:30pm last night, men that arrived late – many of whom had possibly not regularly 
attended the tarawih – got preferential treatment and performed their salah in the area we had, we 
believe, earned through our perseverance. Why were the late men not directed to the marquee? 
 
It is about time that our community, especially the men, begins educating itself about issues that are 
crucial to our lives and survival as a community. Women and children are not second-class citizens 
to be denied access to mosques, to be hushed up whenever we begin talking, and to be shunted 
around at the whims of men. 
 
It is the Grace of Allah that liberated women through Islam 1400 years ago. It was this expression 
of Allah’s Grace that the Prophet Muhammad (saw) ordered that women not be prevented from 
attending mosques. 
 
We will not depend on the grace of some men above that of Allah. We have performed salah here 
for this month and will continue to perform salah here in the months to come. This mosque does not 
belong to a committee, or to the men in our community; it belongs to the whole community: 
children, women and men. 
 
Women’s attendance at this mosque for all salawat will, insha Allah, become a regular feature! 
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Appendix B Memorandum to the IBA 
 IN DEFENCE OF A POSITIVE IMAGE OF ISLAM: 
 THE ISSUE OF WOMEN’S VOICES 
 
This was a memorandum drawn up by a group of progressive Muslims and submitted to the 
Independent Broadcasting Authority during the controversy surrounding Radio Islam’s decision not 
to allow women to be on air. The memorandum had about 30 signatories from throughout South 
Africa. (February 1998) 
 
In the Name of Allah, The Gracious, the Dispenser of Grace 
 
1. We, the undersigned South African Muslims, are deeply concerned about the message of 
discrimination against women being conveyed by the current controversy around the issue 
of women on radio. 
 
2. Islam is a religion of justice and promotes the equality of men and women. We, therefore, 
believe that discrimination on the basis of gender goes against the very spirit of Islam. 
 
3. We are also concerned about the implications of a discredited minority religious opinion 
that purports that women may not be heard in public. This position implies that women are 
perpetual social minors and goes against the spirit of Islamic teachings. Perpetuating such a 
view not only lacks religious credibility, but militates against the hikmah (wisdom) the 
Qur’an exhorts all Muslims to employ in public life. 
 
4. As citizens, Muslims have made a significant contribution to South Africa’s liberation 
struggle and its general socio-economic development and are an inseparable part of this 
country. The current controversy not only reinforces negative stereotypes that portray Islam 
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as an anti-women religion and all Muslim men being women-hating fundamentalists. It also 
has the potential to erode the positive gains Muslims have made in this country for 
centuries. This is not the best way of exposing others to the beauty of Islam. 
 
5. We urge all Muslims who have just rejuvenated themselves in the holy month of Ramadan 
to continue with the process of social transformation aimed at upholding the dignity and 
equality of all of humankind. This is the vision of the Qur’an and was actively promoted by 
the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him). 
 
6.  We call upon all our Muslim fellow citizens to commit themselves to a democratic South 
Africa with the entrenched ideals of non-racialism and non-sexism and to deal with their 
differences with dignity and integrity. 
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Interviews 
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Waggie, Firdouza. 21 November 2000 
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